The Past-Future Asymmetry

As the past-future asymmetry – that fact that we have records of the past but not the future – is still a puzzle the aim of this paper is twofold: a) to explain the asymmetry and its status in philosophy and physics and to critically review the proposed solutions to this puzzle; b) to advance a dynamic solution to the puzzle (which is lacking in alternative proposals) in terms of the ‘universality’ of the entropy relation in statistical mechanics

Social Mechanisms and Social Causation

yesThe aim of this paper is to examine the notion of social mechanisms by comparison with the notions of evolutionary and physical mechanisms. It is argued that social mechanisms are based on trends, and not lawlike regularities, so that social mechanisms are different from mechanisms in the natural sciences. Taking as an example of social causation the abolition of the slave trade, the paper argues that social mechanisms should be incorporated in Weber’s wider notion of adequate causation in order to achieve their explanatory purpose

The Time-Symmetric Gold Universe Reconsidered

yesThe present article proposes to re-examine the parity-of-reasoning or double-standard fallacy argument, which favours a time-symmetric Gold universe model over a cosmological arrow of time. There are two reasons for this re-examination. One is empirical: 1) the recent discovery of an expanding and accelerating universe questions the symmetry assumption of the Gold universe on empirical grounds; 2) the other is theoretical: the argument from t-symmetry fails to take into account some important aspects of the topology of phase space and recently developed typicality arguments. If the parity-of-reasoning argument, which depends on the t-symmetry of probability, is reconsidered in terms of the topology of phase space and typicality arguments, the double-standard fallacy argument loses much of its appeal. The Gold universe model itself suffers from unexplained dynamic asymmetries. The upshot of this paper is that the Gold universe model is implausible or far less plausible than asymmetric models

EPR and the 'Passage' of Time

YesThe essay revisits the puzzle of the ‘passage’ of time in relation to EPR-type measurements and asks what philosophical consequences can be drawn from them. Some argue that the lack of invariance of temporal order in the measurement of a space-like related EPR pair, under relativistic motion, casts serious doubts on the ‘reality’ of the lapse of time. Others argue that certain features of quantum mechanics establish a tensed theory of time – understood here as Possibilism or the growing block universe. The paper analyzes the employment of frame-invariant entropic clocks in a relativistic setting and argues that tenselessness does not imply timelessness. But this conclusion does not support a tensed theory of time, which requires a preferred foliation. It is argued that the only reliable inference from the EPR example and the use of entropic clocks is an inference not just to a Leibnizian order of the succession of events but a frame-invariant order according to some selected clocks

Realism and Relativity

The line of argument pursued in this paper is to proceed from Einstein’s fundamental problem situation to a consideration of scientific representation with respect to the Special theory of relativity (STR). Einstein’s fundamental problem situation, which is Kantian in spirit, is how the conceptual freedom of the scientist is compatible with the need for an objective representation of an independently given material world. To solve this philosophical issue Einstein employs a number of constraints, which are central to the STR. The issue of scientific representation leads to a consideration of the notion of reality and to the realistic commitments implied in the STR. From this point of view, the paper concludes that Einstein was committed to a kind of ‘structural’ realism

Relativistic Thermodynamics and the Passage of Time

The debate about the passage of time is usually confined to Minkowski‟s geometric interpretation of space-time. It infers the block universe from the notion of relative simultaneity. But there are alternative interpretations of space-time – so-called axiomatic approaches –, based on the existence of „optical facts‟, which have thermodynamic properties. It may therefore be interesting to approach the afore-mentioned debate from the point of view of relativistic thermodynamics, in which invariant parameters exist, which may serve to indicate the passage of time. Of particular interest is the use of entropic clocks, gas clocks and statistical thermometers, which suggest that two observers in Minkowski space-time could agree on an objective passing of time

Reichenbach’s ‘Causal’ Theory of Time: A Re-Assessment

The paper proposes a re-assessment of Reichenbach’s ‘causal’ theory of time. Reichenbach’s version of the theory, first proposed in 1921, is interesting because it is one of the first attempts to construct a causal theory as a relational theory of time, which fully takes the results of the Special theory of relativity into account. The theory derives its name from the cone structure of Minkowski space-time, in particular the emission of light signals. At first Reichenbach defines an ‘order’ of time, a ‘before-after’ relationship between mechanical events. In his later work, he comes to the conclusion that the ‘order’ of time needs to be distinguished from the ‘direction’ of time. He therefore abandons the sole focus on light geometry and turns to Boltzmann’s statistical version of thermodynamics. However, as Einstein pointed out, the emission and reception of light signals have thermodynamic aspects. When this is taken into account, Reichenbach’s ‘causal’ theory turns out to be an entropic theory of time. It also emerges that Reichenbach discusses phase space and typicality arguments in support of his dynamic view of time. They provide a better understanding of the notion of entropy. This unifies his approach and helps to answer some of the standard objections against a causal theory of time

Leibniz’s Defence of Heliocentrism

yesThis paper discusses Leibniz’s view and defence of heliocentrism, which was one of the main achievements of the Scientific Revolution (1543-1687). As Leibniz was a defender of a strictly mechanistic worldview, it seems natural to assume that he accepted Copernican heliocentrism and its completion by figures like Kepler, Descartes and Newton without reservation. However, the fact that Leibniz speaks of the Copernican theory as a hypothesis (or plausible assumption) suggests that he had several reservations regarding heliocentrism. On a first approach Leibniz employed two of his most cherished principles to defend the Copernican hypothesis against the proponents of geocentrism: these were the principle of the relativity of motion and the principle of the equivalence of hypotheses. A closer analysis reveals, however, that Leibniz also appeals to dynamic causes of planetary motions, and these constitute a much stronger support for heliocentrism than his two philosophical principles alone

Einstein, Science and Philosophy

Cet article a pour objectif de présenter un compte-rendu accessible de l’immense héritage philosophique de l’œuvre scientifique d’Einstein. Einstein n’était pas un philosophe de métier, mais son raisonnement en sciences physiques portait en soi des conséquences philosophiques qu’il était prêt à explorer. En explorant les conséquences philosophiques de ses travaux scientifiques Einstein s’inscrit dans la démarche de physiciens tels que Newton, Mach, Planck et Poincaré. Einstein déduisait les conséquences philosophiques de la problématique que son travail de physicien faisait surgir. Ces conséquences philosophiques vont de la métaphysique à la philosophie de la physique. Dans une certaine mesure, ces conséquences philosophiques peuvent être considérées comme étant des réponses à des questions philosophiques. On peut noter en particulier, ses vues sur l’aspect représentationnel des théories scientifiques et son insistance, à leur sujet, sur la notion de contraintes. Les travaux sur Einstein ont souvent négligé l’étude des contraintes en philosophie des sciences.The aim of this paper is to provide a readable account of the immense philosophical legacy of Einstein’s scientific work. Einstein was not a systematic philosopher but his physical thought had philosophical consequences. In his willingness to pursue the philosophical consequences of his scientific work, Einstein followed in the footsteps of physicists like Newton, Mach, Planck and Poincaré. Einstein derived these consequences from the problem-situations, into which his work as a physicist had led him. These philosophical consequences range from metaphysics to the philosophy of physics. To a certain extent they can be regarded as answers to philosophical questions. Of particular interest is his view of the representational nature of scientific theories, in which the notion of constraints plays a significant role. An analysis of the role of constraints in Einstein’s ‘philosophy of science’ has often been neglected in the literature

Operational Quantum Mechanics, Quantum Axiomatics and Quantum Structures

The role of operational quantum mechanics, quantum axiomatics and quantum structures in general is presented as a contribution to a compendium on quantum physics, its history and philosophy.Comment: 6 page