Is construct validation valid?

What makes a measure of well-being valid? The dominant approach today, construct validation, uses psychometrics to ensure that questionnaires behave in accordance with background knowledge. Our first claim is interpretive—construct validation obeys a coherentist logic that seeks to balance diverse sources of evidence about the construct in question. Our second claim is critical—while in theory this logic is defensible, in practice it does not secure valid measures. We argue that the practice of construct validation in well-being research is theory avoidant, favoring a narrow focus on statistical tests while largely ignoring relevant philosophical considerations

Happiness and education: troubling students for their own contentment

Currently higher education strategies seem to concentrate on the expedient, developing skills that can secure employment in the world of work. Following Dreyfus and Spinosa (2003), this may have immediate advantages, but in totalising pedagogic practices it may restrict our openness to people and to our own contentment with ourselves. Valuable as this may be as a way to satisfy politico-economic policy imperatives, it strays from education as an edifying process where personal development represents, through the facing up to distress and despair, an unsettling of our developing identity and a negation of our immediate desire satisfaction. Such an unsettling is not intended to give pleasure or satisfaction in the normative way in which the imperative of happiness has been used in student satisfaction surveys or in the wider societal context that this totalisation represents (Ahmed 2010). What I propose for higher education is not a dominant priority to feed the happiness for others but a mission to personal contentment revealed through realising student potentialities to them and so recognising their limitations as part of seeking an attunement to contentment

The ethics of digital well-being: a multidisciplinary perspective

This chapter serves as an introduction to the edited collection of the same name, which includes chapters that explore digital well-being from a range of disciplinary perspectives, including philosophy, psychology, economics, health care, and education. The purpose of this introductory chapter is to provide a short primer on the different disciplinary approaches to the study of well-being. To supplement this primer, we also invited key experts from several disciplines—philosophy, psychology, public policy, and health care—to share their thoughts on what they believe are the most important open questions and ethical issues for the multi-disciplinary study of digital well-being. We also introduce and discuss several themes that we believe will be fundamental to the ongoing study of digital well-being: digital gratitude, automated interventions, and sustainable co-well-being

Improving Cross-Sector Comparisons: Going Beyond the Health-Related QALY

The quality-adjusted life-year (QALY) has become a widely used measure of health outcomes for use in informing decision making in health technology assessment. However, there is growing recognition of outcomes beyond health within the health sector and in related sectors such as social care and public health. This paper presents the advantages and disadvantages of ten possible approaches covering extending the health-related QALY and using well-being and monetary-based methods, in order to address the problem of using multiple outcome measures to inform resource allocation within and between sectors

Worthy to Lose Some Money for Better Air Quality: Applications of Bayesian Networks on the Causal Effect of Income and Air Pollution on Life Satisfaction in Switzerland

One important determinant of well-being is the environmental quality. Many countries apply environmental regulations, reforms and policies for its improvement. However, the question is how the people value the environment, including the air quality. This study examines the association between air pollution and life satisfaction using the Swiss Household Panel survey over the years 2000–2013. We follow a Bayesian network (BN) strategy to estimate the causal effect of the income and air pollution on life satisfaction. We look at five main air pollutants: the ground-level ozone (O3), sulphur dioxide (SO2), nitrogen dioxide (NO2), carbon monoxide (CO) and particulate matter of 10 micrometres (PM10). Then, we calculate the individuals’ marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) of reducing air pollution that aims to improve their life satisfaction. Beside the BN model, we take advantage of the panel structure of our data and we follow two approaches as robustness check. This includes the adapted probit fixed effects and the generalised methods of moments system. Our findings show that O3 and PM10 present the highest MWTP values ranging between $8000 and$12,000, followed by the remained air pollutants with MWTP extending between $2000 and$6500. Applying the BNs, we find that the causal effect of income on life satisfaction is substantially increased. We also show the causal effects of air pollutants remain almost the same, leading to lower values of willingness to pay

Mood Propensity as a Constituent of Happiness: A Rejoinder to Hill

Happiness, Mood, Emotional state, Affect, Emotion, Well-being, Life satisfaction, Hedonism, Philosophy, Welfare,

Classifying theories of welfare

This paper argues that we should replace the common classification of theories of welfare into the categories of hedonism, desire theories, and objective list theories. The tripartite classification is objectionable because it is unduly narrow and it is confusing: it excludes theories of welfare that are worthy of discussion, and it obscures important distinctions. In its place, the paper proposes two independent classifications corresponding to a distinction emphasised by Roger Crisp: a four-category classification of enumerative theories (about which items constitute welfare), and a four-category classification of explanatory theories (about why these items constitute welfare)