Capital mobility, search unemployment and labor market policies: The case of minimum wages

In order to study the in uence of capital mobility on labor market policy, this paper adapts the search-matching approach to an economy with an exogenous stock of capital. Contrary to most matching models, laissez-faire is unavoidably ine cient. However, public policy can neutralize this market failure by implementing a minimum wage. This result leads us to address a much-debated issue: Does capital mobility constrain labor market policies when governments cannot cooperate? To that end we extend the analysis to a n-country symmetric model where the setting of minimum wages results from a Nash non-cooperative game. We nd that, in this context, capital mobility does not a ect the e ciency of public policy

Rotation de la main-d’oeuvre, allocations-chômage et emploi

Comme le remarque Phelps (1992), le traitement théorique de l’assurance-chômage n’est pas entièrement satisfaisant. En effet, il est généralement supposé que tous les chômeurs en bénéficient et ce, indépendamment des causes de la perte de leur emploi. Or, il est bien connu que, dans les systèmes existants, les allocations peuvent être refusées aux travailleurs qui quittent volontairement leur emploi ou qui sont licenciés pour faute.Supposant que les allocations sont refusées aux agents licenciés pour « paresse » (donc pour faute), Atkinson (1995) montre que l’assurance-chômage a un effet d’incitation à l’effort qui est favorable à l’emploi.L’objet de cet article est d’étudier l’influence des indemnités de chômage dans un modèle qui s’inspire de Phelps (1970) et Salop (1979). Suivant cette version de l’hypothèse du salaire efficient, les entreprises qui supportent les coûts de rotation de leur personnel, ont avantage à éviter les démissions. Les salaires sont alors soumis à une condition de no quitting qui explique le chômage. Supposant que les travailleurs démissionnaires ne perçoivent pas d’allocations, on montre que l’assurance-chômage diminue le chômage. En effet, les allocations deviennent ainsi une des caractéristiques des emplois et leur augmentation les rend plus attractifs.As Phelps (1992) points out, theoretical analyses of unemployment insurance are quite questionable. Indeed, authors generally assume that all unemployed are eligible to unemployment insurance whatever the reason of the loss of their job. In fact, workers who leave voluntarily their job as well as workers who are fired for a contract breach can be deprived of benefits.Atkinson (1995) examines the effects of unemployment insurance in the shirking model when benefits are refused to the workers who are fired for shirking (a contract breach). He shows that unemployment insurance then becomes an incentive to effort which tends to raise employment.In this paper, we study the effect of unemployment benefits on employment in a model in the same vein as Phelps (1970) and Salop (1979). In this efficiency wage model, because of turnover costs, firms have to discourage workers to quit their jobs. Hence, wages are subjected to a no quitting constraint which explains unemployment. Assuming that workers who quit their jobs are not eligible to unemployment insurance, we establish that more benefits raise employment. Indeed, in this case, unemployment insurance becomes one of the jobs attributes and benefits make the workers more willing to accept bad jobs

Participation, Recruitment Selection, and the Minimum Wage

This article contains an online appendixInternational audienceIn this paper, we re‐examine the efficiency of participation with heterogeneous workers in a search‐matching model with bargained wages and free entry. Assuming that firms hire their best applicants, we show that participation is always too low. The reason for this is a hold‐up phenomenon: to be active, a worker must pay the entire search cost whereas part of the gain from this investment goes to the firm. As a consequence, introducing a (small) minimum wage raises participation, job creation, and employment. Therefore, net aggregate income of the economy is increased

Cotisations employeurs, cotisations employés et emploi. Qui doit financer les dépenses sociales?

L'objet de cet article est d'étudier l'impact de la répartition de la charge des dépenses sociales entre employeurs et employés sur le coût du travail et sur l'emploi. À cet effet, on utilise un modale de négociations salariales, auquel on intègre une condition d'équilibre budgétaire des comptes sociaux. Il apparaît que l'incidence de la répartition dépend du degré de centralisation des négociations. Ainsi, si les cas polaires de décentralisation totale et de centralisation parfaite permettent de retrouver le résultat usuel de la littérature, à savoir l'absence d'effet de la répartition du financement des dépenses sociales sur l'emploi, la situation de centralisation partielle fait en revanche apparaître un impact de cette répartition. On montre alors qu'une augmentation de la part financée par les cotisations employeurs a un effet favorable sur l'emploi.Cotisations patronales, cotisations salariales, chômage d’équilibre, négociations salariales

Introduction au numéro spécial "Travail, emploi et politiques publiques"

Ce numéro regroupe une sélection de sept communications sur les près de cinquante présentées lors du colloque 2012 de la Fédération de Recherche " Travail, Emploi et Politiques Publiques " (FR 3435 - CNRS) qui s'est déroulé à Caen les 14 et 15 juin. Ce colloque était plus particulièrement dédié à l'analyse des trajectoires professionnelles des travailleurs et, plus généralement, aux déterminants et modalités de leur carrière

Compte-rendu de l'expérimentation des votes par approbation et par note lors des élections présidentielles françaises le 22 avril 2012 à Saint-­Etienne, Strasbourg et Louvigny

During the first round of the presidential election of April 22nd, 2012, voters of three French municipalities were invited to test approval voting and three types of evaluation voting. This paper presents the main results of that experiment. After correction of the local and national representativeness bias, two major outputs appear clearly. Approval voting gives a ranking of candidates which is different from uninominal system one. Whatever is the scale of scores, evaluation voting increases this difference.A l'occasion du premier tour des élections présidentielles du 22 avril 2012, les électeurs de trois communes françaises ont été invités à tester in situ le vote par approbation ainsi que trois versions du vote par évaluation. Ce papier a pour objet de présenter les résultats de cette expérimentation. Après correction des biais de représentativité locaux et nationaux, deux enseignements principaux s'en dégagent. Le vote par approbation conduit à un classement des candidats qui diffère nettement du scrutin uninominal et, quelle que soit l'échelle des notes retenue, le vote par évaluation tend à accentuer cette divergence

On the inefficiency of matching models of unemployment with heterogeneous workers and jobs when firms rank their applicants

International audienceIn a circular matching model with bargained wages, firms rank their applicants and pick the most suitable one. Job creation appears to lower the average output. As firms do not internalize this effect, there are too many jobs in a laissez-faire equilibrium under the Hosios condition. By contrast, job rejection is efficient for the equilibrium value of market tightness. Consequently, introducing unemployment compensation raises the aggregate income by lowering market tightness. Due to the isomorphism between the two models, these results extend to match-specific productivities. However, competitive search restores market efficiency

Keeping Up with the Joneses as an Outcome of Getting Ahead of the Smiths. A Two-Stage Veblenian Status Game

In a status game, homogenous individuals first decide on their income (and on the effort necessary to that end) with the aim at Getting ahead of the Smithes (GAS). Next, they make use of a pure positional good to make incomes visible. Although the GAS hypothesis is ordinal, the signalling costs induce cardinal social concerns. The GAS hypothesis, translated into the KUJ (Keeping Up with the Joneses) (pride) concern, generates an equilibrium in which identical agents have unequal income levels. This equilibrium is an egalitarian optimum. But utilitarian and Paretian inefficiency are the price paid for equality

One Dynamic Game for Two Veblenian Ideas. Income Redistribution is Pareto-Improving in the Presence of Social Concerns

In a status game, homogenous individuals first decide on their income (and on the effort necessary to that end) with the aim of Getting ahead of the Smiths (GAS). Next, they make use of a pure positional good to make incomes visible. Although the GAS hypothesis is ordinal, the signaling costs induce cardinal social concerns. The GAS hypothesis, translated into the pure pride concern, generates an equilibrium in which identical agents have unequal income levels. Because individuals decide on their income without taking into account its effect on the signaling costs of higher-ranked participants, this equilibrium is inefficient. Introducing a Pigovian tax to reduce conspicuous consumption generates a rat-race effect in the income-setting stage which neutralizes the effect of this tax on utilities. But a redistributive income tax, if coupled with an appropriate Pigovian tax on conspicuous consumption, increases all utilities

Mismatch and Wage Posting

This paper provides a wage posting model of the labor market in which workers' search strategies are pure. To that end, the persistency of vacant jobs results from a mismatch problem, not a pure coordination problem. Since firms cannot commit to an output cutoff lower than the announced wage, laissez-faire is inefficient. Under a binding condition however, public policy can restore market efficiency by associating a minimum wage with a layoff tax