When all is said and done: updating "Elections, special interests, and financial crisis"

How do elections affect the costliness of financial crises to taxpayers? Previous research contends that more electorally competitive countries choose policies that are less costly to taxpayers. In this paper, we update Keefer’s seminal 2007 article published in International Organization with revised data. The original article found that more electorally competitive countries had lower fiscal costs from responding to crises. The commonly used IMF/World Bank data set Keefer employed has since been extensively corrected and expanded. We update the original analysis with the newest version of this data set. After doing so, we find no evidence for an association between electoral competitiveness and the fiscal costs of responding to financial crises both within the original sample and outside of it. Our update highlights a broader methodological lesson: that the costs of responding to financial crises can take many years to be settled. Future research should explicitly address and model this delayed cost resolution

Logarithmic bred vectors in spatiotemporal chaos: structure and growth

Bred vectors are a type of finite perturbation used in prediction studies of atmospheric models that exhibit spatially extended chaos. We study the structure, spatial correlations, and the growth- rates of logarithmic bred vectors (which are constructed by using a given norm). We find that, after a suitable transformation, logarithmic bred vectors are roughly piecewise copies of the leading Lyapunov vector. This fact allows us to deduce a scaling law for the bred vector growth rate as a function of their amplitude. In addition, we relate growth rates with the spectrum of Lyapunov exponents corresponding to the most expanding directions. We illustrate our results with simulations of the Lorenz '96 model.Comment: 8 pages, 8 figure

The Political Business Cycles of EU Accession Countries

This paper considers whether political business cycles exist in Eastern European accession countries. Section I introduces the overall objectives of the work. Section II provides a short introduction to the political business cycle literature. It also considers the role of exchange rates, capital mobility, and central bank independence in restricting or encouraging political business cycles. Section III lays out the accession process to date as well as the exchange rate regimes accession states have used. Section IV tests empirically whether there have been political business cycles during the time period 1990 to 1999 for the 10 Eastern European accession countries, with estimations based on a Mundell-Fleming model. It finds that countries with flexible exchange rates have looser monetary policies in election years than in non-election years in countries with dependent central banks. If a country has a fixed exchange rate regime, it manipulates its economy in election years through running larger budgets instead of through looser monetary policy. Section V concludes with some policy implications for the European Union's enlargement process and EMU

Explaining Instability in the Stability and Growth Pact

The Stability and Growth Pact clearly failed to prevent the euro crisis. We contend that the failure was due largely to the ability of the Member States to undermine the Pact’s operation. The European Commission served as a “watchdog” to monitor fiscal performance. The Member States themselves, however, collectively had the ability to change the content of the reports for individual states. We confirm the expectation that powerful Member States had the most success in undermining the role of the Commission. Perhaps more surprisingly, we find supporting evidence for our argument that governments with euroskeptic populations behind them were also more successful in weakening the Commission’s warnings. These results have broader theoretical implications concerning which mechanisms explain country-specific outcomes under a shared rule. Another contribution is the creation of a new data set of European Commission assessments of Member State economic programs and Council of Minister revisions

Preventing German bank failures: Federalism and decisions to save troubled banks

We examine government decisions to support troubled banks. Our contribution is the examination of how federalism can affect decisions to classify banks as systemically important. Whether a bank is viewed by politicians as 'systemically important' varies based on how its failure would affect supporters of the government. How a federation is designed has a strong influence on which banks are given public assistance. Where the top level of government is solely responsible for banks, there will be fewer systemically important institutions and so more banks will be allowed to fail. Where lower levels are responsible, governments will allow fewer failures. We use this approach to understand government support for failing banks in Germany. Our findings are relevant for the European Banking Union

Precursors of extreme increments

We investigate precursors and predictability of extreme increments in a time series. The events we are focusing on consist in large increments within successive time steps. We are especially interested in understanding how the quality of the predictions depends on the strategy to choose precursors, on the size of the event and on the correlation strength. We study the prediction of extreme increments analytically in an AR(1) process, and numerically in wind speed recordings and long-range correlated ARMA data. We evaluate the success of predictions via receiver operator characteristics (ROC-curves). Furthermore, we observe an increase of the quality of predictions with increasing event size and with decreasing correlation in all examples. Both effects can be understood by using the likelihood ratio as a summary index for smooth ROC-curves

Budget institutions and taxation

While a number of different studies have explored the effects of budgetary procedures and the centralization of the budget process on government debt, deficits and spending, few of them have explored whether such fiscal institutions matter for public revenue. This article argues that centralizing the budget process raises the levels of taxation by limiting the ability of individual government officials to veto tax increases in line with common-pool-problem arguments regarding public finances. Using detailed data on budgetary procedures from 15 EU countries, the empirical analysis shows that greater centralization of the budget process increases taxation as a share of GDP and that both the type of budget centralization and level of government fractionalization matter for the size of this effect. The results suggest that further centralizing the budget process limits government debt and deficits by increasing public revenues as well as constraining public spending

Budget Processes: Theory and Experimental Evidence

This paper studies budget processes, both theoretically and experimentally. We compare the outcomes of bottom-up and top-down budget processes. It is often presumed that a top-down budget process leads to a smaller overall budget than a bottom-up budget process. Ferejohn and Krehbiel (1987) showed theoretically that this need not be the case. We test experimentally the theoretical predictions of their work. The evidence from these experiments lends strong support to their theory, both at the aggregate and the individual subject level