Impact of tillage system on arbuscular mycorrhiza fungal communities in the soil under Mediterranean conditions.

A more diverse arbuscular mycorrhiza (AM) fungal community should be more versatile and resilient to variation in environmental conditions over space and time. To evaluate the effect of no-till and conventional tillage systems, AM fungal diversity was assessed as part of a long term field experiment by sequencing of DNA, extracted from soil, that encoded the large ribosomal sub-unit and was obtained by nested-PCR. In comparison with no-till, conventional tillage decreased AM fungal diversity by 40%. Differences between treatments in the frequency of the operational taxonomic units (OTUs) present in soil, confirm that AM fungi are differently vulnerable to soil disturbance

Cooperation in the shadow of WTO law: why litigate when you can negotiate

In the current multilateral trade regime, members often negotiate under the shadow of WTO law. This article develops a formal explanation of the way in which the credible threat to resort to and the actual use of WTO litigation can influence multilateral trade negotiations. We contend that the ability to impose costs on a defendant by way of litigation increases the complainant’s bargaining power, opening a bargaining window and ultimately increasing the chances for cooperation in multilateral trade negotiations. On the other hand, the complainant’s preference for loss-mitigation over gains from retaliation and its expectations about the likelihood that the defendant will not comply with an adverse ruling can augment the defendant’s bargaining leverage. Thus, contrary to conventional wisdom, increased enforcement does not necessarily make actors shy away from further cooperation, although the credibility of the defendant’s non-compliant threats crucially affects the location of any potential negotiated agreement. Empirically, we show that the argument can account for how Brazil, a potential complainant, and the EU and the US, two potential defendants, approached and bargained agricultural negotiations in the Doha round.In the current multilateral trade regime, members often negotiate under the shadow of WTO law. This article develops a formal explanation of the way in which the credible threat to resort to and the actual use of WTO litigation can influence multilateral trade negotiations. We contend that the ability to impose costs on a defendant by way of litigation increases the complainant’s bargaining power, opening a bargaining window and ultimately increasing the chances for cooperation in multilateral trade negotiations. On the other hand, the complainant’s preference for loss-mitigation over gains from retaliation and its expectations about the likelihood that the defendant will not comply with an adverse ruling can augment the defendant’s bargaining leverage. Thus, contrary to conventional wisdom, increased enforcement does not necessarily make actors shy away from further cooperation, although the credibility of the defendant’s non-compliant threats crucially affects the location of any potential negotiated agreement. Empirically, we show that the argument can account for how Brazil, a potential complainant, and the EU and the US, two potential defendants, approached and bargained agricultural negotiations in the Doha round.Refereed Working Papers / of international relevanc

Scale and zonation effects on internal migration indicators in the United Kingdom

Consistent data from the last two population censuses in the United Kingdom are utilised in this paper to compare migration intensity and impact between two 1‐year periods and to identify the scale and zonation effects on the selected migration indicators. The picture of change that emerges is one of declining migration intensities and a diminution in the distribution of migrants from urban to rural areas, with the exception of students and young workers whose net migration losses from rural areas are increasing and whose migration effectiveness is increasing. Scale effects are more apparent for migration intensity than effectiveness, the two components of the aggregate net migration rate, whereas zonation effects are relatively unimportant across scale for intensity but become more significant as zones become larger for effectiveness

Replication Data for: Civil War Mediation and Integration into Global Value Chains

How does the globalization of production affect interstate behavior? While scholars have paid significant attention to the effect of global value chains on trade and political economy, there has been substantially less focus on the interaction between globalized production and conflict behavior. However, the changing economic landscape has the potential to alter the decision calculus of leaders on a variety of issues, including conflict mediation. In this research note, I argue that when deciding how to allocate scarce mediation resources, major powers pay attention to the position of potential beneficiaries in the global production network. In particular, among states involved in intrastate conflicts, those that are more heavily involved in the production and sale of intermediate inputs are more likely to receive mediation from major powers. I test this argument using data on intermediate trade and civil war mediation between 1991 and 2011. The results of the analysis are consistent with the theory, suggesting that major powers are more likely to provide mediation for producers of intermediate goods, but not for consumers

The Effect of Trust in Government on Rallies 'Round the Flag

Previous research has shown that foreign policy crises can cause a ‘rally ’round the flag’ effect, boosting citizens’ approval of their leaders. While scholars agree on the effect’s existence, its magnitude and nature are less readily apparent. This article considers two factors that have been neglected in previous studies: the context in which a conflict occurs and the public’s level of trust in government. The theory presented here suggests that trust is not only an effect of a rally, but mediates the magnitude of the rally. It also proposes that the nature of the rally will be unaffected by whether the state is provoked by its opponent prior to crisis initiation. The resulting hypotheses are tested using aggregate US public opinion data around international crises, as well as individual-level data from the 1990–92 ANES panel regarding the Persian Gulf War. The analysis indicates that trust in government has a major influence on the size of a rally effect, especially at the individual level. However, trust matters more for those in the opposition than for those who have supported the government in the past. These results suggest implications for understanding public attitudes toward foreign policy and for the diversionary theory of war

Teaching the Enemy: The Empirical Implications of Bargaining Under Observation

This article considers the way in which the likelihood of being observed by others affects a state's conflict behavior. The analysis examines the effect of potential observation on the probability that a dispute will escalate to violence as well as the duration of war and peace. To analyze escalation, I employ the nonparametric local logit model, which frees estimation from restrictive functional form assumptions. The evidence suggests that outside observation can change states' behaviors, and that observers tend to modify their own actions based on what they learn. These results indicate that the typical assumption that international conflict is unobserved and unaffected by outside actors is empirically untenable

Multinational firms, value chains, and trade disputes : explaining dispute onset at the world trade organization

In this paper we aim to explain World Trade Organization (WTO) members’ decision to initiate a dispute at the WTO. Since many potential violations of WTO law remain unchallenged, we explore the conditions under which WTO members complain about only some allegedly WTO-incompatible policies, while leaving a large majority of them unchallenged. While there may be different reasons why governments choose to initiate certain disputes, we are especially interested in the relationship between potential and actual trade disputes on the one hand and the degree of integration into so-called global value chains (GVCs) on the other. We demonstrate that decision-makers are more likely to try and eliminate barriers to cross-border trade by tabling WTO complaints when facing pressures to do so by firms and sectors highly integrated into such GVCs. Potential complainants’ policymakers act strategically when considering whether to initiate a formal dispute. Responding to demands of firms and sectors that are highly integrated in GVCs allows complainants’ policymakers to secure the support of politically powerful domestic constituencies while simultaneously minimizing the administrative burdens and the potential negative externalities for bilateral diplomatic relations that a WTO dispute can bring about. We test our hypothesis by examining data from the US using a binomial logistic regression and Cox proportional hazard model and find that trade barriers are both more likely to be filed as disputes and quicker in being tabled at the WTO in sectors highly integrated into GVCs, while controlling for other factors

A Modern Peace? Schumpeter, the Decline of Conflict, and the Investment–War Trade-Off

Drawing on the writings of Joseph Schumpeter, we develop and explore a new theory of international conflict. We outline a simple mechanism whereby industrialization fosters peace, suggesting that industrialized states are more peaceful because they can gain more by investing at home than by pursuing foreign military conquest. We borrow from Schumpeter to argue that our mechanism is distinct from traditional measures of liberalism. Empirically, we propose a measure of industrial development, based on a state’s economic structure. Using World Bank sector-specific economic data, our exploratory analysis shows that a more industrialized economy significantly reduces the likelihood that a state will be involved in a fatal military conflict. We show that this result is robust across a number of model specifications and independent of both democracy and capitalism. We propose this as an interesting first step toward a broader research program on modernization and conflict

Supplemental Material - Election Accomplished: Democracies and the Timing of Peacekeeper Drawdowns

Supplemental Material for Election Accomplished: Democracies and the Timing of Peacekeeper Drawdowns by Burak Giray and John T. Chatagnier in Political Research Quarterly</p