Do re-election probabilities influence public investment?

We identify exogenous variation in incumbent policymakers’ re-election probabilities and explore empirically how this variation affects their investments in physical capital. Our results indicate that a higher re-election probability leads to higher investments, particularly in the purposes preferred more strongly by the incumbents. This aligns with a theoretical framework where political parties disagree about which públic goods to produce using labor and predetermined public capital

Do Re-election Probabilities Influence Public Investment?

We identify exogenous variation in incumbent policymakers' re-election probabilities and explore empirically how this variation affects the incumbents' investment in physical capital. Our results indicate that a higher re-election probability leads to higher investments, particularly in the purposes preferred more strongly by the incumbents. This aligns with a theoretical framework where political parties disagree about which public goods to produce using labor and predetermined public capital. Key for the consistency between data and theory is to account for complementarity between physical capital and flow variables in government production.political economics, strategic capital accumulation, identifying popularity shocks

Voting when the Stakes are High

Rational choice theories of electoral participation stress that an individual's decision to vote depends on her expected net benefit from doing so. If this instrumental motive is relevant, then turnout should be higher in elections where more is at stake. We test this prediction, by studying how turnout is affected by exogenous variation in governments’ financial flexibility to provide pork for their voters. By utilizing simultaneous elections for different offices, we identify a positive effect of election stakes on turnout.voter motivation, elections, turnout

The Political Economy of Fiscal Deficits and Government Production

This paper analyzes a framework where policymakers decide how to spend public resources on physical capital and labor in order to produce two public goods. Candidate policymakers disagree about which goods to produce, and may alternate in office due to elections. When capital and labor are complementary inputs to the production of public goods, the anticipation of political turnover reduces public savings in physical capital rather than financial assets. Political turnover renders the stock of physical capital for public production too low and inefficiently combined with labor.publishedVersio

Government Spending and the Taylor Principle

This paper explores how government size affects the scope for equilibrium indeterminacy in a New Keynesian economy where part of the population live hand-to-mouth. I find that in this framework, a larger public sector may widen the scope for self-fulfilling prophecies to occur. This takes place even though taxes serve to reduce swings in current income. In general, government provision of goods that are Edgeworth substitutes for private consumption tend to narrow the scope for indeterminacy, while government goods that are Edgeworth complements for private consumption increase the problem of indeterminacy. Hence monetary policy should be conducted with an eye to the amount and composition of government consumption.publishedVersio

Announcements of Interest Rate Forecasts: Do Policymakers Stick to Them?

If central banks value the ex-post accuracy of their forecasts, previously announced interest rate paths might affect the current policy rate. We explore whether this "forecast adherence" has influenced the monetary policies of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and the Norges Bank, the two central banks with the longest history of publishing interest rate paths. We derive and estimate a policy rule for a central bank that is reluctant to deviate from its forecasts. The rule can nest a variety of interest rate rules. We find that policymakers appear to be constrained by their most recently announced forecasts.publishedVersio

Om interaksjon mellom pengepolitikk og tidsvarierende makroregulering av finanssektoren

Finanskrisen har skapt en forholdsvis bred konsensus om at eksisterende regulering av finansmarkedene har rettet for mye oppmerksomhet mot de individuelle finansinstitusjoners risiko, og for lite oppmerksomhet mot risikoen det finansielle systemet som helhet. Nye styringsverktøy rettet mot finanssektoren er derfor blitt foreslått. I debatten omtales denne kategorien virkemiddel som "macroprudential policy", eller makroregulering av finanssektoren. Et viktig aspekt ved denne reguleringen er at den innebærer tidsvarierende virkemiddelbruk. Denne tidsvariasjonen reiser spørsmål om hvordan makroregulering av finanssektoren vil interagere med annen tidsvarierende makropolitikk. Dette notatet drøfter samspillet mellom konvensjonell pengepolitikk og tidsvarierende makroregulering av finanssektoren. Hensikten er ikke å gi en detaljert fremstilling av hvordan de foreslåtte virkemidlene vil virke på økonomien eller hvordan de skal implementeres. Målet med notatet er heller å klargjøre de økonomiske mekanismene hvorigjennom de nye virkemidlene vil påvirke effekten av konvensjonell pengepolitikk i form av rentesetting, og potensielle koordineringsproblemer mellom bruken av de nye reguleringsverktøyene og konvensjonell pengepolitikk

That Uncertain Feeling - How Consumption Responds to Economic Uncertainty in Norway

Economic theory predicts that higher uncertainty motivates households to consume less. In this paper we empirically assess how household consumption in Norway responds to variation in economic uncertainty. We consider alternative measures of uncertainty, volatility indexes from financial markets and the frequency with which economic uncertainty is mentioned in the Norwegian press. We find that a one standard deviation rise in our preferred measure of uncertainty is followed by a statistically significant fall in overall consumption reaching a maximum of about 0.6% after one year. For durable consumption the fall is larger, reaching a maximum of 2% after one year. These responses are consistent with precautionary savings affecting all consumption components, and additional wait-and-see effects for durable consumption

Om interaksjon mellom pengepolitikk og tidsvarierende makroregulering av finanssektoren

Finanskrisen har skapt en forholdsvis bred konsensus om at eksisterende regulering av finansmarkedene har rettet for mye oppmerksomhet mot de individuelle finansinstitusjoners risiko, og for lite oppmerksomhet mot risikoen det finansielle systemet som helhet. Nye styringsverktøy rettet mot finanssektoren er derfor blitt foreslått. I debatten omtales denne kategorien virkemiddel som "macroprudential policy", eller makroregulering av finanssektoren. Et viktig aspekt ved denne reguleringen er at den innebærer tidsvarierende virkemiddelbruk. Denne tidsvariasjonen reiser spørsmål om hvordan makroregulering av finanssektoren vil interagere med annen tidsvarierende makropolitikk. Dette notatet drøfter samspillet mellom konvensjonell pengepolitikk og tidsvarierende makroregulering av finanssektoren. Hensikten er ikke å gi en detaljert fremstilling av hvordan de foreslåtte virkemidlene vil virke på økonomien eller hvordan de skal implementeres. Målet med notatet er heller å klargjøre de økonomiske mekanismene hvorigjennom de nye virkemidlene vil påvirke effekten av konvensjonell pengepolitikk i form av rentesetting, og potensielle koordineringsproblemer mellom bruken av de nye reguleringsverktøyene og konvensjonell pengepolitikk

The Political Economy of Fiscal Deficits and Government Production

This paper analyzes a framework where policymakers decide how to spend public resources on physical capital and labor in order to produce two public goods. Candidate policymakers disagree about which goods to produce, and may alternate in office due to elections. When capital and labor are complementary inputs to the production of public goods, the anticipation of political turnover reduces public savings in physical capital rather than financial assets. Political turnover renders the stock of physical capital for public production too low and inefficiently combined with labor