Kant and the Simple Representation “I”

The aim of this paper is to focus on certain characterizations of “I think” and the “transcendental subject” in an attempt to verify a connection with certain metaphysical characterizations of the thinking subject that Kant introduced in the critical period. Most importantly, two distinct meanings of “I think” need be distinguished: in the Transcendental Deduction “I think” is the act of apperception; in the Transcendental Deduction and in the section of Paralogisms “I think” is taken in its representational nature. It proves helpful to interpret the “transcendental subject” in formal terms as a concept that, mutatis mutandis, has the same function of the concept of the “transcendental object.

Descartes and Hume on I-thoughts

Self-consciousness can be understood as the ability to think I-thou-ghts which can be described as thoughts about oneself ‘as oneself’. Self-consciousness possesses two specific correlated features: the first regards the fact that it is grounded on a first-person perspective, whereas the second concerns the fact that it should be considered a consciousness of the self as subject rather than a consciousness of the self as object. The aim of this paper is to analyse a few considerations about Descartes and Hume’s approaches to self-consciousness, as both philosophers introduce a first-personal method of accessing the subjective dimension through an introspective account. Descartes’s view on self-consciousness seems incapable of conceiving and recognizing herself as herself, while Hume’s seems to lack those features assigned to the consciousness of self-as-subjec

Kant on de se

Since the classic works by Castañeda, Perry and Lewis, de se thoughts have been described as thoughts about oneself ‘as oneself’. In recent years, various theoretical perspectives have gained ground, and even if the transcendental system does not seem to contemplate an explicit articulation of de se thoughts, apparently a few features of transcendental apperception and I think do anticipate a few points in Perry and Recanati’s claims on the so-called implicit de se thoughts in the specific terms of Transcendentalism

Kant, the transcendental designation of I, and the direct reference theory

The aim of this paper is to address the semantic issue of the nature of the representation I and of the transcendental designation, i.e., the self-referential apparatus involved in transcendental apperception. The I think, the bare or empty representation I, is the representational vehicle of the concept of transcendental subject; as such, it is a simple representation. The awareness of oneself as thinking is only expressed by the I: the intellectual representation which performs a referential function of the spontaneity of a thinking subject. To begin with, what exactly does Kant mean when he states that I is a simple and empty representation? Secondly, can the features of the representation I and the correlative transcendental designation explain the indexical nature of the I? Thirdly, do the Kantian considerations on indexicality anticipate any of the semantic elements or, if nothing else, the spirit of the direct reference theory

Performance-oriented model learning for data-driven MPC design

Model Predictive Control (MPC) is an enabling technology in applications requiring controlling physical processes in an optimized way under constraints on inputs and outputs. However, in MPC closed-loop performance is pushed to the limits only if the plant under control is accurately modeled; otherwise, robust architectures need to be employed, at the price of reduced performance due to worst-case conservative assumptions. In this paper, instead of adapting the controller to handle uncertainty, we adapt the learning procedure so that the prediction model is selected to provide the best closed-loop performance. More specifically, we apply for the first time the above "identification for control" rationale to hierarchical MPC using data-driven methods and Bayesian optimization.Comment: Accepted for publication in the IEEE Control Systems Letters (L-CSS

La forma vuota dell'Io. Kant e l'autoriferimento del soggetto autocosciente.

Presupponendo l’influenza di alcune tesi dell’idealismo di Kant su alcune tesi di Wittgenstein non solo attraverso la lettura di Schopenhauer, questo contributo prova a ripercorrere alcune contiguità e differenze tra il dispositivo autoreferenziale dell’appercezione trascendentale e certi aspetti emersi dal dibattito contemporaneo sul carattere irriducibile dell’autoascrizione dei pensieri che contengono un riferimento in prima persona, i cosiddetti I-thoughts, dibattito ispirato da Wittgenstein e dalla sua analisi filosofico-linguistica della grammatica del termine “Io”

Descartes y Hume acerca de los pensamientos sobre el yo

Self-consciousness can be understood as the ability to think I-thoughts which can be described as thoughts about oneself ‘as oneself’. Self-consciousness possesses two specific correlated features: the first regards the fact that it is grounded on a first-person perspective, whereas the second concerns the fact that it should be considered a consciousness of the self as subject rather than a consciousness of the self as object. The aim of this paper is to analyse a few considerations about Descartes and Hume’s approaches to self-consciousness, as both philosophers introduce a first-personal method of accessing the subjective dimension through an introspective account. Descartes’s view on self-consciousness seems incapable of conceiving and recognizing herself as herself, while Hume’s seems to lack those features assigned to the consciousness of self-as-subject.La autoconciencia puede ser entendida como la habilidad para llevar a cabo reflexiones sobre uno mismo, las cuales pueden ser descritas como los pensamientos sobre tu propia persona como “individuo”. La autoconciencia comprende dos características relacionadas entre sí: la primera tiene que ver con el hecho de que está basada en una perspectiva en primera persona, mientras que la segunda tiene que ver con el hecho de que debe ser considerada como la conciencia del yo como sujeto en lugar de como objeto. El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar algunas cuestiones acerca del punto de vista de Descartes y de Hume sobre la autoconciencia, ya que ambos filósofos introducen un método de acceso en primera persona a la dimensión subjetiva a través de un enfoque introspectivo. La visión de Descartes sobre la autoconciencia parece incapaz de concebirla y reconocerla como tal, mientras que la de Hume parece carecer de las características asignadas a la conciencia como sujeto

Kant e Wittgenstein su schema e regola

Approfondendo lo schema dell’immaginazione, introdotto da Kant nella Critica della Ragione Pura per risolvere l’applicazione tra concetti e intuizioni, diversi commentatori hanno individuato alcuni legami con l’impostazione di Wittgenstein, soprattutto con le nozioni di immagine del Tractatus logico-philosophicus e di regola delle Ricerche filosofiche. Partendo da una prospettiva filosofico-linguistica, in particolare dalla questione della denominazione, questo saggio prova a ripercorrere alcuni punti critici che emergono dal tale confronto (§ 1),affrontando sia le difficoltà epistemiche interne alla riflessione kantiana sia gli aspetti che caratterizzano il suo paradigma procedurale (§ 2e § 3), per individuare un accostamento plausibile all’impresa filosofica di Wittgenstein (§ 4 e § 5)

Kant and the Problem of Self-Identification

Ever since Strawson’s The Bounds of Sense, the transcendental apperception device has become a theoretical reference point to shed light on the criterionless selfascription form of mental states, reformulating a contemporary theoretical place tackled for the first time in explicit terms by Wittgenstein’s Blue Book. By investigating thoroughly some elements of the critical system the issue of the identification of the transcendental subject with reference to the I think will be singled out. In this respect, the debate presents at least two diametrically opposed attitudes: the first – exemplified in the works by Hacker, Becker, Sturma and McDowell – considers the features of the I think according to Wittgenstein’s approach to the I as subject while the second, exemplified by Kitcher and Carl, criticizes the various commentators who turn to Wittgenstein in order to interpret Kant’s I think. The hypothesis that I will attempt at articulating in this paper starts off not only from the transcendental apperception form, but also from the characterizations of empirical apperception. It may be assumed that Kant’s reflection on the problem of self-identification lies right here, truly prefiguring some features of Wittgenstein’s uses of I, albeit from different metaphysical assumptions and philosophical horizons

Los hombres que llevan a cuestas su rebaño. Ensayo sobre el significado de la celebración de los Mamuthones de Mamoiada, Cerdeña, Italia (parte I)

Este ensayo representa una mirada desde la Antropología Simbólica sobre la actividad pastoril en Mamoiada, Cerdeña, a través de su celebración más tradicional. Descubrimos que dicha labor pertenece exclusivamente al ámbito masculino y reproduce un encuentro dialógico entre hombre, territorio y animales, el cual actúa dinamizando la vida cotidiana. Los personajes nucleares de esta fiesta son los Mamuthones quienes desarrollan una performance ritual investidos con máscaras y cencerros, representación que reafirma el status masculino.This essay gives a Simbolic Anthropology view about shepherding activity in Mamoiada, Sardinia, through its traditional Festival. We realize that this is a male work, which allow men to be in deep contact with nature, putting new energy to daily life. Mamuthones are the main characters of this celebration who develop a ritual performance, wearing wooden masks and heavy metal cowbells, showing male status