Das Recht auf Gehör und die Rechtsnormen

U povodu reforme slovenskog parničnog procesnog prava iz 1999. u radu se - u okviru širega problemskog kompleksa ustavnoga prava na saslušanje (right to be heard) i odnosa zakonodavca prema zahtjevima koji se pred njega u ime toga prava postavljaju - najprije razmatra, osobito s aspekta judikature njemačkog Saveznog ustavnog suda, pitanje odnosi li se to ustavno pravo i na pravnu osnovu spora te proizlazi li iz njega dužnost suda da strankama priopći svoja pravna stajališta i da o tim stajalištima s njima raspravlja, odnosno pitanje u kojim slučajevima propuštanje takva raspravljanja nema samo značenje povrede zakona, nego i povrede ustavnoga prava. Povezano s tim pitanjima, na temelju prakse Europskoga suda za ljudska prava, nastoji se odgovoriti i na pitanje zahtijeva li pravo na saslušanje da se strankama omogući da se izjasne i o stajalištima koje određeno tijelo (npr. državni odvjetnik) može priopćiti sudu u parnici između dviju drugih osoba.With reference to the reform of Slovenian civil litigation procedural law of 1999, the article - within the framework of the broader complex problem of the constitutional right to be heard and the relation of the legislator towards the requirements raised by it – analyses, particularly from the point of view of the judicature of the German Federal Constitutional Court, the question whether this constitutional right also refers to the merits of the case and whether it includes the duty of the court to inform the parties about its legal opinions and discuss them with the parties, i.e. the question in what cases the failure to do so means not only the violation of the law, but also the violation of the constitutional right. In connection with these questions, on the basis of the practice of the European Court of Human Rights, an attempt is also made to answer the question whether the right to be heard requires to enable the parties to express their view on the opinion which a certain body (e.g. state attorney) may give to the court in the lawsuit between other two parties.Anlässlich der Reform des slowenischen Zivilprozessrechts aus dem Jahr 1999 wird im folgenden Artikel - im Rahmen des umfassenderen Problemkomplexes des Verfassungsrechts auf Gehör (right to be hear) und des Verhältnisses des Gesetzgebers den Anforderungen gegenüber, die im Namen dieses Rechts auf ihn gestellt werden - insbesondere vom Standpunkt der Rechtsprechung des deutschen Bundesverfassungsgerichts aus zuerst die Frage erörtert, ob sich dieses Verfassungsrecht auch auf die Rechtsgrundlage der Streitigkeit bezieht und ob daraus die Verpflichtung des Gerichts hervorgeht, den Parteien seine Rechtsstellungnahme mitzuteilen und sie mit ihnen zu erörtern, bzw. die Frage, in welchen Fällen die Unterlassung solcher Erörterung nicht nur eine Verletzung des Gesetzes, sondern auch eine Verletzung des Verfassungsrechts darstellt. Im Zusammenhang mit diesen Fragen wird aufgrund der Praxis des Europäischen Gerichtshofes für Menschenrechte versucht, auch die Frage zu beantworten, ob das Recht auf Gehör außerdem die Voraussetzung beinhaltet, es den Parteien zu ermöglichen, sich zu den Stellungnahmen zu äußern, die ein bestimmtes Organ (z.B. der Staatsanwalt) dem Gericht im Prozess zwischen zwei anderen Personen mitteilen kann

Restrictions for Late Factual Allegations and Evidence and the Goal of Civil Procedure

Jugoslavenski Zakon o parničnom postupku nije sadržavao učinkovita sredstva za koncentraciju postupka i dobru sadržajnu pripremu glavne rasprave. Već prvi slovenski ZPP iz 1999. donio je u tom smislu određena poboljšanja, a novi koraci učinjeni su novelom ZPP-a (ZPP-D) iz 2008. godine. Stranka parničnog postupka treba doprinijeti ubrzanju postupka i postizanju cilja, sadržajno pravilne sudske odluke. Naglašeno je značenje stadija pripreme glavne rasprave. Uvodi se sustav vremenskih ograničenja iznošenja novota (prekluzija). Cilj toga procesnog instituta nije u tome da se sudu omogući da se jednostavno riješi obveze donošenja potpune meritorne presude. Primarni cilj prekluzija kao procesnih sankcija je prevencija. Ako stranke budu poštovale zahtjeve suda za pravovremenim iznošenjem novota, priprema glavne rasprave bit će bolja, a argumenti stranaka potpuniji i sistematičniji. Za postizanje cilja, sadržajne kvalitete sudske zaštite to može biti samo korisno.The Yugoslav Civil Procedure Act did not contain efficient tools that could assure concentration of proceedings and a substantial preparation of the main hearing. There were no sanctions for default in filing of preparatory submissions, and judges were not empowered to impose binding time limits for written clarifications and supplementations of the parties\u27 submissions. Already the first Slovenian Civil Procedure Act (1999) brought some improvements in this regard. Further steps were made by the CPA amendments in 2008. The legislator\u27s intention was to put an emphasis on the preparatory stage of civil proceedings. For the first time, the judge was empowered to use his discretion in shaping the procedure and to adjust it to the characteristics of each individual case. The new amendments also promoted the idea that a party to civil litigation should contribute both to acceleration of the proceedings, as well as to achieving the goal of substantive justice on merits. The relation between the goal of substantive justice and procedural sanctions cannot be determined based on ideologically burdened or even demagogical arguments. It is all about finding a right balance. The goal of preclusions is not to enable the court to avoid the determination of the merits of the case. The primary goal of such procedural sanctions is prevention. One can expect that parties comply with court orders and directions. If they do so, the preparation of trial and arguments of parties should be more comprehensive and of better quality. For achieving the goal of good quality of adjudication this can only be beneficial

A Civil Law Perespective on the Supreme Court and its Functions

The text presents the issue of the Supreme Court’s functions from the perspective of civil law countries. The author argues that the division into cassation, revision and appeal is not an adequate point of reference enabling to define those functions. The author asserts that the most important criterion is whether the Supreme Court acts overwhelmingly in public or private interest. The assessment of that criterion should be made on the basis of the methods of selection of cases by the Supreme Court. What is essential is whether the selection is based on public aims or whether it simply aims at solving a given case accurately. It may be argued that as a result of reforms introduced in the last few years, the majorityof civil law countries have focusedon the implementation of the public rather than private functions. The author concludes that the public function of supreme courts is of a completely different significance than in the times of socialism. The public interest is combined with private interest as it refers to the situation of parties – not parties to the specific proceedings, but all parties which are going to engage in litigation in the future

Jurisdiction over Consumer, Employment, and Insurance Contracts under the Brussels I Regulation Recast: Enhancing the Protection of the Weaker Party

ENGLISH: This article aims to present and critically assess the changes which the Recast Brussels I Regulation brought to the protective regime for the weaker parties. Although these changes are not as far-reaching as in other fields, they are nevertheless important. The most significant changes concern the limited extension of the scope of applicability against defend-ants from third states and jurisdiction based on the entering of an appearance. Although these changes improve the procedural protection of the weaker parties in principle, some new dilemmas arise, which are liable to jeopardize certainty and predictability of the jurisdictional regime. DEUTSCH: Der vorliegende Beitrag soll die wichtigsten Änderungen der neuen Brüssel Ibis Verordnung betreffend den Rechtsschutz für schwächere Parteien kritisch analysieren. Die VO bringt wichtige Verbesserungen im Rechtsschutz für Verbraucher bei Klagen gegen Unternehmer bzw Arbeitgeber aus Drittstaaten und sieht eine Belehrung zugunsten bestimmter schwächerer Parteien über die Folgen einer rügelosen Prozesseinlassung vor. Obwohl diese Änderungen den prozessrechtlichen Schutz schwächerer Parteien grundsätzlich verbessern, lassen die neuen Bestimmungen viele Fragen offen und gefährden daher die Rechtssicherheit und die Berechenbarkeit des Zuständigkeitsregimes

Argument precedensa ali stališče Ustavnega sodišča RS o prepovedi samovoljnega odstopa od sodne prakse

V celinskih pravnih sistemih je ustaljeno pravilo, po katerem odločitve sodišč niso formalni pravni vir. Ne glede na to pa z ustavno pravico do enakosti pred zakonom iz 14. člena URS (ta zahteva, da so enaki primeri odločeni enako) sodna praksa pridobi vlogo pomembnega pravnega vira tudi v novoveških pravnih sistemih, podobno kot določa doktrina stare decisis. Slovensko ustavno sodišče je razsojanju ustavnih pritožb že podalo pomembne odločitve, potrjujoče to načelo, s katerim so zavezana redna sodišča. Ustavna pravica do enakosti pred zakonom je kršena, če je o nekem vprašanju sodna praksa ustaljena in v pritožnikovem primeru sodišče od nje odstopi, ne da bi za to izrecno navedlo utemeljene razloge. Takšen odstop od ustaljene sodne prakse lahko označimo kot samovoljno, zato bo ustavna pritožba zoper takšno sodno odločbo uspešna.A traditional rule in continental legal systems is that courts’ decisions are not a formal legal source. However, through a constitutional right to equality before the law, which also demands that like cases should be decided alike, a case law gains a position of an important legal source also in modern continental legal systems, similarly to a stare decisis doctrine. The Constitutional Court of Slovenia has, when adjudicating in the field of constitutional complaints, already delivered important decisions confirming this principle that binds ordinary judiciary. The constitutional right to equality before the law is violated if there is a well established case law on certain point and if in applicant’s case a court has departed from it without explicit and thorough grounds why it departed from an established precedent. Such a departure from an established case law can be denoted as being arbitrary and the applicant’s constitutional complaint against such a judicial decision will be successful

Živeči laboratoriji in veliko podatkovje v praksi: Stratumseind 2.0: Diskusija živečega laboratorija na Nizozemskem

Living lab projects – as a platform and methodology for technology testing and experimentation – are becoming common practice in (smart) cities around the world. As a relatively recent phenomenon, however, they are underresearched and lack a widely recognised definition and theoretical framework. The proliferation and growing importance of such technological projects that increasingly shape life in the city, demands a more thorough analysis and disentanglement of the practice and the concept. In order to address this need, the contribution first presents a living lab in practice – the Stratumseind Living Lab (part of the larger Stratumseind 2.0 project) in Eindhoven, the Netherlands. The Stratumseind Living Lab, a smaller project in a middle-sized and upcoming European city, which includes local and global technology companies and employs big data analysis, serves as an illustrative example of a living lab, its operation and its promises. The second part of this contribution examines academic literature on living labs and briefly analyzes the operation of the Stratumseind Living Lab project in view of its promises, particularly pertaining to big data. Based on the examination of theory and the practical example, the contribution concludes that such technological projects carry with them a wide range of social, political, ethical and legal concerns (including increasing surveillance in urban areas, issues connected to privacy and data security, a neoliberal form of city governance and the transformation of public space into quasi-public space), which the parties of such projects are either not aware of or simply do not take seriously enough. The pace of development and rollout of living lab (and smart city) technologies, which is proceeding well ahead of wider reflection, critique and regulation, is thus foolish and dangerous, requiring additional interrogation of the vision and implementation

Živeči laboratoriji in veliko podatkovje v praksi: Stratumseind 2.0: Diskusija živečega laboratorija na Nizozemskem

Living lab projects – as a platform and methodology for technology testing and experimentation – are becoming common practice in (smart) cities around the world. As a relatively recent phenomenon, however, they are underresearched and lack a widely recognised definition and theoretical framework. The proliferation and growing importance of such technological projects that increasingly shape life in the city, demands a more thorough analysis and disentanglement of the practice and the concept. In order to address this need, the contribution first presents a living lab in practice – the Stratumseind Living Lab (part of the larger Stratumseind 2.0 project) in Eindhoven, the Netherlands. The Stratumseind Living Lab, a smaller project in a middle-sized and upcoming European city, which includes local and global technology companies and employs big data analysis, serves as an illustrative example of a living lab, its operation and its promises. The second part of this contribution examines academic literature on living labs and briefly analyzes the operation of the Stratumseind Living Lab project in view of its promises, particularly pertaining to big data. Based on the examination of theory and the practical example, the contribution concludes that such technological projects carry with them a wide range of social, political, ethical and legal concerns (including increasing surveillance in urban areas, issues connected to privacy and data security, a neoliberal form of city governance and the transformation of public space into quasi-public space), which the parties of such projects are either not aware of or simply do not take seriously enough. The pace of development and rollout of living lab (and smart city) technologies, which is proceeding well ahead of wider reflection, critique and regulation, is thus foolish and dangerous, requiring additional interrogation of the vision and implementation