Determinants of Moral Judgments Regarding Budgetary Slack:An Experimental Examination of Pay Scheme and Personal Values

We study moral judgments regarding budgetary slack made by participants at the end of a participative budgeting experiment in which an expectation for a truthful budget was present. We find that participants who set budgets under a slackinducing pay scheme, and therefore built relatively high levels of budgetary slack, judged significant budgetary slack to be unethical on average, whereas participants who set budgets under a truth-inducing pay scheme did not. This suggests that the slack-inducing pay scheme generated a moral frame by setting economic self-interest against common social norms such as honesty or responsibility. We also find that participants who scored high in traditional values and empathy on a pre-experiment personality questionnaire (JPI-R) were more likely to judge significant budgetary slack to be unethical. These results suggest that financial incentives play a role in determining the moral frame of the budgeting setting and that personal values play a role in determining how individuals respond to that moral frame

Penal Disenfranchisement

This paper considers the justifiability of removing the right to vote from those convicted of crimes. Firstly, I consider the claim that the removal of the right to vote from prisoners (or serious offenders) is necessary as a practical matter to protect the democratic process from those who have shown themselves to be untrustworthy. Secondly, I look at the claim that offenders have broken the social contract and forfeited rights to participate in making law. And thirdly, I look at the claim that the voting ban is essential part of the justified punishment of serious offenders. These arguments have in common the feature that they attempt to articulate the sense in which rights imply responsibilities, particularly that voting rights should be conditional on one's having met one's civic responsibilities. I argue that the only interpretation of this view that could justify prisoner disenfranchisement is that which thinks of disenfranchisement as fair and deserved retributive punishment for crime. Against widespread opposition to, and confusion about, the importance of retributive punishment, I offer a brief defence. However, I conclude that even if legitimate retributive purposes could in principle justify prisoner disenfranchisement, the significance of disenfranchisement is such that it should be reserved for the most serious crimes. © 2014 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

Internalised Values and Fairness Perception: Ethics in Knowledge Management

This chapter argues for ethical consideration in knowledge management (KM). It explores the effect that internalised values and fairness perception have on individuals’ participation in KM practices. Knowledge is power, and organisations seek to manage knowledge through KM practices. For knowledge to be processed, individual employees—the source of all knowledge—need to be willing to participate in KM practices. As knowledge is power and a key constituent part of knowledge is ethics, individuals’ internalised values and fairness perception affect knowledge-processing. Where an organisation claims ownership over knowledge, an individual may perceive being treated unfairly, which may obstruct knowledge-processing. Through adopting ethical KM practices, individual needs are respected, enabling knowledge-processing. Implications point towards an ethical agenda in KM theory and practice

Modeling medical ethics through intelligent agents

Abstract. The amount of research using health information has in- creased dramatically over the last past years. Indeed, a significative num- ber of healthcare institutions have extensive Electronic Health Records (EHR), collected over several years for clinical and teaching purposes, but are uncertain as to the proper circumstances in which to use them to improve the delivery of care to the ones in need. Research Ethics Boards in Portugal and elsewhere in the world are grappling with these issues, but lack clear guidance regarding their role in the creation of and access to EHRs. However, we feel we have an effective way to handle Medical Ethics if we look to the problem under a structured and more rational way. Indeed, we felt that physicians were not aware of the relevance of the subject in their pre-clinical years, but their interest increase when they were exposed to patients. On the other hand, once EHRs are stored in machines, we also felt that we had to find a way to ensure that the behavior of machines toward human users, and perhaps other machines as well, is ethically acceptable. Therefore, in this article we discuss the importance of machine ethics and the need for machines that represent ethical principles explicitly. It is also shown how a machine may abstract an ethical principle from a logical representation of ethical judgments and use that principle to guide its own behavior

Aquinas on Hating Sin in Summa Theologiae II-II Q34 A3 and I-II Q23 A1

This essay explores the phenomenological features of the passional response to evil that Aquinas calls \u27hatred of sin\u27 in Summa Thelogiae II-II Q34 A3 and I-II Q23 A1, among other places. Social justice concerns and philosophical objections, however, challenge the notion that one can feel hatred toward an agent\u27s vice or sin without it being the agent who is hated. I argue that a careful, contextual reading of these texts shows that Aquinas cannot be read as commending \u27hate\u27 in any form. The texts under consideration offer no comfort to those who appeal to hatred of sin or vice to legitimate sentiments or actions that can be reasonably taken to express hatred of persons

Emotions

Cognitive science has shown that emotions are a sine qua non for cognition, and nowadays emotions are not anymore understood as irrational or “nonintellectual” feelings. The debate regarding the nature of emotions is still ongoing; however, it would be possible to provide a general definition of emotions as complex states of mind and body, which have an active power – they are not characterized only as receptivity – that impacts human’s intentionality towards the environment. The goal of this entry is to highlight the role of emotions in reasoning, focusing on their meaningfulness in learning environments and in those educational practices where emotions work together with rationality to enhance understanding and learning. Following the description of the three main ways to understand emotions in the contemporary philosophy of emotions, this entry will discuss the differences between the standard cognitivist approach and other approaches grounded in the embodied cognition in education