The Constitutionalism of American States

Review of: "The Constitutionalism of American States," edited by George E. Connor and Christopher W. Hammons

Of Time, Place, and the Alaska Constitution

This Article places the Alaska Constitution in historical perspective by comparing it with other state constitutions. It first considers how the convention delegates’ need to satisfy four audiences—Congress, Alaska residents who would ratify the constitution, those who would live under the constitution, and posterity—affected the constitution’s design. It next shows how the Alaska Constitution reflects the fact that it is the state’s first constitution, that it is a western constitution, and that it is a mid-twentieth-century constitution. Finally, it compares the Alaska Constitution with the Hawaii Constitution, which was drafted at the same time

Of Time, Place, and the Alaska Constitution

This Article places the Alaska Constitution in historical perspective by comparing it with other state constitutions. It first considers how the convention delegates’ need to satisfy four audiences—Congress, Alaska residents who would ratify the constitution, those who would live under the constitution, and posterity—affected the constitution’s design. It next shows how the Alaska Constitution reflects the fact that it is the state’s first constitution, that it is a western constitution, and that it is a mid-twentieth-century constitution. Finally, it compares the Alaska Constitution with the Hawaii Constitution, which was drafted at the same time

American Reconstitution: How The States Stabilize American Constitutional Development

The American Constitution is exceptionally stable. Americans have proposed and ratified only one national constitution with only twenty-seven amendments. In contrast, the American states have proposed 354 constitutions, held 250 conventions, and ratified 146 constitutions with at least 5,900 amendments. Why is the federal Constitution so much more stable than the state constitutions? Many scholars cite the federal Constitution’s higher procedural barriers to revision. But this dissertation asserts that ongoing state constitutional revision resolves national constitutional controversies, preempting federal constitutional amendment and quieting national inter-branch conflict. The dissertation tests this claim in two ways. First, it compares all attempted federal and state constitutional revision since 1776, drawing on an original dataset of all proposed state constitutions to show that federal and state constitutional revision are closely associated over time. Second, the dissertation disaggregates this trend by topic, offering case studies in which state constitutional revision preempted or resolved national constitutional conflicts. Since the states constrain the scope of national constitutional controversies, one cannot fully understand the political development of the national branches or Constitution without the states

Reports of the selectmen, treasurer, and school committee of the town of Merrimack, for the year ending March 1st, 1882.

This is an annual report containing vital statistics for a town/city in the state of New Hampshire

Reports of the selectmen, treasurer, and school committee of the town of Merrimack, for the year ending March 1st, 1882.

This is an annual report containing vital statistics for a town/city in the state of New Hampshire

Lifting the Fog: Ending Felony Disenfranchisement in Virginia

This comment explores how Virginia\u27s disenfranchisement law originated, how it has managed to survive throughout Virginia\u27s history, and whether it may be vulnerable to various legal challenges. Part II outlines the history of felony disenfranchisement in Virginia. Part III analyzes common policy justifications for the current law and discusses the widely held beliefs about the role of race in the law\u27s inception. Part IV examines legal challenges to similar laws in the federal courts and evaluates the potential for success of comparable challenges in Virginia. Part V looks to recent attempts at enacting solutions at the state level. Part VI offers thoughts and recommendations for the future

Federal Experimentation Through State Constitutional Initiatives

This Article describes how reformers, who were often blocked by Congress, were able to achieve their policy aims through state constitutional initiatives. The Constitution grants the state and federal governments shared, concurrent constitutional powers. On concurrent powers matters, reformers might attempt either state or federal constitutional revision. Reformers might petition Congress for a federal amendment to dictate national policy or to bind or homogenize the states. But federal amendments rarely clear the two-thirds supermajorities needed to pass Congress or the three-quarters supermajorities needed for subsequent ratification by the states. Of the 11,790 proposed federal amendments, only thirty-three have been passed by Congress and twenty-seven ratified by the states. Scholars have thus deemed the Article V amendment process dead letter. Landmark federal judicial decisions can be similarly difficult, taking decades of coordinated litigation. In contrast, state constitutions are easier to revise. All state constitutions impose lower bars to amendment passage and ratification—of the 11,635 amendments proposed to the fifty standing state constitutions, 7,695 have been ratified. Initiative amendments also face low bars to passage and ratification. In Massachusetts, for example, a proposed constitutional initiative needs only 25,000 petition signatures to make the ballot. Nearly all states use some form of simple majority vote to ratify constitutional initiatives. This has yielded long, detailed state constitutions, which in turn are subject to frequent reform by amendment. This frequent amendment, coupled with the federal Constitution’s relative brevity, lets states serve as subnational “laboratories of democracy,” testing diverse solutions to national constitutional problems. Federal judges have long refused to intervene in the states’ amendment and initiative processes, leaving the states to experiment with little interference