Honneth on Social Pathologies: A Critique

Over the last two decades, Axel Honneth has written extensively on the notion of social pathology. He has presented it as a distinctive critical resource of Frankfurt School Critical Theory, in which tradition he places his own work; and as an alternative to the mainstream liberal approaches in political philosophy. In this paper, I review the developments in Honneth's writing about this notion and offer an immanent critique, with a particular focus on his recent major work Freedom's Right. Both his early context-transcendent approach and his more recent immanent approach are found wanting, and his increasing reformism is exposed and criticized. The central distinction in Freedom's Right between social pathologies and misdevelopments is also shown to be unworkable. In addition, I demonstrate that Zurn's influential proposal to characterize the phenomena Honneth identified as social pathologies in terms of a cognitive disconnect does not fit (with Zurn's own description of) these phenomena. While some such phenomena, like what Honneth describes as “Organized Self-Realization,” call out for conceptualization in terms of the notion of social pathology, an alternative characterization of this notion is necessary

Misdevelopments, Pathologies, and Normative Revolutions: Normative Reconstruction as Method of Critical Theory

In this article I argue that the method of normative reconstruction underlying Freedom's Right undermines Critical Theory's aspiration to be a force that is unreservedly critical and progressive. I start out by giving a brief account of the four premises of the method of normative reconstruction and unpack their implications for how Honneth conceptualizes social pathologies and misdevelopments, specifically that these notions are no longer linked to radical critique and normative revolution. In the second part, I demonstrate that abandoning forms of radical critique and normative revolution is internally linked to adopting this method, before arguing that Freedom's Right contains no resources to account for why abandoning them does not amount to a deficiency. In the final part, I point out two problematic implications of turning away from radical critique and normative revolution for the very project Honneth pursues in Freedom's Right. I show that Honneth's own view about the limited scope of application of the method of normative reconstruction and his account of the dangers associated with social misdevelopments give us (additional) reasons to consider this method to be incomplete. Finally, I contend that the explanatory power of Freedom's Right is dubious because methodological premises that form part of normative reconstruction lead Honneth to ignore relevant alternative explanations of processes of deviation and disassociation from norms of social freedom, which he characterizes as social misdevelopments

Is the Market a Sphere of Social Freedom?

In this paper I examine Axel Honneth's normative reconstruction of the market as a sphere of social freedom in his 2014 book, Freedom's Right. Honneth's position is complex: on the one hand, he acknowledges that modern capitalist societies do not realize social freedom; on the other hand, he insists that the promise of social freedom is implicit in the market sphere. In fact, the latter explains why modern subjects have seen capitalism as legitimate. I will reconstruct Honneth's conception of social freedom and investigate how it is realized in the sphere in which Honneth sees it most successfully at work, the sphere of interpersonal relations. I then move on to the sphere of the market economy and discuss two related problems of this view that stem from his interpretation of Hegel. Next, I consider Honneth's method of “normative reconstruction” and his reconstructions of the sphere of consumption and, finally, the labor market. My conclusion will be that market institutions cannot realize social freedom, and that this insight should orient the philosophical direction of critical social theory

Luta social por reconhecimento: dilemas e impasses na articulação pública do desrespeito

O artigo faz uma reconstrução da teoria de Honneth sobre o reconhecimento da imputabilidade moral e social e sua complexa articulação com a formação da identidade e de seus estados de luta. Mostra-se a inter-relação entre a comunidade de valores e as condições morais das relações jurídicas. Ou seja, os ideais de justiça e os critérios pelos quais os grupos sociais avaliam moralmente o seu meio social estão mais presentes no sentimento de desrespeito do que em uma formulação racional e crítica aos princípios de valor vigente. O desafio que se coloca é se essas zonas de conflito normativo são capazes de atingir a visibilidade e o potencial de articular e coordenar uma luta social que integre os meios semânticos, simbólicos, materiais e imateriais para além das redes emotivas e morais por em que circulam cotidianamente, sem que se deixem cooptar politicamente ou se traduzir publicamente por uma semântica inadequada a suas pretensões de reconhecimento

Conceptualisations of children’s wellbeing at school: the contribution of recognition theory

A large study in Australian schools aimed to elucidate understandings of ‘wellbeing’ and of factors in school life that contribute to it. Students and teachers understood wellbeing primarily, and holistically, in terms of interpersonal relationships, in contrast to policy documents which mainly focused on ‘problem areas’ such as mental health. The study also drew on recognition theory as developed by the social philosopher Axel Honneth. Results indicate that recognition theory may be useful in understanding wellbeing in schools, and that empirical research in schools may give rise to further questions regarding theory

Individual Rights, Economic Transactions, and Recognition: A Legal Approach to Social Economics

Modernity brought the idea of individual property rights as a com- plex phenomenon. However, economics adopted a simplistic view of property as a fundamental institution, understating the complex interaction of different rights and obligations that frame the legal environment of economic processes with an insufficiently elaborated tool. Here, a more elaborate view of legal elements will be propose

Verwilderungen des sozialen Konflikts: Anerkennungskämpfe zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts

In einigen seiner materialen Analysen hat Talcott Parsons die Etablierung moderner Gesellschaften als einen Prozess der Ausdifferenzierung von verschiedenen Sphären der wechselseitigen Anerkennung beschrieben. Im Ausgang von diesen anerkennungstheoretischen Teilen der Gesellschaftsanalyse Parsons skizziere ich in meinem Beitrag einige Züge des sozialen Konflikts in der jüngsten Gegenwart. Dabei gehe ich von dem Bild aus, das Parsons von den Anerkennungskämpfen gegeben hat, welche sich zu seiner Zeit in den hochindustrialisierten Gesellschaften des Westens abgespielt haben (1). Parsons’ Diagnose normativ geordneter Anerkennungskonflikte dient im zweiten Schritt als Hintergrund, um einige der gesellschaftlichen Tendenzen herauszuarbeiten, die im letzten Drittel des 20. Jahrhunderts zu einer schleichenden Untergrabung der von Parsons angenommenen pazifizierenden Ausgleichsregelungen geführt haben (2). Das vorläufige Ergebnis dieser Auflösungserscheinungen stelle ich im letzten Schritt meiner Überlegungen vor, indem ich Phänomene einer „Verwilderung“ des sozialen Konflikts beschreibe; gemeint ist damit ein gesellschaftlicher Zustand, in dem die Bestrebungen nach sozialer Anerkennung ausufern und anomisch werden, weil sie in den systemisch vorgesehenen Handlungssphären keine normativ gerechtfertigte Befriedigung mehr finden (3). Der Beitrag zeigt die gesellschaftstheoretische Zentralstellung des Begriffs der Anerkennung auf, indem er diesen im Anschluss an Parsons für eine Analyse des gegenwärtigen Strukturwandels sozialer Konflikte fruchtbar macht.In several of his analyses, Talcott Parsons describes the establishment of modern societies as a differentiation process across spheres of mutual recognition. In this paper, I use Parsons’ social theory of recognition to examine features of recent social conflicts. I begin with Parsons’ description of the struggles for recognition that took place during his lifetime in the highly industrialized societies of the west (1). I then use Parsons’ view of normatively ordered recognition conflicts to point out societal trends that led, in the final third of the twentieth century, to a gradual undermining of the pacification structures postulated by Parsons (2). An initial outcome of this apparent disintegration I describe as a “barbarization” of social conflict. By this I mean a state of society where struggles for social recognition escalate and become anomic because resolution can no longer be found in the existing systemic spheres of negotiation (3). This paper shows the importance of the term recognition to social theory by following Parsons’ theory in analyzing structural transformations that are currently emerging in response to social conflicts

Bullying and the need to belong: Early adolescents’ bullying-related behavior and the acceptance they desire and receive from particular classmates

Based on the notion that one of the motives underlying children's antisocial behavior is their need to belong to particular peers, it was examined how each of four types of bullying-related behavior would be related to the acceptance that 10 to 13-year-old children desired and received from same- and other-sex children with different bullying-related behavioral styles. Bullying-related behavior was assessed using a peer nomination procedure. Children rated the importance of being accepted by each particular classmate and their own acceptance of these same classmates. Among boys, antisocial involvement in bullying was related to a desire to be accepted by other antisocial boys and to actually being rejected by boys in general. Among girls, antisocial involvement in bullying was related to a desire to be accepted by boys in general. © Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2007