The association between voluntary disclosure and corporate governance in the presence of severe agency conflicts

Agency conflicts between different types of investors are particularly severe in the presence of high family and block-holder ownership. By focusing on a setting characterised by high ownership concentration, we study the role of independent directors in promoting transparency through increased disclosure. In our tests, we use a sample of Spanish firms and, consistent with prior work, show that the presence of these directors is strongly associated with increased voluntary disclosure. Additionally, we find that when an executive director takes on Chair responsibilities the level of voluntary information is reduced, creating potential conflicts with the role of independent directors. Our results suggest that a strong legal framework holds firm-level clashes of interest in check. We conclude that this regulatory environment can create sufficient incentives to bring together the interests of minority and majority shareholders and guarantee an efficient monitoring role of independent directors. However, results suggest that other mechanisms should be reinforced in order to improve the role of governance control on agency relationships, particularly in the case of the concentration of Chair and executive responsibilitie

Proprietary costs, governance and the segment disclosure decision

This version of the article has been accepted for publication, after peer review (when applicable) and is subject to Springer Nature’s AM terms of use, but is not the Version of Record and does not reflect post-acceptance improvements, or any corrections. The Version of Record is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-012-9243-4Focusing on the Spanish setting, characterized by high ownership concentration and a regulatory framework that traditionally has given more priority to the avoidance of proprietary and competition costs related to disclosure than to promoting transparency, this paper aims to identify the main factors influencing the segment reporting decision. In particular, we aim to test whether the strength of concentrated ownership structures together with the persistence of the pre-IAS reporting philosophy offsets the role of independent directors. If this is the case, it would be in spite of the new IAS/IFRS reporting standards based on relevance and transparency, and would also run counter to the improvements in the Spanish governance framework which strengthens the presence of independent non-executive directors. The empirical evidence suggests that, under the new IAS/IFRS reporting philosophy, proprietary costs may have lost relevance due to the introduction of mandatory segment information requirements. In addition, within an institutional context of high ownership concentration, independent directors play a significant role in raising the level of reported information. The context of the new IFRS 8 offers opportunities to observe how governance and proprietary costs affect the new 'management approach' to segment classification. © 2012 Springer Science+Business Media New Yor

Gobierno corporativo e información voluntaria en las compañías cotizadas españolas

El objetivo de este trabajo consiste en analizar los principales factores que determinan la revelación de información voluntaria por parte de las compañías cotizadas españolas, más concretamente, la importancia de la estructura del consejo de administración y el papel de los consejeros independientes. El análisis empírico se ha desarrollado sobre un total de 62 empresas españolas cotizadas que publican su informe anual donde se recoge la información de carácter voluntario relacionada con la evolución de la compañía a lo largo del ejercicio. El grado de información voluntaria publicada por las empresas ha sido medido a través de la elaboración de un índice compuesto por un total de 76 ítems de información clasificados en un total de ocho categorías. Los resultados son consistentes con trabajos previos realizados en contextos institucionales diferentes y parecen apuntar el importante papel de los consejeros independientes a la hora de fomentar la transparencia informativa en las compañías y revelar a los usuarios de la información financiera más información de la exigida legalmente. Asimismo, el análisis empírico también pone de manifiesto que la concentración de las figuras de presidente y consejero delegado en la misma persona reduce los niveles de información voluntaria. En cuanto al papel de los consejeros dominicales, los resultados indican que estos no ejercen un importante papel en la revelación de información voluntaria suministrada a los usuarios externos. Aunque los trabajos previos realizados en el contexto español ponen de manifiesto el importante papel de los consejeros dominicales a la hora de reducir las prácticas de gestión del resultado (García y Gill de Albornoz, 2007), no se observa ningún efecto significativo de estos en los niveles de información publicada de forma voluntaria por las empresas, lo que sugiere que su presencia y más concretamente el control que ejercen sobre la dirección empresarial y sobre los niveles de calidad del resultado contable, hace menos necesario utilizar mecanismos alternativos de información

Public oversight systems for statutory auditors in the European Union

We provide a comparative overview of the process of implementation, harmonization and stabilization of public oversight systems for statutory auditors across the European Union (EU) after Directive 2006/43/EC. We build on institutional change theory to identify potential determinants as to why some countries still lag in this harmonization process. Oversight systems are a key institutional factor to guarantee the quality of financial information, essential to maintain investors’ confidence and deep and stable capital markets. Thus, the harmonization of these systems has long been an objective of the EU. Our analyses serve to identify, analyse and compare how EU countries have incorporated European-wide requirements into their national legal systems. Particularly, we study: (1) basic characteristics of the system and bodies for public oversight, (2) organizational structure, (3) financing (4) transparency, (5) supervisory, and (6) disciplinary mechanisms. We show that significant diversity still exists across systems and that both the incentives for institutional change and the distance between pre-existing systems and the Directive are important explanatory factors of the achieved level of harmonization.We acknowledge financial contribution from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (ECO2010-19314 and ECO2013-48328), the ICAC (Instituto de Contabilidad y Auditoría de Cuentas) and ASEPUC, through the XVIII Fernandez Pirla Research Funding

Ahora / Ara

La cinquena edició del microrelatari per l’eradicació de la violència contra les dones de l’Institut Universitari d’Estudis Feministes i de Gènere «Purificación Escribano» de la Universitat Jaume I vol ser una declaració d’esperança. Aquest és el moment en el qual les dones (i els homes) hem de fer un pas endavant i eliminar la violència sistèmica contra les dones. Ara és el moment de denunciar el masclisme i els micromasclismes començant a construir una societat més igualitària. Cadascun dels relats del llibre és una denúncia i una declaració que ens encamina cap a un món millor

El comportamiento de las bolsas de valores europeas como motivación para el desarrollo de prácticas de gestión del resultado contable = Evaluating the effect of earnings patterns on the European capital markets as a possible driving factor of earnings management practices

Tesis doctoral inédita. Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Departamento de Contabilidad y Organización de Empresas. Fecha de lectura: 4-05-0