The legacy of economic recession in terms of over-indebtedness : A framework and review of the evidence

Funding Information: This work has been funded by the Council of Strategic Research, Academy of Finland, decision 312710 Kantola, Anu M. Publisher Copyright: © 2021 Cambridge University Press. All rights reserved.With the expansion of credit, low interest rates and overly optimistic expectations about future economic and housing price developments, mortgage lending soared in most OECD countries in the run-up to the 2008 global economic crisis. The crisis revealed the hidden epidemic of over-indebtedness, which continues to overshadow the lives of millions in rich countries. In the wake of the global economic crisis, the household debt crisis led to worsening economic conditions and put pressure on government finances, which caused further income shocks in the form of austerity measures such as social welfare cuts and higher taxes. This article is based on a scoping review aimed at summarising and reflecting on the available literature. It analyses the effects of over-indebtedness on individuals and societies across six OECD countries: Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, the UK and the US.Peer reviewe

We need to deal with household debt now before the next financial crisis hits

What will happen to indebted households when the next recession hits Europe? Strongly pro-cyclical financial policy in the US is likely to trigger over-heating and recession in the US perhaps already at the end of next year. Many economists predict a recession to strike Europe a year later. One thing is sure. Sooner or later a recession will arrive and with already near zero level interest rates the means to fight it are more limited than they were after the economic collapse of 2008

Church Poverty Relief during a Time of Crisis? : Experiences of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland

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Why fertility has been declining in Finland after the Global Recession? : A theoretical approach

A steady improvement in the economy and employment since 2010 did not stop the drop in total fertility rate in Finland. Declining fertility now includes women in almost all age and educational groups in the country. This decline has continued long enough to also indicate a dramatic decrease in completed fertility, which is a departure from decades of sustained levels of completed fertility. Drawing from a range of publicly available descriptive data, this article assesses the extent to which old and new theories of fertility are relevant in explaining this development. In conclusion, the fertility development in Finland is surprising, and challenges traditional theories on fertility, which analyse fertility from economic and gender perspectives. Social interaction theory holds more promise. However, it is very difficult to find data sources which could elucidate the role of social interaction in the fertility decline. Designing pro-natalistic policies is challenging before there is more detailed evidence and understanding concerning the key drivers of the fertility decline in Finland.Peer reviewe

Adapting the Nordic welfare state model to the challenges of automation

The inclusive Nordic welfare model has facilitated economic growth, stable business environments and excellent living conditions as demonstrated by a number of scholars. The Nordic ‘happy democracies’ have been characterised by consensual decision-making procedures, corporatism, relatively high voter turnout, wide representation of various social groups, active membership in social organisations and remarkable levels of both institutional and social trust. The eradication of poverty is not merely a matter of expenditures and compensation. A convincing body of literature demonstrates that the level of trust in a society has consequences for economic performance as well as for individual well-being. Robert Putnam has identified two dimensions of social capital: bridging or inclusive, and bonding or exclusive social capital. Labour union membership has declined in Nordic countries with new forms of contracted work and other types of non-standard employment contracts.Peer reviewe

Köyhyyttä Helsingissä : Toimeentulotuen saajat ja käyttö 2008-2010

Tutkimuksen tarkoitus oli selvittää toimeentulotuen käyttöä Helsingissä vuosina 2008–2010: ketkä saivat toimeentulotukea, millaisiin menoihin toimeentulotukea tarvittiin ja kuinka pitkäksi aikaa? Lisäksi tarkasteltiin syksyllä 2008 alkaneen talouskriisin vaikutuksia toimeentulotuen tarpeeseen. Pääasiallisena tutkimusaineistona oli Helsingin kaupungin sosiaaliviraston rekisteritiedoista koostettu TotuHelsinki-aineisto. Tulosten mukaan toimeentulotukeen turvautuivat eniten yksin elävät, ja he olivat tavallisimmin työttömiä tai lomautettuja. Maahanmuuttajat saivat kantaväestöä suhteellisesti useammin toimeentulotukea. Toimeentulotuki oli usealle – myös nuorille – pitkäaikainen tukimuoto. Noin 60 prosenttia toimeentulotuesta maksettiin suoraan asiakkaan tilille käyttökohdetta erittelemättä. Eritellyistä käyttökohteista toimeentulotukea maksettiin eniten asumiskustannuksiin sekä erilaisiin terveydenhuoltomenoihin. Vuoden 2008 syksyllä alkaneen talouskriisin vaikutukset näkyivät toimeentulotukimenoissa ja toimeentulotuen asiakasmäärissä erityisesti vuoden 2009 alkupuoliskolla ja kesäaikana.15,00 euro

Debt matters? Mental wellbeing of older adults with household debt in England

Background A record number of older individuals have household debt, but little is known about possible links between debts and their mental wellbeing. This study examines the extent to which different aspects of household indebtedness predict mental wellbeing among this population. Methods A sample of 17,091 individuals (72,700 observations) aged 50 and over in England was derived from waves 1 - 8 of the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing. Mental wellbeing was assessed by two outcome measures: number of depressive symptoms (CES-D 8) and quality of life (CASP-19 score). The predictors of mental wellbeing were examined using quartiles of non-zero overall debt amount, debt-to-income and debt-to-non-housing wealth ratios as alternative measures of debt burden. Linear regression models estimated the associations of mortgage and non-mortgage debt measures with mental wellbeing while adjusting for observable socioeconomic confounding factors. Individual fixed effect models were used to control for all time-constant factors among a longitudinal subsample. Results Individuals in the highest debt-to-wealth quartile were particularly at risk of lower mental wellbeing, that is, a higher number of depressive symptoms and lower quality of life. After covariate adjustment, non-mortgage debt predicted lower mental wellbeing on both measures but mortgage debt was only linked to lower quality of life. Among the subsample who experienced changes in high non-mortgage debt levels, a small association of these changes with mental wellbeing outcomes were observed. Asymmetric within-individual estimation showed that both getting rid of and acquiring new debts during the study period predicted symmetrically (small) increases and decreases, respectively, in mental wellbeing. Conclusion These findings indicate that among older individuals in England, non-mortgage debt status is linked to poor mental wellbeing. High, non-mortgage, debt-to-wealth ratios may help identify risk of mental wellbeing issues in older people with debts

A Truly Missed Opportunity : The Political Context and Impact of the Basic Income Experiment in Finland

A contribution to the special issue on "The Policy Impact of Basic Income Experiments in Europe"Finland conducted the first nationwide field experiment with partial basic income between 2017 and 2018. The experiment and its results were widely reported in international media and featured in political debates across the globe. Domestically, the experiment had an impact on social policy debates but no impact on social policy. For example, it did not feature in the Social Security 2030 project or in the work of the Social Security Reform Committee (2020-2027). The research setting for the experiment was compromised from the beginning due to political reasons; but the scientific power was further undermined by a new sanctioning model, which was implemented in 2018 at the beginning of the second year of the basic income experiment. The new Government taking office in 2019 promised to continue with a negative income tax experiment; however, no such experiment was conducted. The article will unpack these developments in Finland and discuss possible explanations for denouncing basic income as a policy idea.Peer reviewe

Fertility Response to Economic Recessions in Finland 1991–2015

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Church poverty relief during a time of crisis? Experiences of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland

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