Discriminatory vs Uniform Price Auction: Auction Revenue

We compare auction revenues from discriminatory auctions and uniform price auctions in the case of the Korean treasury bonds auction market. For this purpose, we employ detailed bidder level data for each of 16 discriminatory auctions recently carried out in Korea. We first theoretically recover unobserved individual bidding functions under counter-factual uniform price auctions from the observed bidding functions under the actual discriminatory auctions, and then empirically estimate revenue differences. To test significance of the auction revenue differences, we use Bootstrap re-sampling methods where uncertainty in the cut-off yield spreads and uncertainty in the bidders are addressed individually as well as simultaneously. Our results indicate that uniform price auction increases the auction revenue relative to the discriminatory auction in most of the 16 cases, justifying the Korean government’s decision to switch to the uniform price auction mechanism in August 2000Treasury bonds auction, discriminatory auction, uniform price auction, hazard rate, Bootstrap re-sampling, yield spread, bidding function, bid shading

FLUIDIZATION TECHNOLOGY FOR STABLE STARTUP OF COMMERCIAL FCC UNIT

Conditions for maintaining good fluidization in the start-up of FCC have been determined. Catalyst defluidization and consequent catalyst losses from reactor cyclone are mainly affected by catalyst properties and stripper operating condition based on previous commercial startup experiences. Effect of fine catalyst contents on bed fluidity was determined. Bed fluidity in stripper was analyzed with slip velocity. Finally new startup guide was proposed and it was successfully applied to commercial FCC process of SK energy, Korea

A Prediction Rule to Identify Severe Cases among Adult Patients Hospitalized with Pandemic Influenza A (H1N1) 2009

The purpose of this study was to establish a prediction rule for severe illness in adult patients hospitalized with pandemic influenza A (H1N1) 2009. At the time of initial presentation, the baseline characteristics of those with severe illness (i.e., admission to intensive care unit, mechanical ventilation, or death) were compared to those of patients with non-severe illnesses. A total of 709 adults hospitalized with pandemic influenza A (H1N1) 2009 were included: 75 severe and 634 non-severe cases. The multivariate analysis demonstrated that altered mental status, hypoxia (PaO2/FiO2 ≤ 250), bilateral lung infiltration, and old age (≥ 65 yr) were independent risk factors for severe cases (all P < 0.001). The area under the ROC curve (0.834 [95% CI, 0.778-0.890]) of the number of risk factors were not significantly different with that of APACHE II score (0.840 [95% CI, 0.790-0.891]) (P = 0.496). The presence of ≥ 2 risk factors had a higher sensitivity, specificity, positive predictive value and negative predictive value than an APACHE II score of ≥ 13. As a prediction rule, the presence of ≥ 2 these risk factors is a powerful and easy-to-use predictor of the severity in adult patients hospitalized with pandemic influenza A (H1N1) 2009

Mirae Asset Co., Korea

Abstract: We compare auction revenues from discriminatory auctions and uniform price auctions in the case of the Korean treasury bonds auction market. For this purpose, we employ detailed bidder level data for each of 16 discriminatory auctions recently carried out in Korea. We first theoretically recover unobserved individual bidding functions under counter-factual uniform price auctions from the observed bidding functions under the actual discriminatory auctions, and then empirically estimate revenue differences. To test significance of the auction revenue differences, we use Bootstrap resampling methods where uncertainty in the cut-off yield spreads and uncertainty in the bidders are addressed individually as well as simultaneously. Our results indicate that uniform price auction increases the auction revenue relative to the discriminatory auction in most of the 16 cases, justifying the Korean government’s decision to switch to the uniform price auction mechanism