The Political Economy of Natural Resource Use: Lessons for Fisheries Reform

This report discusses key lessons drawn from reform experience in the wider natural resource sector that might inform successful reform in fisheries. This report is a compilation of 12 papers prepared by acknowledged international experts in the fields of fisheries and wider natural resource reform which were reviewed at a workshop convened by the Property and Environment Research Center (PERC) in May 2009.The report forms an important initial input into an ongoing enquiry into the political economy of fisheries reform initiated by the World Bank in partnership with the Partnership for African Fisheries (a United Kingdom Department for International Development funded program of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD))

Ownership competence

Ownership is fundamental to firm strategy, organization, and governance. Standard ownership concepts—mainly derived from agency and incomplete contracting theories—focus on its incentive effects. However, these concepts and theories neglect ownership's role as an instrument to match judgment about resource use and governance with the firm's evolving environment under uncertainty. We develop the concept of ownership competence—the skill with which ownership is used as an instrument to create value—and decompose it into matching competence (what to own), governance competence (how to own), and timing competence (when to own). We describe how property rights of use, appropriation, and transfer relate to the three ownership competences and show how our theory offers a fresh perspective into the role of ownership for value generation

Forests as Commons – Changing Traditions and Governance in Europe

Commons are complex institutions and exist across the world in a wide range of situations regarding locally developed governance and management systems of many different natural resources. For many people commons remain associated with Hardin’s theory concerning the “Tragedy of the Commons” (1968), in which he assumed that local users of a natural resource are unable to formulate governance and management structures concerning their own choices that took into account the long-term sustainability of the resource itself. As a result, Hardin articulated that the tragedy was that the resource would inevitably become degraded in such situations and that the solution was private or public ownership. However, across Europe many forests have for a very long period of time successfully been managed as commons, just as they have in many other parts of the world. This chapter has three main aims: It will provide an introduction to the various types of commons before going on to link the issue of commons to the traditional forest landscapes of Europe, and it will look at how the role of forests and forest landscapes has changed and how it may change further in the future

The transaction costs in biotechnology

This paper aims to relate the principles of Ronald Coase Theorem with negative impacts of biotechnology, taking cases of specific research groups and medium-sized companies in biotechnology. We consider an application of economic theory on transaction costs (TTC) provides a good foundation for understanding the underlying problems of this sector, even more, when analyzing the political economy of biotechnology since the transaction costs can best viewed their limitations and the limited scope of government policy. In biotechnology it is possible to get a policy that combines both equity and efficiency, that is, a wider range of policy applications to improve the living standards of people in Colombia