The moral foundations of illusory correlation

Podeu consultar dades primàries associades a l'article a: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/114909Previous research has studied the relationship between political ideology and cognitive biases, such as the tendency of conservatives to form stronger illusory correlations between negative infrequent behaviors and minority groups. We further explored these findings by studying the relation between illusory correlation and moral values. According to the moral foundations theory, liberals and conservatives differ in the relevance they concede to different moral dimensions: Care, Fairness, Loyalty, Authority, and Purity. Whereas liberals consistently endorse the Care and Fairness foundations more than the Loyalty, Authority and Purity foundations, conservatives tend to adhere to the five foundations alike. In the present study, a group of participants took part in a standard illusory correlation task in which they were presented with randomly ordered descriptions of either desirable or undesirable behaviors attributed to individuals belonging to numerically different majority and minority groups. Although the proportion of desirable and undesirable behaviors was the same in the two groups, participants attributed a higher frequency of undesirable behaviors to the minority group, thus showing the expected illusory correlation effect. Moreover, this effect was specifically associated to our participants' scores in the Loyalty subscale of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire. These results emphasize the role of the Loyalty moral foundation in the formation of attitudes towards minorities among conservatives. Our study points out the moral system as a useful fine-grained framework to explore the complex interaction between basic cognitive processes and ideology

A comparator-hypothesis account of biased contingency detection.

Our ability to detect statistical dependencies between different events in the environment is strongly biased by the number of coincidences between them. Even when there is no true covariation between a cue and an outcome, if the marginal probability of either of them is high, people tend to perceive some degree of statistical contingency between both events. The present paper explores the ability of the Comparator Hypothesis to explain the general pattern of results observed in this literature. Our simulations show that this model can account for the biasing effects of the marginal probabilities of cues and outcomes. Furthermore, the overall fit of the Comparator Hypothesis to a sample of experimental conditions from previous studies is comparable to that of the popular Rescorla-Wagner model. These results should encourage researchers to further explore and put to the test the predictions of the Comparator Hypothesis in the domain of biased contingency detection

Sesgos cognitivos y convicciones morales

Los sesgos cognitivos son errores sistemáticos de nuestro razonamiento. Mediante el término "correlación ilusoria" nos referimos a la tendencia a sobreestimar la existencia de covariación entre dos eventos. En un estudio reciente (Rodríguez-Ferreiro y Barberia, 2017) exploramos la posible relación entre este sesgo cognitivo y las preocupaciones morales

Persistence of Causal Illusions After Extensive Training

We carried out an experiment using a conventional causal learning task but extending the number of learning trials participants were exposed to. Participants in the standard training group were exposed to 48 learning trials before being asked about the potential causal relationship under examination, whereas for participants in the long training group the length of training was extended to 288 trials. In both groups, the event acting as the potential cause had zero correlation with the occurrence of the outcome, but both the outcome density and the cause density were high, therefore providing a breeding ground for the emergence of a causal illusion. In contradiction to the predictions of associative models such the Rescorla-Wagner model, we found moderate evidence against the hypothesis that extending the learning phase alters the causal illusion. However, assessing causal impressions recurrently did weaken participants' causal illusions

Do Associations Explain Mental Models of Cause?

The propositional or rationalist Bayesian approach to learning is contrasted with an interpretation of causal learning in associative terms. A review of the development of the use of rational causal models in the psychology of learning is discussed concluding with the presentation of three areas of research related to cause-effect learning. We explain how rational context choices, a selective association effect (i.e., blocking of inhibition) as well as causal structure can all emerge from processes that can be modeled using elements of standard associative theory. We present the auto-associator (e.g., Baetu & Baker, 2009) as one such simple account of causal structure

Causal illusion as a cognitive basis of pseudoscientific beliefs

Causal illusion has been proposed as a cognitive mediator of pseudoscientific beliefs. However, previous studies have only tested the association between this cognitive bias and a closely related but different type of unwarranted beliefs, those related to superstition and paranormal phenomena. Participants (n = 225) responded to a novel questionnaire of pseudoscientific beliefs designed for this study. They also completed a contingency learning task in which a possible cause, infusion intake, and a desired effect, headache remission, were actually non‐contingent. Volunteers with higher scores on the questionnaire also presented stronger causal illusion effects. These results support the hypothesis that causal illusions might play a fundamental role in the endorsement of pseudoscientific beliefs

Are we truly special and unique? A replication of Goldenberg et al. (2001)

According to the mortality salience hypothesis of terror management theory, reminders of our future death increase the necessity to validate our cultural worldview and to enhance our self-esteem. In Experiment 2 of the study 'I am not an animal: Mortality salience, disgust, and the denial of human creatureliness', Goldenberg et al. (Goldenberg et al. 2001 J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 130, 427-435. (doi:10.1037/0096-3445.130.3.427)) observed that participants primed with questions about their death provided more positive evaluations to an essay describing humans as distinct from animals than control participants presented with questions regarding another aversive situation. In a replication of this experiment conducted with 128 volunteers, we did not observe evidence for a mortality salience effect

Slowed reacquisition of a previously extinguished response: the effect of partial extinction in human contingency learning

Extinction is a very relevant learning phenomenon from an applied and theoretical point of view. Extinction-based therapies constitute the most widespread empirically validated treatment of anxiety disorders. However, they face an important limitation, as relapse often takes place once the extinction procedure has been completed. We provide the first demonstration of relapse reduction, a slowed reacquisition, in human contingency learning after a partial extinction procedure using mild aversive stimuli. This effect was specific of the partial extinction treatment (i.e., reinforced trials were occasionally experienced during extinction; Experiment 1) and not only due to differences in uncertainty levels between the partial and a standard extinction group (Experiment 2). Experiment 3 explored conditions in which partial extinction was complete, while the slowed reacquisition effect was still obtained. Potential uses of this strategy in anxiety disorders therapies, its theoretical explanation and its current limitations are discussed.Universidad de Málaga. Campus de Excelencia Internacional Andalucía Tech

Authority Brings Responsibility: Feedback from Experts Promotes an Overweighting of Health-Related Pseudoscientific Beliefs

The popularity and spread of health-related pseudoscientific practices is a worldwide problem. Despite being counteracted by competent agents of our societies, their prevalence and spread continue to grow. Current research has focused on identifying which characteristics make us more likely to hold pseudoscientific beliefs. However, how we hold these beliefs despite all the available information against them is a question that remains unanswered. Here, we aimed to assess if the development of health-related pseudoscientific beliefs could be driven by a positive bias in belief updating. Additionally, we aimed to explore whether this bias could be exacerbated, depending on source credibility. In this study, participants (N = 116) underwent a belief updating task where they offered their agreement with various health-related pseudoscientific statements before and after receiving supporting and discrediting feedback from (a) experts (doctors), (b) peers, or (c) a random number generator. Our results suggest that when receiving feedback from experts (but not from peers or random feedback), the participants preferentially integrated supporting information relative to discrediting information about health-related pseudoscience. We discuss the implications of this biased belief updating pattern on health-related pseudoscientific research and suggest new strategies for intervention focused on increasing awareness, training, and consensus among healthcare practitioners

Are we truly special and unique? A replication of Goldenberg et al. (2001)

According to the mortality salience hypothesis of terror management theory, reminders of our future death increase the necessity to validate our cultural worldview and to enhance our self-esteem. In Experiment 2 of the study ‘I am not an animal: Mortality salience, disgust, and the denial of human creatureliness’, Goldenberg et al. (Goldenberg et al. 2001 J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 130, 427–435. (doi:10.1037/0096-3445.130.3.427)) observed that participants primed with questions about their death provided more positive evaluations to an essay describing humans as distinct from animals than control participants presented with questions regarding another aversive situation. In a replication of this experiment conducted with 128 volunteers, we did not observe evidence for a mortality salience effect.J.R.-F., I.B. and M.A.V. were supported by grant nos. PSI2016-80061-R (AEI/FEDER UE), PSI2016-75776-R (AEI/FEDER UE) and PSI2017-85159-P (AEI/FEDER UE), respectively. M.A.V. was also supported by grant no. 2016-T1/SOC-1395 (Comunidad de Madrid; Programa de Atracción de Talento Investigador)