Precise Complexity of the Core in Dichotomous and Additive Hedonic Games

Hedonic games provide a general model of coalition formation, in which a set of agents is partitioned into coalitions, with each agent having preferences over which other players are in her coalition. We prove that with additively separable preferences, it is $\Sigma_2^p$-complete to decide whether a core- or strict-core-stable partition exists, extending a result of Woeginger (2013). Our result holds even if valuations are symmetric and non-zero only for a constant number of other agents. We also establish $\Sigma_2^p$-completeness of deciding non-emptiness of the strict core for hedonic games with dichotomous preferences. Such results establish that the core is much less tractable than solution concepts such as individual stability.Comment: ADT-2017, 15 pages in LNCS styl

Scheduling with step-improving processing times

2005-2006 > Academic research: refereed > Publication in refereed journalAccepted ManuscriptPublishe

An EPTAS for Scheduling on Unrelated Machines of Few Different Types

In the classical problem of scheduling on unrelated parallel machines, a set of jobs has to be assigned to a set of machines. The jobs have a processing time depending on the machine and the goal is to minimize the makespan, that is the maximum machine load. It is well known that this problem is NP-hard and does not allow polynomial time approximation algorithms with approximation guarantees smaller than $1.5$ unless P$=$NP. We consider the case that there are only a constant number $K$ of machine types. Two machines have the same type if all jobs have the same processing time for them. This variant of the problem is strongly NP-hard already for $K=1$. We present an efficient polynomial time approximation scheme (EPTAS) for the problem, that is, for any $\varepsilon > 0$ an assignment with makespan of length at most $(1+\varepsilon)$ times the optimum can be found in polynomial time in the input length and the exponent is independent of $1/\varepsilon$. In particular we achieve a running time of $2^{\mathcal{O}(K\log(K) \frac{1}{\varepsilon}\log^4 \frac{1}{\varepsilon})}+\mathrm{poly}(|I|)$, where $|I|$ denotes the input length. Furthermore, we study three other problem variants and present an EPTAS for each of them: The Santa Claus problem, where the minimum machine load has to be maximized; the case of scheduling on unrelated parallel machines with a constant number of uniform types, where machines of the same type behave like uniformly related machines; and the multidimensional vector scheduling variant of the problem where both the dimension and the number of machine types are constant. For the Santa Claus problem we achieve the same running time. The results are achieved, using mixed integer linear programming and rounding techniques

On the Computational Complexity of Vertex Integrity and Component Order Connectivity

The Weighted Vertex Integrity (wVI) problem takes as input an $n$-vertex graph $G$, a weight function $w:V(G)\to\mathbb{N}$, and an integer $p$. The task is to decide if there exists a set $X\subseteq V(G)$ such that the weight of $X$ plus the weight of a heaviest component of $G-X$ is at most $p$. Among other results, we prove that: (1) wVI is NP-complete on co-comparability graphs, even if each vertex has weight $1$; (2) wVI can be solved in $O(p^{p+1}n)$ time; (3) wVI admits a kernel with at most $p^3$ vertices. Result (1) refutes a conjecture by Ray and Deogun and answers an open question by Ray et al. It also complements a result by Kratsch et al., stating that the unweighted version of the problem can be solved in polynomial time on co-comparability graphs of bounded dimension, provided that an intersection model of the input graph is given as part of the input. An instance of the Weighted Component Order Connectivity (wCOC) problem consists of an $n$-vertex graph $G$, a weight function $w:V(G)\to \mathbb{N}$, and two integers $k$ and $l$, and the task is to decide if there exists a set $X\subseteq V(G)$ such that the weight of $X$ is at most $k$ and the weight of a heaviest component of $G-X$ is at most $l$. In some sense, the wCOC problem can be seen as a refined version of the wVI problem. We prove, among other results, that: (4) wCOC can be solved in $O(\min\{k,l\}\cdot n^3)$ time on interval graphs, while the unweighted version can be solved in $O(n^2)$ time on this graph class; (5) wCOC is W[1]-hard on split graphs when parameterized by $k$ or by $l$; (6) wCOC can be solved in $2^{O(k\log l)} n$ time; (7) wCOC admits a kernel with at most $kl(k+l)+k$ vertices. We also show that result (6) is essentially tight by proving that wCOC cannot be solved in $2^{o(k \log l)}n^{O(1)}$ time, unless the ETH fails.Comment: A preliminary version of this paper already appeared in the conference proceedings of ISAAC 201

Strategyproof Mechanisms for Additively Separable Hedonic Games and Fractional Hedonic Games

Additively separable hedonic games and fractional hedonic games have received considerable attention. They are coalition forming games of selfish agents based on their mutual preferences. Most of the work in the literature characterizes the existence and structure of stable outcomes (i.e., partitions in coalitions), assuming that preferences are given. However, there is little discussion on this assumption. In fact, agents receive different utilities if they belong to different partitions, and thus it is natural for them to declare their preferences strategically in order to maximize their benefit. In this paper we consider strategyproof mechanisms for additively separable hedonic games and fractional hedonic games, that is, partitioning methods without payments such that utility maximizing agents have no incentive to lie about their true preferences. We focus on social welfare maximization and provide several lower and upper bounds on the performance achievable by strategyproof mechanisms for general and specific additive functions. In most of the cases we provide tight or asymptotically tight results. All our mechanisms are simple and can be computed in polynomial time. Moreover, all the lower bounds are unconditional, that is, they do not rely on any computational or complexity assumptions

A general framework for handling commitment in online throughput maximization

We study a fundamental online job admission problem where jobs with deadlines arrive online over time at their release dates, and the task is to determine a preemptive single-server schedule which maximizes the number of jobs that complete on time. To circumvent known impossibility results, we make a standard slackness assumption by which the feasible time window for scheduling a job is at least $1+\varepsilon$ times its processing time, for some $\varepsilon>0$. We quantify the impact that different provider commitment requirements have on the performance of online algorithms. Our main contribution is one universal algorithmic framework for online job admission both with and without commitments. Without commitment, our algorithm with a competitive ratio of $O(1/\varepsilon)$ is the best possible (deterministic) for this problem. For commitment models, we give the first non-trivial performance bounds. If the commitment decisions must be made before a job's slack becomes less than a $\delta$-fraction of its size, we prove a competitive ratio of $O(\varepsilon/((\varepsilon-\delta)\delta^2))$, for $0<\delta<\varepsilon$. When a provider must commit upon starting a job, our bound is $O(1/\varepsilon^2)$. Finally, we observe that for scheduling with commitment the restriction to the `unweighted' throughput model is essential; if jobs have individual weights, we rule out competitive deterministic algorithms

Recognizing Members of the Tournament Equilibrium Set is NP-hard

A recurring theme in the mathematical social sciences is how to select the "most desirable" elements given a binary dominance relation on a set of alternatives. Schwartz's tournament equilibrium set (TEQ) ranks among the most intriguing, but also among the most enigmatic, tournament solutions that have been proposed so far in this context. Due to its unwieldy recursive definition, little is known about TEQ. In particular, its monotonicity remains an open problem up to date. Yet, if TEQ were to satisfy monotonicity, it would be a very attractive tournament solution concept refining both the Banks set and Dutta's minimal covering set. We show that the problem of deciding whether a given alternative is contained in TEQ is NP-hard.Comment: 9 pages, 3 figure