Vom „Geöfneten Ritter-Platz“ (1702) zum postmodernen Jugendroman – Ritterdarstellungen aus vier Jahrhunderten Kinder- und Jugendliteratur

Schmideler S. Vom „Geöfneten Ritter-Platz“ (1702) zum postmodernen Jugendroman – Ritterdarstellungen aus vier Jahrhunderten Kinder- und Jugendliteratur. In: Herweg M, Keppler-Tasaki S, eds. Rezeptionskulturen. Fünfhundert Jahre literarischer Mittelalterrezeption zwischen Kanon und Populärkultur. Trends in Medieval Philology. Vol 27. Berlin; Boston: de Gruyter; 2012: 383-410

Charlemagne

Cet atelier destiné aux jeunes chercheur·ses a pour objet la genèse et la dynamique des images médiévales de Charlemagne, figure-clef des relations franco-allemandes. Des textes littéraires et historiographiques d’expression latine, française et allemande seront analysés pour la première fois de façon commune par de jeunes chercheur·ses francophones et germanophones : à la lumière de leurs « regards croisés », ils étudieront la pertinence et la persistance de ces images pré-nationales dans le contexte de l’Europe post-nationale

Himmel, Hölle

Benz M. Himmel, Hölle. In: Renz T, Hanauska M, Herweg M, eds. Literarische Orte in deutschsprachigen Erzählungen des Mittelalters. Ein Handbuch. Berlin ; Boston: De Gruyter; 2018: 271-285

Reference points in renegotiations: The role of contracts and competition

Several recent papers argue that contracts provide reference points that affect ex post behavior. We test this hypothesis in a canonical buyer-seller relationship with renegotiation. Our paper provides causal experimental evidence that an initial contract has a highly significant and economically important impact on renegotiation behavior that goes beyond the effect of contracts on bargaining threatpoints. We compare situations in which an initial contract is renegotiated to strategically equivalent bargaining situations in which no ex ante contract was written. The ex ante contract causes sellers to ask for markups that are 45 percent lower than in strategically equivalent bargaining situations without an initial contract. Moreover, buyers are more likely to reject given markups in renegotiations than in negotiations. We do not find that these effects are stronger when the initial contract is concluded under competitive rather than monopolistic conditions