Acromegaly, Mr Punch and caricature.

The origin of Mr Punch from the Italian Pulcinella of the Commedia dell'arte is well known but his feature, large hooked nose, protruding chin, kyphosis and sternal protrusion all in an exaggerated form also suggest the caricature of an acromegalic. This paper looks at the physical characteristics of acromegaly, the origin of Mr Punch and the development of caricature linking them together in the acromegalic caricature that now has a life of its own

In the dedicated pursuit of dedicated capital: restoring an indigenous investment ethic to British capitalism

Tony Blair’s landslide electoral victory on May 1 (New Labour Day?) presents the party in power with a rare, perhaps even unprecedented, opportunity to revitalise and modernise Britain’s ailing and antiquated manufacturing economy.* If it is to do so, it must remain true to its long-standing (indeed, historic) commitment to restore an indigenous investment ethic to British capitalism. In this paper we argue that this in turn requires that the party reject the very neo-liberal orthodoxies which it offered to the electorate as evidence of its competence, moderation and ‘modernisation’, which is has internalised, and which it apparently now views as circumscribing the parameters of the politically and economically possible

Different paths to the modern state in Europe: the interaction between domestic political economy and interstate competition

Theoretical work on state formation and capacity has focused mostly on early modern Europe and on the experience of western European states during this period. While a number of European states monopolized domestic tax collection and achieved gains in state capacity during the early modern era, for others revenues stagnated or even declined, and these variations motivated alternative hypotheses for determinants of fiscal and state capacity. In this study we test the basic hypotheses in the existing literature making use of the large date set we have compiled for all of the leading states across the continent. We find strong empirical support for two prevailing threads in the literature, arguing respectively that interstate wars and changes in economic structure towards an urbanized economy had positive fiscal impact. Regarding the main point of contention in the theoretical literature, whether it was representative or authoritarian political regimes that facilitated the gains in fiscal capacity, we do not find conclusive evidence that one performed better than the other. Instead, the empirical evidence we have gathered lends supports to the hypothesis that when under pressure of war, the fiscal performance of representative regimes was better in the more urbanized-commercial economies and the fiscal performance of authoritarian regimes was better in rural-agrarian economie

Contested firm governance, institutions and the undertaking of corporate restructuring practices in Germany

This article investigates the undertaking of corporate restructuring practices (employee downsizing and wage moderation) in Germany from 2008 to 2015. The article presents a political perspective that draws on the insights of the power resources approach and of institutional analyses. The theoretical framework highlights how institutional arrangements structure power relations within companies by empowering, in an asymmetrical manner, different categories of firm stakeholders (employees, managers and shareholders) as well as shaping how they relate to each other in an interactive manner. The article’s empirical findings point to the importance of extensive, but contingent, corporate restructuring in Germany. Companies are more likely to implement ‘defensive’ corporate restructuring practices under conditions of high leverage/debt than when confronted by shareholder value driven investors, thereby reflecting the presence of overlapping interests between employees and managers

Protection of Domestic bank Ownership in France and Germany: The Functional Equivalency of Institutional Diversity in Takeovers

We investigate the character of the market for corporate control (i.e. takeovers) in French and German banking. The key feature of this character is the marked ability of French and German banks to resist unsolicited takeover bids, especially – although not exclusively– those from foreign competitors. We present an institutional perspective to account for the restrained character of takeovers in French and German banking. Our perspective is composed of two elements. First, institutional arrangements are important since they structure power relations among firm stakeholders by providing opportunities, as well as imposing constraints, to influence the decision-making process in which takeover transactions take place. Second, institutional arrangements provide firm stakeholders with several potential opportunities, not just one, to block unsolicited bids since takeover contests are composed of sequences of decisions for which approval is needed at each stage. French and German banks have used different mixes of institutional arrangements, themselves located at different stages of takeover transactions, to secure restrained markets for corporate control. Our institutional analysis, in turn, also illustrates an important shortcoming of banking sector protectionism, namely the contribution of protection from unsolicited takeover bids to the building of banks carrying systemic risks

Disease proteomics

Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/62680/1/nature01514.pd

Eligibility for and outcome of treatment of latent tuberculosis infection in a cohort of HIV-infected people in Spain

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>Previous studies have demonstrated the efficacy of treatment for latent tuberculosis infection (TLTBI) in persons infected with the human immunodeficiency virus, but few studies have investigated the operational aspects of implementing TLTBI in the co-infected population.The study objectives were to describe eligibility for TLTBI as well as treatment prescription, initiation and completion in an HIV-infected Spanish cohort and to investigate factors associated with treatment completion.</p> <p>Methods</p> <p>Subjects were prospectively identified between 2000 and 2003 at ten HIV hospital-based clinics in Spain. Data were obtained from clinical records. Associations were measured using the odds ratio (OR) and its 95% confidence interval (95% CI).</p> <p>Results</p> <p>A total of 1242 subjects were recruited and 846 (68.1%) were evaluated for TLTBI. Of these, 181 (21.4%) were eligible for TLTBI either because they were tuberculin skin test (TST) positive (121) or because their TST was negative/unknown but they were known contacts of a TB case or had impaired immunity (60). Of the patients eligible for TLTBI, 122 (67.4%) initiated TLTBI: 99 (81.1%) were treated with isoniazid for 6, 9 or 12 months; and 23 (18.9%) with short-course regimens including rifampin plus isoniazid and/or pyrazinamide. In total, 70 patients (57.4%) completed treatment, 39 (32.0%) defaulted, 7 (5.7%) interrupted treatment due to adverse effects, 2 developed TB, 2 died, and 2 moved away. Treatment completion was associated with having acquired HIV infection through heterosexual sex as compared to intravenous drug use (OR:4.6; 95% CI:1.4-14.7) and with having taken rifampin and pyrazinamide for 2 months as compared to isoniazid for 9 months (OR:8.3; 95% CI:2.7-24.9).</p> <p>Conclusions</p> <p>A minority of HIV-infected patients eligible for TLTBI actually starts and completes a course of treatment. Obstacles to successful implementation of this intervention need to be addressed.</p

Republicanism and the political economy of democracy

Europe is experiencing rapidly accelerating poverty and social exclusion, following half a decade of financial crisis and austerity politics. The key problem behind Europe's malaise, in our view, is the economic disenfranchisement of large parts of its population in the winner-takes-all-society. This article proposes that we examine the contribution of republican political theory as a distinctive approach that provides us with the conceptual and normative resources to reclaim what we call the political economy of democracy, the constellation of political and economic institutions aimed at promoting broad economic sovereignty and individuals' capacities to govern their own lives. This article identifies three key ideas that together constitute a distinctively republican approach to political economy: (1) establish an economic floor; (2) impose an economic ceiling to counter excess economic inequality; and (3) democratize the governance and regulation of the main economic institutions