Mirroring and beyond: coupled dynamics as a generalized framework for modelling social interactions

When people observe one another, behavioural alignment can be detected at many levels, from the physical to the mental. Likewise, when people process the same highly complex stimulus sequences, such as films and stories, alignment is detected in the elicited brain activity. In early sensory areas, shared neural patterns are coupled to the low-level properties of the stimulus (shape, motion, volume, etc.), while in high-order brain areas, shared neural patterns are coupled to high-levels aspects of the stimulus, such as meaning. Successful social interactions require such alignments (both behavioural and neural), as communication cannot occur without shared understanding. However, we need to go beyond simple, symmetric (mirror) alignment once we start interacting. Interactions are dynamic processes, which involve continuous mutual adaptation, development of complementary behaviour and division of labour such as leader-follower roles. Here, we argue that interacting individuals are dynamically coupled rather than simply aligned. This broader framework for understanding interactions can encompass both processes by which behaviour and brain activity mirror each other (neural alignment), and situations in which behaviour and brain activity in one participant are coupled (but not mirrored) to the dynamics in the other participant. To apply these more sophisticated accounts of social interactions to the study of the underlying neural processes we need to develop new experimental paradigms and novel methods of data analysis

What we observe is biased by what other people tell us: beliefs about the reliability of gaze behavior modulate attentional orienting to gaze cues

For effective social interactions with other people, information about the physical environment must be integrated with information about the interaction partner. In order to achieve this, processing of social information is guided by two components: a bottom-up mechanism reflexively triggered by stimulus-related information in the social scene and a top-down mechanism activated by task-related context information. In the present study, we investigated whether these components interact during attentional orienting to gaze direction. In particular, we examined whether the spatial specificity of gaze cueing is modulated by expectations about the reliability of gaze behavior. Expectations were either induced by instruction or could be derived from experience with displayed gaze behavior. Spatially specific cueing effects were observed with highly predictive gaze cues, but also when participants merely believed that actually non-predictive cues were highly predictive. Conversely, cueing effects for the whole gazed-at hemifield were observed with non-predictive gaze cues, and spatially specific cueing effects were attenuated when actually predictive gaze cues were believed to be non-predictive. This pattern indicates that (i) information about cue predictivity gained from sampling gaze behavior across social episodes can be incorporated in the attentional orienting to social cues, and that (ii) beliefs about gaze behavior modulate attentional orienting to gaze direction even when they contradict information available from social episodes

Atypical Social Modulation of Imitation in Autism Spectrum Conditions.

Appropriate modulation of imitation according to social context is important for successful social interaction. In the present study we subliminally primed high-functioning adults with ASC and age- and IQ-matched controls with either a pro- or non- social attitude. Following priming, an automatic imitation paradigm was used to acquire an index of imitation. Whereas imitation levels were higher for pro-socially primed relative to non-socially primed control participants, there was no difference between pro- and non- socially primed individuals with ASC. We conclude that high-functioning adults with ASC demonstrate atypical social modulation of imitation. Given the importance of imitation in social interaction we speculate that difficulties with the modulation of imitation may contribute to the social problems characteristic of ASC

Age-related change in brain metabolite abnormalities in autism: a meta-analysis of proton magnetic resonance spectroscopy studies

Abnormal trajectory of brain development has been suggested by previous structural magnetic resonance imaging and head circumference findings in autism spectrum disorders (ASDs); however, the neurochemical backgrounds remain unclear. To elucidate neurochemical processes underlying aberrant brain growth in ASD, we conducted a comprehensive literature search and a meta-analysis of 1H-magnetic resonance spectroscopy (1H-MRS) studies in ASD. From the 22 articles identified as satisfying the criteria, means and s.d. of measure of N-acetylaspartate (NAA), creatine, choline-containing compounds, myo-Inositol and glutamate+glutamine in frontal, temporal, parietal, amygdala-hippocampus complex, thalamus and cerebellum were extracted. Random effect model analyses showed significantly lower NAA levels in all the examined brain regions but cerebellum in ASD children compared with typically developed children (n=1295 at the maximum in frontal, P<0.05 Bonferroni-corrected), although there was no significant difference in metabolite levels in adulthood. Meta-regression analysis further revealed that the effect size of lower frontal NAA levels linearly declined with older mean age in ASD (n=844, P<0.05 Bonferroni-corrected). The significance of all frontal NAA findings was preserved after considering between-study heterogeneities (P<0.05 Bonferroni-corrected). This first meta-analysis of 1H-MRS studies in ASD demonstrated robust developmental changes in the degree of abnormality in NAA levels, especially in frontal lobes of ASD. Previously reported larger-than-normal brain size in ASD children and the coincident lower-than-normal NAA levels suggest that early transient brain expansion in ASD is mainly caused by an increase in non-neuron tissues, such as glial cell proliferation

Vasopressin modulates social recognition-related activity in the left temporoparietal junction in humans

The neuropeptide vasopressin is a key molecular mediator of social behavior in animals and humans, implicated in anxiety and autism. Social recognition, the ability to assess the familiarity of others, is essential for appropriate social interactions and enhanced by vasopressin; however, the neural mechanisms mediating this effect in humans are unknown. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and an implicit social recognition matching task, we employed a double-blinded procedure in which 20 healthy male volunteers self-administered 40 UI of vasopressin or placebo intranasally, 45 min before performing the matching task in the scanner. In a random-effects fMRI analysis, we show that vasopressin induces a regionally specific alteration in a key node of the theory of mind network, the left temporoparietal junction, identifying a neurobiological mechanism for prosocial neuropeptide effects in humans that suggests novel treatment strategies

Are women better mindreaders? Sex differences in neural correlates of mentalizing detected with functional MRI

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>The ability to mentalize, i.e. develop a Theory of Mind (ToM), enables us to anticipate and build a model of the thoughts, emotions and intentions of others. It has long been hypothesised that women differ from men in their mentalizing abilities. In the present fMRI study we examined the impact of (1) gender (women vs. men) and (2) game partner (human vs. computer) on ToM associated neural activity in the medial prefrontal cortex. Groups of men (n = 12) and women (n = 12) interacted in an iterated classical prisoner's dilemma forced choice situation with alleged human and computer partners who were outside the scanner.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>Both the conditions of playing against putative human as well as computer partners led to activity increases in mPFC, ACC and rTPJ, constituting the classic ToM network. However, mPFC/ACC activity was more pronounced when participants believed they were playing against the alleged human partner. Differences in the medial frontal lobe activation related to the sex of the participants could be demonstrated for the human partner > computer partner contrast.</p> <p>Conclusion</p> <p>Our data demonstrate differences in medial prefrontal brain activation during a ToM task depending on both the gender of participants and the game partner.</p

Are all beliefs equal? Implicit belief attributions recruiting core brain regions of theory of mind

Humans possess efficient mechanisms to behave adaptively in social contexts. They ascribe goals and beliefs to others and use these for behavioural predictions. Researchers argued for two separate mental attribution systems: an implicit and automatic one involved in online interactions, and an explicit one mainly used in offline deliberations. However, the underlying mechanisms of these systems and the types of beliefs represented in the implicit system are still unclear. Using neuroimaging methods, we show that the right temporo-parietal junction and the medial prefrontal cortex, brain regions consistently found to be involved in explicit mental state reasoning, are also recruited by spontaneous belief tracking. While the medial prefrontal cortex was more active when both the participant and another agent believed an object to be at a specific location, the right temporo-parietal junction was selectively activated during tracking the false beliefs of another agent about the presence, but not the absence of objects. While humans can explicitly attribute to a conspecific any possible belief they themselves can entertain, implicit belief tracking seems to be restricted to beliefs with specific contents, a content selectivity that may reflect a crucial functional characteristic and signature property of implicit belief attribution

Brains swinging in concert: cortical phase synchronization while playing guitar

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>Brains interact with the world through actions that are implemented by sensory and motor processes. A substantial part of these interactions consists in synchronized goal-directed actions involving two or more individuals. Hyperscanning techniques for assessing fMRI simultaneously from two individuals have been developed. However, EEG recordings that permit the assessment of synchronized neuronal activities at much higher levels of temporal resolution have not yet been simultaneously assessed in multiple individuals and analyzed in the time-frequency domain. In this study, we simultaneously recorded EEG from the brains of each of eight pairs of guitarists playing a short melody together to explore the extent and the functional significance of synchronized cortical activity in the course of interpersonally coordinated actions.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>By applying synchronization algorithms to intra- and interbrain analyses, we found that phase synchronization both within and between brains increased significantly during the periods of (i) preparatory metronome tempo setting and (ii) coordinated play onset. Phase alignment extracted from within-brain dynamics was related to behavioral play onset asynchrony between guitarists.</p> <p>Conclusion</p> <p>Our findings show that interpersonally coordinated actions are preceded and accompanied by between-brain oscillatory couplings. Presumably, these couplings reflect similarities in the temporal properties of the individuals' percepts and actions. Whether between-brain oscillatory couplings play a causal role in initiating and maintaining interpersonal action coordination needs to be clarified by further research.</p

Why I tense up when you watch me: inferior parietal cortex mediates an audience’s influence on motor performance

The presence of an evaluative audience can alter skilled motor performance through changes in force output. To investigate how this is mediated within the brain, we emulated real-time social monitoring of participants’ performance of a fine grip task during functional magnetic resonance neuroimaging. We observed an increase in force output during social evaluation that was accompanied by focal reductions in activity within bilateral inferior parietal cortex. Moreover, deactivation of the left inferior parietal cortex predicted both inter- and intra-individual differences in socially-induced change in grip force. Social evaluation also enhanced activation within the posterior superior temporal sulcus, which conveys visual information about others’ actions to the inferior parietal cortex. Interestingly, functional connectivity between these two regions was attenuated by social evaluation. Our data suggest that social evaluation can vary force output through the altered engagement of inferior parietal cortex; a region implicated in sensorimotor integration necessary for object manipulation, and a component of the action-observation network which integrates and facilitates performance of observed actions. Social-evaluative situations may induce high-level representational incoherence between one’s own intentioned action and the perceived intention of others which, by uncoupling the dynamics of sensorimotor facilitation, could ultimately perturbe motor output

When the Choice Is Ours: Context and Agency Modulate the Neural Bases of Decision-Making

The option to choose between several courses of action is often associated with the feeling of being in control. Yet, in certain situations, one may prefer to decline such agency and instead leave the choice to others. In the present functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, we provide evidence that the neural processes involved in decision-making are modulated not only by who controls our choice options (agency), but also by whether we have a say in who is in control (context). The fMRI results are noteworthy in that they reveal specific contributions of the anterior frontomedian cortex (viz. BA 10) and the rostral cingulate zone (RCZ) in decision-making processes. The RCZ is engaged when conditions clearly present us with the most choice options. BA 10 is engaged in particular when the choice is completely ours, as well as when it is completely up to others to choose for us which in turn gives rise to an attribution of control to oneself or someone else, respectively. After all, it does not only matter whether we have any options to choose from, but also who decides on that