The End of Self-Regulation? Hedge Funds and Derivatives in Global Financial Governance

This volume examines the changes in international financial regulation from the vantage point of the key powers in global finance including the US, the EU, Japan, and China

Gatekeepers of financial power: from London to Lagos

The main premise of this paper is that, until recently, African elites did not regulate or control financial flows moving across the continent. They were not financial gatekeepers. In Africa Since 1940, Cooper identified African elites as gatekeepers regulating access to resources and opportunities passing through strategic sites. This paper makes a case for revision of existing notions of the gatekeeper state in an ongoing effort to (re)negotiate the continent’s colonial past through two new arguments. The first is that financial power was never located at a ‘peripheral’ African gate, but resolutely held onto within leading financial centres, circumventing any opportunity for African elites to control financial flows. Failure to distinguish between types of flows distorts analysis of African political economic power under colonialism. It is only in the post-2000 period, that we see powerful African states driving the integration of African markets into the global financial system. The second argument is that these African goals to control financial flows correspond more to ‘gateway’ strategies than to gatekeeper. Drawing on the case of Lagos, I demonstrate how this ‘gateway’ concept better captures trans-scalar processes of new financial clustering in Africa’s emerging markets than a concept associated with ‘gates’ under Empire

The new resilience of emerging and developing countries: systemic interlocking, currency swaps and geoeconomics

The vulnerability/resilience nexus that defined the interaction between advanced and developing economies in the post-WWII era is undergoing a fundamental transformation. Yet, most of the debate in the current literature is focusing on the structural constraints faced by the Emerging and Developing Countries (EDCs) and the lack of changes in the formal structures of global economic governance. This paper challenges this literature and its conclusions by focusing on the new conditions of systemic interlocking between advanced and emerging economies, and by analysing how large EDCs have built and are strengthening their economic resilience. We find that a significant redistribution of ‘policy space’ between advanced and emerging economies have taken place in the global economy. We also find that a number of seemingly technical currency swap agreements among EDCs have set in motion changes in the very structure of global trade and finance. These developments do not signify the end of EDCs’ vulnerability towards advanced economies. They signify however that the economic and geoeconomic implications of this vulnerability have changed in ways that constrain the options available to advanced economies and pose new challenges for the post-WWII economic order

Oil elite networks in a transforming global oil market

This article analyses oil elite formation in light of the wider transformation that is taking place in the global oil order due to the rise of powers from the Global South, including Russia: in particular, the expansion and integration of the state-owned oil companies into the global oil market. This is done by analysing the networks that the directors of the world's largest oil companies create through their affiliations with a) other corporations, b) policy planning bodies and c) with the state. The most important finding is that the increased cooperation between the Western private oil companies and the non-Western state-owned oil companies has not yet translated into increased integration between their respective elite networks. It is argued that this indicates we are witnessing a transition towards a more multi-polar global oil order that increasingly needs to take into account the rising powers of the Global South. © The Author(s) 2012

The Political Economy of Failure: The Euro as an International Currency

How do international currencies get established and consolidated? What domestic and international political foundations support an international currency? And what kinds of macro-economic flows enable an international currency? In this essay we consider these perennial questions of modern IPE scholarship in reverse order to ask whether the euro could ever have become, or seek to become, a true international currency rivalling the US dollar, used not only for passive foreign exchange reserves but also as a major commercial currency outside the EU. We argue that the EU lacks the will, the ideas and the capacity to promote the euro into the status of an international currency. In this article, we concentrate on this final issue of capacity, as the will and ideas issues have already been well explored. Capacity is an issue coeval with, if not prior to, the first two issues. The EU's current institutional arrangements and its economic geography create macro-economic consequences that diminish the euro's capacity to operate as a top currency. These conflicts go beyond the well-recognized issue that the euro-zone is not an optimum currency area. Examining the euro's debilities sheds light not only on the euro's (in)capacity to rival the dollar as an international currency, but also on the future of both the euro and the dollar in the aftermath of the euro-zone crisis

Outsourcing Governance: States and the Politics of a ‘Global Value Chain World’

Politics, and by extension states, are marginal in debates about the genesis, evolution and functioning of the GVC-based global economy. We contend here that the core complexity of state agency and state power needs to be much more carefully understood in GVC and related debates, as a basis on which the governance of the evolving GVC world can be properly theorised as revolving around the inseparability of economic and political power. We advance a framework for understanding the role of politics and states in the construction and maintenance of a GVC world, using a three-fold typology of facilitative, regulatory and distributive forms of governance, and propose a notion of ‘outsourcing governance’ as an attempt to capture the ways in which states purposefully, through active political agency, have engaged in a process of delegating a variety of governance functions and authority to private actors. Our overarching argument is normative: ‘outsourced governance’ of the form we currently observe is associated with regressive distributional outcomes, and is antithetical to an inclusive and sustainable global economy