El 11-S, o modernidad y terror

La autora centra su argumentación alrededor de la genealogía del terror hasta dar con la acción con apego al terror como un tipo de acción no exclusiva de organizaciones o estados totalitarios como los representados por las «modernidades» nacionalsocialista y comunista, sino como un tipo de acción también susceptible de ser vehiculizada por agentes violentos no estatales. Éstos, dice contundentmente, han transmutado rasgos de los grupos activos y extremistas de los años setenta que enfrentaron al poder contenido en sus respectivos estados nacionales, bajo un nuevo programa ideológico. Sin embargo, el terrorista del tipo de Bin Laden y sus seguidores, a juicio de Heller, son parte de narrativas pantópicas y totalitarias, fundadas en la no-libertad y que discurren sobre la reunificación de mundos musulmanes. Su supuesta misión recurre a y moviliza sus recursos disponibles, «el miedo, la intimidación sin precedentes» y «la muerte indiscriminada»: «los dos significados de la palabra terror».The author takes into account the sociological meaning of the New Terror that rises from the 9-11-2001 as an ever recurring dark side of modernity, the sectarian, totalitarian and jacobin tendencies which are built in the political program of modernity from the very beginning in the French Revolution, and continued in the german nazi Endelösung and in the Russian and Chinese Revolutions. The New Terror reshapes the two key meanings of Terror: fear and unprecedented intimidation, on the one hand, and indiscriminate death

Omnívora modernidad

Sin resume

ARE THERE OBLIGATIONS WITHOUT RIGHTS?

In all command-obedience relations of asymmetric reciprocity, obligations or rather duties do not go normally with corresponding rights. There are no rights related to such relationships, at least not in the present  understanding of the word “right”, since they are prerogatives. But there are obligations based on morals, if not on rights, also in relations of  asymmetric reciprocity. Only in a relation of symmetric reciprocity do rights appear as foundations (archai) for claims, both in a positive, and in a  negative sense. We have obligations to future generations, even  responsibilities for living up to those obligations, but future generations cannot have rights. There is not, and cannot be, symmetric reciprocity between us and any future generation, in fact no reciprocity at all; there are obligations without corresponding rights.The cases of prospective responsibility, of being in charge, also implies obligations irrespective of the circumstance whether the parties towards whom we have obligations are the bearers of rights or not. Intergenerational justice does not presuppose extant rights whereas potential rights are just projections or metaphors with little relevance, for they are not binding

Critical Theory in a World of Uncertainties

Also CSST Working Paper #122.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/51313/1/549.pd

La sociología como desfetichizacion de la modernidad

No presenta resume