Two heads are better than one, but how much? Evidence that people's use of causal integration rules does not always conform to normative standards.

Many theories of causal learning and causal induction differ in their assumptions about how people combine the causal impact of several causes presented in compound. Some theories propose that when several causes are present, their joint causal impact is equal to the linear sum of the individual impact of each cause. However, some recent theories propose that the causal impact of several causes needs to be combined by means of a noisy-OR integration rule. In other words, the probability of the effect given several causes would be equal to the sum of the probability of the effect given each cause in isolation minus the overlap between those probabilities. In the present series of experiments, participants were given information about the causal impact of several causes and then they were asked what compounds of those causes they would prefer to use if they wanted to produce the effect. The results of these experiments suggest that participants actually use a variety of strategies, including not only the linear and the noisy-OR integration rules, but also averaging the impact of several causes

A short educational intervention diminishes causal illusions and specific paranormal beliefs in undergraduates

Cognitive biases such as causal illusions have been related to paranormal and pseudoscientific beliefs and, thus, pose a real threat to the development of adequate critical thinking abilities. We aimed to reduce causal illusions in undergraduates by means of an educational intervention combining training-in-bias and training-in-rules techniques. First, participants directly experienced situations that tend to induce the Barnum effect and the confirmation bias. Thereafter, these effects were explained and examples of their influence over everyday life were provided. Compared to a control group, participants who received the intervention showed diminished causal illusions in a contingency learning task and a decrease in the precognition dimension of a paranormal belief scale. Overall, results suggest that evidence-based educational interventions like the one presented here could be used to significantly improve critical thinking skills in our students

CRISPR/Cas9-mediated glycolate oxidase disruption is an efficacious and safe treatment for primary hyperoxaluria type I

CRISPR/Cas9 technology offers novel approaches for the development of new therapies for many unmet clinical needs, including a significant number of inherited monogenic diseases. However, in vivo correction of disease-causing genes is still inefficient, especially for those diseases without selective advantage for corrected cells. We reasoned that substrate reduction therapies (SRT) targeting non-essential enzymes could provide an attractive alternative. Here we evaluate the therapeutic efficacy of an in vivo CRISPR/Cas9-mediated SRT to treat primary hyperoxaluria type I (PH1), a rare inborn dysfunction in glyoxylate metabolism that results in excessive hepatic oxalate production causing end-stage renal disease. A single systemic administration of an AAV8-CRISPR/Cas9 vector targeting glycolate oxidase, prevents oxalate overproduction and kidney damage, with no signs of toxicity in Agxt1(-/-) mice. Our results reveal that CRISPR/Cas9-mediated SRT represents a promising therapeutic option for PH1 that can be potentially applied to other metabolic diseases caused by the accumulation of toxic metabolites

The importance of the altricial – precocial spectrum for social complexity in mammals and birds:A review

Various types of long-term stable relationships that individuals uphold, including cooperation and competition between group members, define social complexity in vertebrates. Numerous life history, physiological and cognitive traits have been shown to affect, or to be affected by, such social relationships. As such, differences in developmental modes, i.e. the ‘altricial-precocial’ spectrum, may play an important role in understanding the interspecific variation in occurrence of social interactions, but to what extent this is the case is unclear because the role of the developmental mode has not been studied directly in across-species studies of sociality. In other words, although there are studies on the effects of developmental mode on brain size, on the effects of brain size on cognition, and on the effects of cognition on social complexity, there are no studies directly investigating the link between developmental mode and social complexity. This is surprising because developmental differences play a significant role in the evolution of, for example, brain size, which is in turn considered an essential building block with respect to social complexity. Here, we compiled an overview of studies on various aspects of the complexity of social systems in altricial and precocial mammals and birds. Although systematic studies are scarce and do not allow for a quantitative comparison, we show that several forms of social relationships and cognitive abilities occur in species along the entire developmental spectrum. Based on the existing evidence it seems that differences in developmental modes play a minor role in whether or not individuals or species are able to meet the cognitive capabilities and requirements for maintaining complex social relationships. Given the scarcity of comparative studies and potential subtle differences, however, we suggest that future studies should consider developmental differences to determine whether our finding is general or whether some of the vast variation in social complexity across species can be explained by developmental mode. This would allow a more detailed assessment of the relative importance of developmental mode in the evolution of vertebrate social systems

When is a cause the "same"? Incoherent generalization across contexts

A theory or model of cause such as Cheng's power (p) allows people to predict the effectiveness of a cause in a different causal context from the one in which they observed its actions. Liljeholm and Cheng demonstrated that people could detect differences in the effectiveness of the cause when causal power varied across contexts of different outcome base rates, but that they did not detect similar changes when only the cause-outcome contingency, ∆p, but not power, varied. However, their procedure allowed participants to simplify the causal scenarios and consider only a subsample of observations with a base rate of zero. This confounds p, ∆p, and the probability of an outcome (O) given a cause (C), P(O|C). Furthermore, the contingencies that they used confounded p and P(O|C) in the overall sample. Following the work of Liljeholm and Cheng, we examined whether causal induction in a wider range of situations follows the principles suggested by Cheng. Experiments 1a and 1b compared the procedure used by Liljeholm and Cheng with one that did not allow the sample of observations to be simplified. Experiments 2a and 2b compared the same two procedures using contingencies that controlled for P(O|C). The results indicated that, if the possibility of converting all contexts to a zero base rate situation was avoided, people were sensitive to changes in P(O|C), p, and ∆p when each of these was varied. This is inconsistent with Liljeholm and Cheng's conclusion that people detect only changes in p. These results question the idea that people naturally extract the metric or model of cause from their observation of stochastic events and then, reasonably exclusively, use this theory of a causal mechanism, or for that matter any simple normative theory, to generalize their experience to alternative contexts.Itxaso Barberia, Irina Baetu, Joan Sansa, and A.G. Bake

Do Associations Explain Mental Models of Cause?

The propositional or rationalist Bayesian approach to learning is contrasted with an interpretation of causal learning in associative terms. A review of the development of the use of rational causal models in the psychology of learning is discussed concluding with the presentation of three areas of research related to cause-effect learning. We explain how rational context choices, a selective association effect (i.e., blocking of inhibition) as well as causal structure can all emerge from processes that can be modeled using elements of standard associative theory. We present the auto-associator (e.g., Baetu & Baker, 2009) as one such simple account of causal structure.Itxaso Barberia, Irina Baetu, Robin A. Murphy and A.G. Bake

Maybe this old dinosaur isn't extinct: What does Bayesian modeling add to associationism?

We agree with Jones and Love (JandL) that much of Bayesian modeling has taken a fundamentalist approach to cognition; but we do not believe in the potential of Bayesianism to provide insights into psychological processes. We discuss the advantages of associative explanations over Bayesian approaches to causal induction, and argue that Bayesian models have added little to our understanding of human causal reasoning. © 2011 Cambridge University Press

Conservative and endodontic treatment performed under general anesthesia: A discussion of protocols and outcomes

International audienc