Proprietary costs, governance and the segment disclosure decision

Abstract

This version of the article has been accepted for publication, after peer review (when applicable) and is subject to Springer Nature’s AM terms of use, but is not the Version of Record and does not reflect post-acceptance improvements, or any corrections. The Version of Record is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-012-9243-4Focusing on the Spanish setting, characterized by high ownership concentration and a regulatory framework that traditionally has given more priority to the avoidance of proprietary and competition costs related to disclosure than to promoting transparency, this paper aims to identify the main factors influencing the segment reporting decision. In particular, we aim to test whether the strength of concentrated ownership structures together with the persistence of the pre-IAS reporting philosophy offsets the role of independent directors. If this is the case, it would be in spite of the new IAS/IFRS reporting standards based on relevance and transparency, and would also run counter to the improvements in the Spanish governance framework which strengthens the presence of independent non-executive directors. The empirical evidence suggests that, under the new IAS/IFRS reporting philosophy, proprietary costs may have lost relevance due to the introduction of mandatory segment information requirements. In addition, within an institutional context of high ownership concentration, independent directors play a significant role in raising the level of reported information. The context of the new IFRS 8 offers opportunities to observe how governance and proprietary costs affect the new 'management approach' to segment classification. © 2012 Springer Science+Business Media New Yor