New Modes of Governance in Europe: Policy Making without Legislating? IHS Political Science Series: 2002, No. 81

The article analyzes new modes of governance in Europe. Firstly, different types of new governance, the open coordination method and voluntary accords, and their individual elements are identified. The theoretical discussion about them points out the reasons of their emergence, their mode of operation and the links to the ‘classical’ forms of decision-making. Secondly the simple question of the relative importance of new modes of governance in European policy-making is raised. Looking at the policy measures from the beginning of 2000 until July 2001, the analysis found that only a minority of measures can be considered new modes of governance, defined in the above terms. A third question raised concerns political institutional capacity. Finally the question or instrumental capacity or effectiveness is raised

Codecision and Institutional Change

We examine the sources and processes of institutional change in one important aspect of EU politics-the legislative procedure of codecision and show how interstitial change of institutions emerges between formal Treaty revisions and under specific conditions may be formalized in subsequent formal Treaty reforms. We develop two related models of Treaty change. First, in a 'simple' model, we argue that informal rules will be formalized in the Treaty text where all member states are in agreement, and will be rolled back when all member states oppose them; otherwise they will continue in existence at the informal level. Second, in a more complex framework, we argue that actors who have effective veto powers in a related arena may make credible threats that allow them to press member states into formalizing informal rules, provided that member states are not unanimously opposed to this formalization. We empirically assess our claims in the light of several instances of informal rules applied in the codecision procedure.democracy; European Parliament; European Parliament; co-decision procedure

New modes of governance in Europe: policy making without legislating?

Die Studie untersucht neue Formen des Regierens (governance) in Europa. Zunächst werden Typen des 'new governance' wie die Methode der offenen Koordination und der freiwilligen Abstimmung unterschieden. Die theoretische Diskussion dieser Typen arbeitet die Ursachen ihrer Entstehung, den Operationsmodus und die Verbindungen mit den 'klassischen' Formen der Entscheidungsfindung heraus. In einem zweiten Schritt wird dann die relative Bedeutung dieser neuen Formen im europäischen politischen Entscheidungsprozess erörtert. Die Beobachtung der europäischen Politik im Zeitraum von Anfang 2000 bis Juli 2001 zeigt, dass nur ein geringes Maß des policy-outputs als 'neu' im obigen Sinn bezeichnet werden kann. Abschließend werden Fragen der institutionellen Kapazität der EU und deren instrumentelle Effektivität und Effizienz erörtert. (ICAÜbers)'The article analyzes new modes of governance in Europe. Firstly, different types of new governance, the open coordination method and voluntary accords, and their individual elements are identified. The theoretical discussion about them points out the reasons of their emergence, their mode of operation and the links to the 'classical' forms of decision-making. Secondly the simple question of the relative importance of new modes of governance in European policy-making is raised. Looking at the policy measures from the beginning of 2000 until July 2001, the analysis found that only a minority of measures can be considered new modes of governance, defined in the above terms. A third question raised concerns political institutional capacity. Finally the question or instrumental capacity or effectiveness is raised.' (author's abstract)

Legislate or Delegate? Bargaining over Implementation and Legislative Authority in the European Union

In this article we explain how actors' ability to bargain successfully in order to advance their institutional preferences has changed over time as a function of the particular institutional context. We show how actors use their bargaining power under given institutional rules in order to shift the existing balance between legislation and delegation, and shift the rules governing delegation in their favor, between formal treaty changes. We argue that a collective actor's preferences over delegation is a function of whether the actor has more ability to influence policy through delegation or through legislation. We go on to argue that the degree to which a specific actor's preferences can prevail (in a setting in which different actors have different preferences) will depend upon its bargaining power under existing institutional rules, i.e. its ability to impede or veto policy in order to change the division between legislation and delegation and the rules of delegation. Our primary focus in this article is on choice over procedure; i.e. the battles over whether or not delegation or legislation should be employed. We maintain a secondary focus on change in procedure, examining how different procedures of comitology have come into being and been removed from the table. We examine the evolution of the debate over comitology and implementation, over five key periods. We scrutinize how actors within these periods seek to shift the balance of legislation and delegation and the rules of delegation according to their preferences. Our conclusions assess our empirical findings on the basis of our model.accountability; European Commission; Council of Ministers; European Parliament; European Parliament

The Shadow of Hierarchy and New Modes of Governance

This special issue about sectoral governance in the shadow of hierarchy focuses on two sets of questions. Firstly, do new modes of sectoral governance in themselves contribute to the efficacy of policymaking or do they require the shadow of hierarchy, i.e. legislative and executive decisions, in order to deal effectively with the problems they are supposed to solve? And, secondly, what are the institutional links between sectoral governance and territorially bounded democratic governments? How do different links contribute to the efficacy of policymaking and how do they change over time? Is there a retreat of government from policymaking and a corresponding increase of sectoral governance, or just the opposite

The European Parliament and Delegation to Comitology

In this article we argue that that the delegation of implementing power to the Commission changes due to the fact that, under co-decision, two legislators (the Council and the EP) must agree to delegate. We first show that, with the introduction of co-decision in environmental policy, the legislators have relied more extensively on delegation. This indicates that the EP and the Council sought to save the political transaction costs associated with detailed legislation.. Moreover, the finding that increased delegation preceded the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty shows that the Council – anticipating its relative loss of power by having to share legislative power with the EP - was in a rush to delegate as much as possible to the Commission before the entry into force of co-decision. This is in accordance with a redistributive power-based bargaining argument according to which the Council prefers to delegate to the Commission, over which it has some control through comitology rather than sharing the legislative power with the EP. We also claimed that with increasing formal powers in comitology the EP will less oppose delegation. Our results support this hypothesis, but call for some qualification: the EP opposes delegation less, if the increase in competences is important. If, however, it is only minor, it does not lead to less opposition to comitology. Quite the contrary, the EP appears to be prompted to systematically introduce amendments to restrict the scope of delegation. Which in turn may be used as a leverage in future negotiations over the revising of the rules governing comitology

Inter-organizational negotiation and intra-organizational power in shared decision-making: early agreements under codecision and their impact on the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers

'Dieser Beitrag plädiert dafür, inter-organisatorische Entscheidungsregeln und ihre Auswirkungen auf intra-organisatorische Prozesse stärker in den Blick zu nehmen. Wir argumentieren, dass ein exogener Wandel der makroinstitutionellen Regeln von formellen und sequentiellen zu informellen und simultanen Interaktionen die Einflussmöglichkeiten einzelner Akteure innerhalb von Organisationen verändert. Bestimmte Akteure, insbesondere 'Schnittstellen'-Akteure, die den organisationsinternen Informationsfluss steuern, gewinnen dadurch an Einfluss. Doch wie reagieren Organisationen auf eine solche Veränderung der internen Machtverhältnisse? Organisationen, in denen die Beziehungen gegenüber externen Akteuren zentral koordiniert sind, werden mit einer effektiven Strategie der internen Regelanpassung reagieren. Organisationen, die eine Vielzahl untereinander wenig koordinierter Beziehungen zu externen Akteuren unterhalten, werden eine solche interne Regelanpassung dagegen nur sehr schwer bewerkstelligen können. Wir illustrieren unser generelles theoretisches Argument am Beispiel des Zusammenwirkens von Europäischem Parlament und Ministerrat im Rahmen des Verfahrens der Mitentscheidung und der daraus resultierenden intra-organisatorischen Effekte.' (Autorenreferat)'In this article we argue that closer attention should be paid to the inter-organizational rules of decision-making and their implications for intra-organizational processes. We claim that exogenous changes in macro-institutional rules, which result in a move from formal and sequential to informal and simultaneous interaction between collective actors will lead to changes in individual actors' respective influence over outcomes within organizations. Certain individuals, in particular 'relais' actors, controlling information flows between organizations, will see an increase in their power over legislative outcomes. This begs the question of how organizations will respond to these shifts in their internal power balance. We argue that collective actors that centralize coordination over dealings with external actors will respond effectively through internal rule change. In contrast, collective actors with multiple, ill coordinated links to other organizations, will find it difficult to change internal rules. We empirically explore the general argument by analyzing the relationship between the Council and the European Parliament in the process of codecision and its implications for intra-organizational processes.' (author's abstract

Quality and Environmental Regulation: Verifying Compliance along the Supply Chain

Among the factors providing incentives to monitor the behaviour of input suppliers are the regulatory requirements to which downstream firms are subject. We develop a formal economic model to examine the relationship between the strictness of the regulatory environment and downstream firms’ incentives to act as inspectors of their sub-contractors. We consider the interaction between a downstream producer and an upstream input supplier. The downstream chooses the probability with which to monitor the upstream’s compliance and the upstream chooses a compliance level which determines compliance of the end product with quality or environmental regulation. We find that the strictness of regulation affects the downstream’s monitoring strategy in combination with the level of quality or environmental standards. If the standards are sufficiently low then the strictness of regulation increases incentives to monitor the upstream. Contrary, if the standards are sufficiently high then the pressure on the downstream to monitor the upstream is relaxed and the strictness of regulation decreases incentives to monitor. We argue that the strictness of regulation should not be treated in isolation as a factor determining the choice of downstream firms to monitor their input suppliers.compliance; monitoring; supply chain; quality and environmental regulation

The emergence of transnational hybrid governance: how private risks trigger public intervention

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The logic of regulatory venue shopping: a firm's perspective

Drawing on an original and unprecedented survey data set of 243 medium- and bigsized firms operating in five sectors(energy, telecommunications, railways, airlines, and postal services) and across 29 European countries, we analyse what incentivizes firms to interact with and influence multiple regulators. In so doing, we map the regulatory opportunity structure and scrutinize firms’venue shopping logics. The study shows that firms can clearly identify where the locus of political and regulatory competence lies and that they concentrate their activities at this level. In particular, the data shows that the national level is still the most important target level for regulatory representation. Regulatory venue shopping, the study illustrates, occurs when issues are highly salient, highly technical and when high stakes are involved. Notably, we show that firms tend to address more regulators in sectors characterized by higher international competitiveness to mitigate uncertainty when operating in multiple markets and facing rivalry from international competitors