R.J. Rummel: An Assessment of His Many Contributions

The book provides a critical and constructive assessment of the many contributions to social science and politics made by Professor R. J. Rummel. Rummel was a prolific writer and an important teacher and mentor to a number of people who in turn have made their mark on the profession. His work has always been controversial. But after the end of the Cold War, his views on genocide and the democratic peace in particular have gained wide recognition in the profession. He was also a pioneer in the use of statistical methods in international relations. His work in not easily classified in the traditional categories of international relations research (realism, idealism, and constructivism). He was by no means a pacifist and his views on the US-Soviet arms race led him to be classified as a hawk. But his work on the democratic peace has become extremely influential among liberal IR scholars and peace researchers. Above all, he was a libertarian

R.J. Rummel: An Assessment of His Many Contributions

genocide; democracy; libertarianism; peace; Cold Wa

Democratic Jihad ? Military intervention and democracy

Democracies rarely if ever fight one another, but they participate in wars as frequently as autocracies. They tend to win the wars in which they participate. Democracies frequently build large alliances in wartime, but not only with other democracies. From time to time democracies intervene militarily in ongoing conflicts. The democratic peace may contribute to a normative justification for such interventions, for the purpose of promoting democracy and eventually for the promotion of peace. This is reinforced by an emerging norm of humanitarian intervention. Democracies may have a motivation to intervene in non-democracies, even in the absence of ongoing conflict, for the purpose of regime change. The recent Iraq War may be interpreted in this perspective. A strong version of this type of foreign policy may be interpreted as a democratic crusade. The paper examines the normative and theoretical foundations of democratic interventionism. An empirical investigation of interventions in the period 1960-96 indicates that democracies intervene quite frequently, but rarely against other democracies. In the short term, democratic intervention appears to be successfully promoting democratization, but the target states tend to end up among the unstable semi-democracies. The most widely publicized recent interventions are targeted on poor or resource-dependent countries in non-democratic neighborhoods. Previous research has found these characteristics to reduce the prospects for stable democracy. Thus, forced democratization is unpredictable withregard to achieving long-term democracy and potentially harmful with regard to securing peace. But short-term military successes may stimulate more interventions until the negative consequences become more visible.Population Policies,Peace&Peacekeeping,Parliamentary Government,Politics and Government,Political Systems and Analysis

Against All Odds: 2013 Richardson Award to Mats Hammarstr�m and Peter Wallensteen

The institutionalization of peace research has been a tortuous process and it has proven particularly difficult to establish separate departments for peace research in the universities. The Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University is a spectacular exception. This article honors two outstanding scholars who made it happen against all odds and who received the 2013 Lewis Fry Richardson Lifetime Achievement Award for their contribution to the scientific study of armed conflict. Peter Wallensteen and Mats Hammarstr�m were awarded the prize for their individual scholarly output but above all for their joint achievement in establishing peace and conflict research at Uppsala University with its two pillars, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program and the training program for young scholars. They have made a lasting contribution to an institution of world-wide renown that pursues research in the scientific tradition of Richardson

Demand, supply, and restraint: Determinants of domestic water conflict and cooperation

This article focuses on one of the most likely empirical manifestations of the "environment-conflict" claim by examining how demand for and supply of water may lead to domestic water conflict. It also studies what factors may reduce the risk of conflict and, hence, induce cooperation. To this end, the article advances several theory-based arguments about the determinants of water conflict and cooperation, and then analyzes time-series cross-section data for 35 Mediterranean, Middle Eastern, and Sahel countries between 1997 and 2009. The empirical results show that demand-side drivers, such as population pressure, agricultural productivity, and economic development are likely to have a stronger impact on water conflict risk than supply-side factors, represented by climate variability. The analysis also reveals that violent water conflicts are extremely rare, and that factors conducive to restraint, such as stable political conditions, may stimulate cooperation. Overall, these results suggest that the joint analysis of demand, supply, and restraint improves our ability to account for domestic water-related conflict and cooperation

Elections and Ethnic Civil War

Existing research on how democratization may influence the risk of civil war tends to consider only changes in the overall level of democracy and rarely examines explicitly the postulated mechanisms relating democratization to incentives for violence. The authors argue that typically highlighted key mechanisms imply that elections should be especially likely to affect ethnic groups’ inclination to resort to violence. Distinguishing between types of conflict and the order of competitive elections, the authors find that ethnic civil wars are more likely to erupt after competitive elections, especially after first and second elections following periods of no polling. When disaggregating to the level of individual ethnic groups and conflicts over territory or government, the authors find some support for the notion that ethno-nationalist mobilization and sore-loser effects provoke postelectoral violence. More specifically, although large groups in general are more likely to engage in governmental conflicts, they are especially likely to do so after noncompetitive elections. Competitive elections, however, strongly reduce the risk of conflict. </jats:p

Regime Type and Bilateral Treaty Formalization

How does domestic regime type affect bilateral cooperation, and one of its most visible manifestations, bilateral treaties? This article explains how domestic political regime affects bilateral cooperation and, contrary to the expectations of some scholars, why autocracies should be expected to be more likely than democracies to enter into bilateral treaties. If the preferences of a pair of states are not identical, the sets of agreements that each party would consent to (win-sets) need to overlap for a bilateral treaty to be acceptable. Because additional domestic constraints reduce the size of a country’s win-set, autocracies should have broader win-sets than democracies. Therefore, autocratic dyads should be more likely to formalize bilateral treaties than other pairs of states. Based on an original data set, I present empirical evidence showing that pairs of autocracies are more likely than other pairs of states to enter into agreements formalizing bilateral cooperation