Judgments Of Resource Distributions: The Role Of Long-term Outcomes

Equity theory (Adams, 1965; Walster, Berscheid, & Walster, 1976) proposes that people will perceive a distribution of resources as fair when each person in the relationship receives outcomes in proportion to his/her contributions. While equity appears to be a very important determinant of perceived fairness, inequitable distributions may also be judged fair (Deutsch, 1985). For this dissertation, it was hypothesized that many apparently inequitable distributions are seen as fair because the relationship is expected to be equitable eventually. In such a case, equity is still the underlying principle of distributive fairness, though, on the surface, people appear to be defining distributive fairness in terms other than equity.;In two experiments, undergraduates were presented with a situation, either hypothetical or actual, in which they and another person made unequal contributions to a task. Expectations for long-term equity were manipulated, after which participants rated the fairness of and/or their preferences for an equitable vs. an equal distribution of rewards. Participants also completed individual difference measures thought to relate to expectations for eventual equity (namely, beliefs in a just world, locus of control, and endorsement of the Protestant ethic).;In both studies, equity was seen as the fairest distribution principle, in general. In Study 1, equality was perceived as more fair when eventual equity was probable than when it was not, but only for strong believers in a just world and participants with an internal locus of control. In Study 2, there was little evidence that expectations for long-term equity influenced fairness ratings. Fairness ratings in both experiments appeared to be affected by motives in addition to fairness, such as politeness. The measures of distributive fairness in both studies yielded similar, but not identical, results to the preference measures.;These findings suggest that perceptions of distributions may be influenced by long-term expectations, at least in certain situations and for certain individuals. They also suggest that distributive justice researchers should be aware that perceived fairness and preferences may not be deemed equivalent. Finally, the findings appear to show that both distributive fairness and distributive preferences are influenced by a complex array of competing motivations

Experimental evidence of subtle victim blame in the absence of explicit blame.

We argue that people will often eschew explicit victim blame (e.g., claiming that "X is to blame") because it is counternormative and socially undesirable, yet they might still engage in subtle victim blame by attributing victims' suffering to behaviors the victims can control (i.e., "high control causes"). We found support for this argument in three online studies with US residents. In Studies 1 and 2, participants viewed a victim posing either a high threat to the need to believe in a just world, which should heighten the motivation to engage in victim blame, or a low threat. They then rated explicit blame items and attributions for the victim's suffering. Explicit blame was low overall and not influenced by victim threat. However, participants attributed the high threat victim's suffering, more than the low threat victim's suffering, to high control causes, thus showing a subtle blame effect. In Study 2, explicit blame and subtle blame were less strongly associated (in the high threat condition) for individuals high in socially desirable responding. These results are consistent with our argument that explicit and subtle blame diverge in part due to social desirability concerns. In Study 3, most participants believed others viewed the explicit blame items, but not the attribution items, as assessing blame. Thus, attributions to high control causes can be seen as "subtle" in the sense that people believe others will view such statements as reflecting constructs other than blame. Our studies suggest a way of responding to innocent victims that could be particularly relevant in a modern context, given increasing social undesirability of various negative responses to disadvantaged and victimized individuals

Deservingness, the scope of justice, and actions toward others

In this chapter, the authors report three studies that examined the psychological mechanisms underlying the effects of several factors previously shown to influence decisions to help or harm a target. In particular, the studies tested whether the perceived deservingness of a target for favorable (or unfavorable) treatment or, instead, the inclusion (or exclusion) of the target in the perceiver’s “scope of justice” best accounted for the effects of variables that have been hypothesized by previous theorists to operate by means of the latter mechanism (inclusion-exclusion). In the rest of the two studies, the authors manipulated the usefulness of the target, the degree of conflict between the target and the perceiver, and the similarity between the target and the perceiver. The results of these studies provided some support for a deservingness perspective but no support for a scope of justice perspective. In a third study, the authors tested whether exclusion from the scope of justice might indeed occur, but only in relatively extreme conditions. They conclude the chapter with suggestions for future research on this issue

Distinguishing two meanings of moral exclusion: exclusion from moral principles or principled harm-doing?

The concept of “moral exclusion” has often been used to understand harm-doing. The present studies examined two, distinct meanings that have been ascribed to this concept. First, exclusion has sometimes been conceptualized as the belief that moral principles do not apply to a target person or group (e.g., exclusion from the application of justice principles). Second, the term has been used to refer to exclusion from positive treatment that is accorded to others, which the actors believe to be morally justified, though outside observers do not. Distinguishing between these two meanings can clarify the mechanisms underlying the relation between proposed antecedents to exclusion and harm-doing. In two experiments, we obtained evidence compatible with each of these conceptualizations of exclusion, as well as preliminary evidence that certain antecedents are more likely to lead to processes indicative of one or the other conceptualization. Our findings have practical implications for the reduction of harm-doing as well as for conflict that might arise in such attempts

The relation between people's connection with a target and the perceived importance of justice

We propose that actors will perceive justice as more important with respect to a target when they experience moderate versus extremely high or extremely low connection with the target. In two studies, we manipulated actors’ connection with (e.g., similarity to) a target and the target's standing on the appropriate justice criterion. Both studies yielded the predicted curvilinear relation between connectedness and the perceived relevance of justice. In Study 2, actors’ decisions were more affected by the justice criterion in the moderate versus extreme connectedness conditions. Our findings have important implications for the interplay between connection with others and moral motivations