On the ambidirectionality of Thai mid-scale predicates: How to get more "warm" by getting less "hot"

This paper presents new data on the semantic interaction between gradable predicates and the Thai particle kʰuen. When the particle composes with rɔ́m (hot) and nâ:w (cold), it describes temperature increases and decreases, respectively, in much the same way as English get hotter and get colder. However, when it composes with so-called mid-scale predicates like ʔùn (warm), it can describe increases or decreases, as long as the change is toward temperatures described as ʔùn (warm). We first consider two types of analyses where (i) ʔùn has an inherent central orientation much like English mild or (ii) kʰuen describes changes oriented toward the threshold of the gradable predicate it combines with. We argue against analyses of type (i) and (ii) and show that they predict unattested interpretations

Asymmetry in presupposition projection: The case of conjunction

Is the basic mechanism behind presupposition projection fundamentally asymmetric or symmetric? This is a basic question for the theory of presupposition, and also bears on broader issues concerning the source of asymmetries observed in natural language: are these simply rooted in superficial asymmetries of language use – language use unfolds in time, which we experience as fundamentally asymmetric – or can they be, at least in part, directly referenced in linguistic knowledge and representations? In this paper we aim to make progress on these questions by exploring presupposition projection across conjunction, which has typically been taken as a central piece of evidence that presupposition projection is asymmetric. As a number of authors have recently pointed out, however, whether or not this conclusion is warranted is not clear once we take into account independent issues of redundancy. Building on previous work by Chemla & Schlenker (2012) and Schwarz (2015), we approach this question experimentally by using an inference task which controls for redundancy and presupposition suspension. We find strong evidence for left-to-right filtering across conjunctions, but no evidence for right-to-left filtering,suggesting that, at least as a default, presupposition projection across conjunction is indeed asymmetric

Presupposition projection from the scope of None: Universal, existential, or both?

The nature of presupposition projection from the scope of quantificational expressions, particularly negative ones, continues to be both theoretically and empirically controversial. We experimentally investigate the interpretation of sentences like None of the bears won the race, which could in principle be associated with three projection options, giving rise to: an existential reading, on which at least one of the bears participated and none won; a universal reading, on which all of the bears participated and none won; and a presuppositionless reading on which none of the bears both participated and won. We used a covered box task to investigate English-speaking adults' and children's interpretations of such sentences. The results from the adult participants provide empirical evidence for all three readings; the results from the child participants, however, reveal no evidence for the existential reading. We discuss our results in light of competing theoretical accounts, focusing on options for reconciling the theories with the experimental data from both adults and children

Vague, Présupposition et Jugements de Valeur de Vérité

This thesis aims to jointly account for the non-bivalent truth value judgments, namely judgments which neither correspond to “True” nor to “False”, that are triggered by presuppositional sentences (like 1 in a context where Oscar is not French), vague sentences (like 2 in a context where Oscar is of an average age) or even hybrid sentences (like 3 in the same context).1.Oscar has realized that you are French.2.Oscar is old.3.Oscar has realized that you are old.Drawing on systems defining three logical values (true, false and other) and discussed both in the literature on vagueness and in the literature on presupposition, I develop a system with five totally ordered values, which thus defines three intermediate levels between true and false. After collecting experimental data conflicting with the predictions of this system, I propose a system with four partially ordered values, which is compatible with the experimental results and which defines vagueness and presupposition as entering in relation with truth along distinct specific dimensions.In parallel, I conducted an experiment in collaboration with Paul Égré, which shows that speakers systematically reject contradictory descriptions of the form “old and young” but can accept contradictory descriptions of the form “neither old nor young”, “neither old nor not old” and “old and not old”. These results echo the idea that vague sentences like 1 can be judged “Neither true nor false” but also “True and false”, and allow us to discriminate between two competing theories of antonyms.Cette thèse vise à rendre compte conjointement des jugements de valeurs de vérité non-bivalents, c'est-à-dire des jugements ne correspondant ni à « Vrai » ni à « Faux », déclenchés par des phrases présuppositionnelles (telles que 1 en contexte où Oscar n'est pas français), vagues (telles que 2 en contexte où Oscar est de taille moyenne) ou encore hybrides (telles que 3 dans en contexte où l'interlocuteur est d'âge moyen).1.Oscar a réalisé que tu es français.2.Oscar est vieux.3.Oscar a réalisé que tu es vieux.Sur la base de systèmes logiques définissant trois valeurs de vérité (vrai, faux et autre) proposés dans la littérature sur le vague tout comme dans la littérature sur la présupposition, j'élabore dans un premier temps un système à cinq valeurs de vérité ordonnées, qui définit ainsi trois paliers intermédiaires entre le vrai et le faux. Suite à l'obtention de résultats expérimentaux incompatibles avec les prédictions de ce système, je propose dans un deuxième temps un système à quatre valeurs de vérité non ordonnées, compatible avec les résultats et qui place cette fois le vague et la présupposition sur des dimensions distinctes.Une expérience menée avec Paul Égré établit par ailleurs que les locuteurs rejettent systématiquement des descriptions contradictoires comme « vieux et jeune », mais qu'ils peuvent accepter des descriptions contradictoires comme « ni vieux ni jeune », « ni veux ni pas vieux » et « vieux et pas vieux ». Ces résultats confortent l'idée qu'une phrase vague comme 1 peut être jugée « Ni vraie ni fausse » mais aussi « Vraie et fausse », et nous permettent de discriminer entre deux approches concurrentes de l'antonymie adjectivale

Classes

Class material about Ibex and the new PennControlle

Le Vague, la présupposition et les valeurs de jugements de vérité

The aim of my thesis is to give a uniform account of non-bivalent truth-value judgments induced by presuppositional expressions and by vague expression (namely judgments other than "True" or "False"). For example, a presuppositional sentence like 1 below is typically judged neither true nor false in a context where Oscar is not French, and a vague sentence like 2 is also reported as neither true or nor false in a context where Oscar is of an average height. The same holds of a hybrid sentence like 3, combining a vague adjective and a presuppositional expression, in a context where the interlocutor is of an average height:1. Oscar has realized that you are French.2. Oscar is old.3. Oscar has realized that you are old. Abstract:Drawing on systems defining three logical values (true, false and other) and discussed both in the literature on vagueness and in the literature on presupposition, I propose a system with five totally ordered values, thereby defining three intermediate levels between true and false.After collecting experimental data conflicting with the predictions of this system, I propose a system with four values which is compatible with the experimental results and where the four values are partially ordered along a dimension specific to vagueness and along a dimension specific to presupposition.To get further insights about truth-value judgments specific to vagueness, I conducted another set of experiments (in collaboration with Paul Égré), showing that speakers systematically reject contradictory descriptions of the form "old and young" but that they can accept contradictory descriptions of the form "neither old nor young", "neither old nor not old" and "old and not old". These results echo the idea that vague sentences like 1 can be judged "Neither true nor false" but also "True and false", and allow us to discriminate between two competing theories of adjectival antonyms.Cette thèse vise à rendre compte conjointement des jugements de valeurs de vérité non-bivalents, c'est-à-dire des jugements ne correspondant ni à « Vrai » ni à « Faux », déclenchés par des phrases présuppositionnelles (telles que 1 en contexte où Oscar n'est pas français), vagues (telles que 2 en contexte où Oscar est de taille moyenne) ou encore hybrides (telles que 3 en contexte où l'interlocuteur est de taille moyenne).1. Oscar a réalisé que tu es français.2. Oscar est vieux.3. Oscar a réalisé que tu es vieux.Sur la base de systèmes logiques définissant trois valeurs de vérité (vrai, faux et autre) proposés dans la littérature sur le vague tout comme dans la littérature sur la présupposition, j'élabore dans un premier temps un système à cinq valeurs de vérité ordonnées, qui définit ainsi trois paliers intermédiaires entre le vrai et le faux.Suite à l'obtention de résultats expérimentaux incompatibles avec les prédictions de ce système, je propose dans un deuxième temps un système à quatre valeurs de vérité non ordonnées, compatible avec les résultats et qui place cette fois le vague et la présupposition sur des dimensions distinctes. Une expérience menée avec Paul Égré établit par ailleurs que les locuteurs rejettent systématiquement des descriptions contradictoires comme « vieux et jeune », mais qu'ils peuvent accepter des descriptions contradictoires comme "ni vieux ni jeune", "ni veux ni pas vieux" et "vieux et pas vieux". Ces résultats confortent l'idée qu'une phrase vague comme 1 peut être jugée "Ni vraie ni fausse" mais aussi "Vraie et fausse", et nous permettent de discriminer entre deux approches concurrentes de l'antonymie adjectivale

Documentation for PennController

This is the documentation for the IBEX library PennController. The library is currently in its beta development stage, which means it is not ready to be shared with a large audience yet, as important bugs may remain

Returning to non-entailed presuppositions again

Recent work by Sudo (2012) and Klinedinst (2016) proposes a new perspective on differences between classes of presupposition triggers, with an empirical split roughly mirroring Abusch’s (2002) hard vs. soft distinction and related notions. These two authors propose that triggers differ in whether or not their presuppositional content simultaneously affects the calculation of the presuppositions and of the entailments of the sentences in which they appear. Drawing on a proposal by Glanzberg (2005) we formulate the Removability/Independence Hypothesis: triggers that do not affect entailments are triggers that can be left out of sentences without affecting interpretability. We experimentally test the hypothesis by embedding 'return', '(go) again' and '(go) back' in non-monotonic environments, which Sudo argues to elicit differences in presuppositions and entailments. Our results provide clear evidence against the RI hypothesis: whereas only the trigger 'return' is crucial for the sake of interpretability, all three triggers produced similar results. At the same time, data for the triggers 'stop' and 'also', included as controls, lend further support in favor of Sudo’s entailment-contrast proposal

Interpreting presuppositions in the scope of quantifiers: 'every' vs. 'at least one'

This paper experimentally investigates presupposition projection from the scope of the quantifiers every and at least one, as triggered by the factive verb be aware and the iterative adverb again. The first issue we are concerned with is whether presuppositions project universally or existentially from quantified sentences. Different theoretical accounts endorse opposing views here (e.g., Heim, 1983; Geurts, 1999; Beaver, 2001; Schlenker, 2008, 2009; Fox, 2012), while recent experimental work (Chemla, 2009; Tiemann, 2014) suggests that the force of the projected presupposition varies by quantifier. The second issue we look at is how the descriptively observed readings arise—in particular, as a direct result output from the projection mechanism, or via additional, independent mechanisms such as domain restriction (e.g., Geurts and van Tiel, 2016): if the domain of the quantifier is restricted, this can yield what looks like non-universal inferences in light of the overall, unrestricted domain, even if the projection mechanism itself yields a universal presupposition. Finally, we test whether the presupposed content also forms part of the entailed content, at least for certain triggers (Sudo, 2012; Klinedinst, 2016; Zehr and Schwarz, 2016). Our results yield clearly different patterns for every and at least one, with every giving rise to universal presuppositions, which, to a very limited extent, can be weakened by domain restriction, and at least one overwhelmingly giving rise to non-universal presuppositions. Our results also indicate the availability of presupposition-less readings for both triggers in the task at hand, apparently more prevalent than domain restriction. Thereby, we present novel evidence that helps to pinpoint which of the theoretical options can be substantiated experimentally