Detecting semantic social engineering attacks with the weakest link: Implementation and empirical evaluation of a human-as-a-security-sensor framework

The notion that the human user is the weakest link in information security has been strongly, and, we argue, rightly contested in recent years. Here, we take a step further showing that the human user can in fact be the strongest link for detecting attacks that involve deception, such as application masquerading, spearphishing, WiFi evil twin and other types of semantic social engineering. Towards this direction, we have developed a human-as-a-security-sensor framework and a practical implementation in the form of Cogni-Sense, a Microsoft Windows prototype application, designed to allow and encourage users to actively detect and report semantic social engineering attacks against them. Experimental evaluation with 26 users of different profiles running Cogni-Sense on their personal computers for a period of 45 days has shown that human sensors can consistently outperform technical security systems. Making use of a machine learning based approach, we also show that the reliability of each report, and consequently the performance of each human sensor, can be predicted in a meaningful and practical manner. In an organisation that employs a human-as-a-security-sensor implementation, such as Cogni-Sense, an attack is considered to have been detected if at least one user has reported it. In our evaluation, a small organisation consisting only of the 26 participants of the experiment would have exhibited a missed detection rate below 10%, down from 81% if only technical security systems had been used. The results strongly point towards the need to actively involve the user not only in prevention through cyber hygiene and user-centric security design, but also in active cyber threat detection and reporting

Radiological assessment on spent resin treatment facility and transportation for radioactive waste disposal

Several radionuclides including tritium generated in heavy-water reactor nuclear power plants are managed through ion-exchange resins, and these spent resins are then stored in storage tanks. To maintain the capacity of the storage tanks, the waste sludge should be treated using appropriate methods. Dose assessments are conducted to ensure radiological safety during the treatment and disposal of the spent resin. In this study, it is performed that a radiological evaluation of the operation of spent-resin waste treatment facilities and transportation of the radioactive waste???in a polymer concrete high-integrity container (PC-HIC) for spent resin disposal???of Wolseong Nuclear Power Plant, a heavy-water reactor nuclear power plant in Korea. Radiation workers using the spent resin treatment equipment, as well as radiation workers transporting PC-HIC to the disposal site and public spaces in the transportation route, were considered in the evaluation. The maximum dose received by radiation workers was 11.2 mSv, which is below the annual average dose limit of 20 mSv/year. Doses were below the limit at all routes, objects, and sampling locations. For waste truck drivers, the individual dose was 6.10E-03 mSv, which is also below the driver dose limit of 6 mSv. The treatment and disposal of the spent resin operations are performed while maintaining the individual doses below the dose limits set for the practices