Linking metacognition and mindreading: Evidence from autism and dual-task investigations

Questions of how we know our own and other minds, and whether metacognition and mindreading rely on the same processes, are longstanding in psychology and philosophy. In Experiment 1, children/adolescents with autism (who tend to show attenuated mindreading) showed significantly lower accuracy on an explicit metacognition task than neurotypical children/adolescents, but not on an allegedly metacognitive implicit one. In Experiment 2, neurotypical adults completed these tasks in a single-task condition, or a dual-task condition that required concurrent completion of a secondary task that tapped mindreading. Metacognitive accuracy was significantly diminished by the dual-mindreading-task on the explicit task, but not the implicit task. In Experiment 3, we included additional dual-tasks to rule out the possibility that any secondary task (regardless of whether it required mindreading) would diminish metacognitive accuracy. Finally, in both experiments 1 and 2, metacognitive accuracy on the explicit task, but not the implicit task, was associated significantly with performance on a measure of mindreading ability. These results suggest that explicit metacognitive tasks (used frequently to measure metacognition in humans) share metarepresentational processing resources with mindreading, whereas implicit tasks (which are claimed by some comparative psychologists to measure metacognition in non-human animals) do not

Metacognition, Metamemory, and Mindreading in High-Functioning Adults With Autism Spectrum Disorder

Objectives: Metacognition refers to cognition about cognition, and encompasses both knowledge of cognitive processes and the ability to monitor and control one’s own cognitions. The current study aimed to establish whether metacognition is impaired in autism spectrum disorder (ASD). According to some theories, the ability to represent one’s own mental states (an aspect of metacognition) relies on the same mechanism as the ability to represent others’ mental states (“mindreading”). Given numerous studies have shown mindreading is impaired in ASD, there is good reason to predict concurrent impairments in metacognition. Metacognition is most commonly explored in the context of memory, often by assessing people’s ability to monitor their memory processes. The current study addressed the question of whether people with ASD have difficulty monitoring the contents of their memory (alongside impaired mindreading). Method: Eighteen intellectually high-functioning adults with ASD and 18 IQ- and age-matched neurotypical adults participated. Metamemory monitoring ability and mindreading ability were assessed using a feeling-of-knowing task and the “animations” task, respectively. Participants also completed a self-report measure of metacognitive ability. Results: In addition to showing impaired mindreading, participants with ASD made significantly less accurate feeling-of-knowing judgements than neurotypical adults, suggesting that metamemory monitoring (an aspect of metacognition) was impaired. Conversely, participants with ASD self-reported superior metacognitive abilities compared to those reported by neurotypical participants. Conclusion: This study provides evidence that individuals with ASD have metamemory monitoring impairments. The theoretical and practical implications of these findings for our current understanding of metacognition in ASD and typical development are discussed

The self in autism and its relation to memory

This chapter begins with some definitions of memory and the self and continues to explain their relation on the psychological level along with their facets. It considers the relevance of these theories to autism spectrum disorder (ASD). The chapter provides a critical review of relevant research on the self in autism, followed by some hypotheses concerning how diminished sense of self might predict and explain the unique memory profile in the ASD population. Although there are a considerable number of studies showing typical performance on some types of “self” task among people with ASD on balance, existing evidence suggests that individuals with ASD have atypical me‐selves. There is a considerable amount of evidence to suggest that individuals with ASD have impaired episodic memory. Strikingly, the study of prospective memory in ASD is an emergent research field with a handful of studies published to date. Two forms of prospective memory are commonly distinguished: event‐based and time‐based

The Self-reference Effect on Memory is Not Diminished in Autism: Three Studies of Incidental and Explicit Self-referential Recognition Memory in Autistic and Neurotypical Adults and Adolescents

Three experiments investigated the extent to which a) individuals with autism show a self-reference effect (i.e., better memory for self-relevant information), and b) the size of the self-reference effect is associated with autism traits. Participants studied trait adjectives in relation to their own name (self-referent) or a celebrity’s name (other-referent) under explicit and incidental/implicit encoding conditions. Explicit encoding involved judging whether the adjectives applied to self or other (denoted by proper names). Implicit encoding involved judging whether the adjectives were presented to the right or left of one’s own or a celebrity’s name. Recognition memory for the adjectives was tested using a yes/no procedure. Experiment 1 (individual differences; N = 257 neurotypical adults) employed the Autism-spectrum Quotient as a measure of autistic traits. Experiments 2 (N = 60) and 3 (N = 52) involved case-control designs with closely-matched groups of autistic and neurotypical adults and children/adolescents, respectively. Autistic traits were measured using the Autism-spectrum Quotient and Social Responsiveness Scale, respectively. In all experiments, a significant self-reference effect was observed in both explicit and implicit encoding conditions. Most importantly, however, there was (a) no significant relation between size of the self-reference effect and number of autistic traits (Experiments 1, 2 and 3), and (b) no significant difference in the size of the self-reference effect between autistic and neurotypical participants (Experiments 2 and 3). In these respects, Bayesian analyses consistently suggested that the data supported the null hypothesis. These results challenge the notion that subjective or objective self-awareness are impaired in autism. It is generally easier to remember information that is relevant to oneself than to remember other kinds of information. This is known as the “self-reference effect”. Previously, it has been claimed that people with autism show a reduced self-reference effect (implying diminished self-awareness) but this study provides robust evidence that people with autism are, in fact, just as susceptible to this effect as neurotypical people

Relationships between implicit and explicit uncertainty monitoring and mindreading: Evidence from autism spectrum disorder

We examined performance on implicit (non-verbal) and explicit (verbal) uncertaintymonitoring tasks among neurotypical participants and participants with autism, while also testing mindreading abilities in both groups. We found that: (i) performance of autistic participants was unimpaired on the implicit uncertainty-monitoring task, while being significantly impaired on the explicit task; (ii) performance on the explicit task was correlated with performance on mindreading tasks in both groups, whereas performance on the implicit uncertainty-monitoring task was not; and (iii) performance on implicit and explicit uncertainty-monitoring tasks was not correlated. The results support the view that (a) explicit uncertainty-monitoring draws on the same cognitive faculty as mindreading whereas (b) implicit uncertainty-monitoring only test first-order decision making. These findings support the theory that metacognition and mindreading are underpinned by the same meta-representational faculty/resources, and that the implicit uncertainty-monitoring tasks that are frequently used with nonhuman animals fail to demonstrate the presence of metacognitive abilities

Interoceptive impairments do not lie at the heart of Autism or Alexithymia

Background: Quattrocki and Friston (2012) argued that abnormalities in interoception–the process of representing one’s internal physiological states–could lie at the heart of autism, because of the critical role interoception plays in the ontogeny of social-affective processes. This proposal drew criticism from proponents of the alexithymia hypothesis, who argue that social-affective and underlying interoceptive impairments are not a feature of autism per se, but of alexithymia (a condition characterised by difficulties describing and identifying one's own emotions), which commonly co-occurs with autism. Despite the importance of this debate for our understanding of ASD, and of the role of interoceptive impairments in psychopathology more generally, direct empirical evidence is scarce and inconsistent. Methods: Experiment 1 examined in a sample of 137 neurotypical individuals the association among autistic traits, alexithymia, and interoceptive accuracy on a standard heartbeat tracking measure of interoceptive accuracy. In Experiment 2, interoceptive accuracy was assessed in 46 adults with ASD (27 of whom had clinically-significant alexithymia) and 48 neurotypical adults. Results: Experiment 1 confirmed strong associations between autistic traits and alexithymia, but yielded no evidence to suggest that either was associated with interoceptive difficulties. Similarly, Experiment 2 provided no evidence for interoceptive impairments in autistic adults, irrespective of any co-occurring alexithymia. Bayesian analyses consistently supported the null hypothesis. Conclusions: The observations pose a significant challenge to notions that interoceptive impairments constitute a core feature of either ASD or alexithymia, at least as far as the direct perception of interoceptive signals is concerned. General scientific summary: This article suggests that impairments in interoception–the process of representing one’s internal physiological states–do not lie at the heart of either autism or alexithymia

Systematic review of MRI safety literature in relation to radiofrequency thermal injury prevention

Introduction Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) is a rapidly evolving modality, generally considered safe due to lack of ionising radiation. While MRI technology and techniques are improving, many of the safety concerns remain the same as when first established. Patient thermal injuries are the most frequently reported adverse event, accounting for 59% of MRI incidents to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Surveys indicate many incidents remain unreported. Patient thermal injuries are preventable and various methods for their mitigation have been published. However, recommendations can be variable, fragmented and confusing. The aim of this systematic review was to synthesise the evidence on MRI safety and associated skin injuries and offer comprehensive recommendations for radiographers to prevent skin thermal injuries. Methods Four journal databases were searched for sources published January 2010–May 2023, presenting information on MRI safety and thermal injuries. Results Of 26,801 articles returned, after careful screening and based on the eligibility criteria, only 79 articles and an additional 19 grey literature sources were included (n = 98). Included studies were examined using thematic analysis to determine if holistic recommendations can be provided to assist in preventing skin burns. This resulted in three simplified recommendations: - Remove any electrically conductive items - Insulate the patient to prevent any conductive loops or contact with objects - Communicate regularly Conclusion By implementing the above recommendations, it is estimated that 97% of skin burns could be prevented. With thermal injuries continuing to impact MRI safety, strategies to prevent skin burns and heating are essential. Assessing individual risks, rather than blanket policies, will help prevent skin thermal injuries occurring, improving patient care

Data-in-Place: Thinking through the Relations Between Data and Community

We present findings from a year-long engagement with a street and its community . The work is targeted at exploring how the production and use of data is bound up with place, both in terms of physical and social geography. We detail three strands of the project. First, we consider how residents have sought to curate existing data about the street in the form of an archive with physical and digital components. Second, we report endeavours to capture data about the street’s environment, especially of traffic moving through it. Third, we draw on the possibilities afforded by technologies for polling opinion. We reflect on how these engagements have: materialised distinctive relations between the community and their data; surfaced flows and contours of data , and spatial, temporal and social boundaries ;and enacted a multiplicity of ‘small worlds’. We consider how such a conceptualisation of data-in-place is relevant to the design of data technologies