On Packet Scheduling with Adversarial Jamming and Speedup

In Packet Scheduling with Adversarial Jamming packets of arbitrary sizes arrive over time to be transmitted over a channel in which instantaneous jamming errors occur at times chosen by the adversary and not known to the algorithm. The transmission taking place at the time of jamming is corrupt, and the algorithm learns this fact immediately. An online algorithm maximizes the total size of packets it successfully transmits and the goal is to develop an algorithm with the lowest possible asymptotic competitive ratio, where the additive constant may depend on packet sizes. Our main contribution is a universal algorithm that works for any speedup and packet sizes and, unlike previous algorithms for the problem, it does not need to know these properties in advance. We show that this algorithm guarantees 1-competitiveness with speedup 4, making it the first known algorithm to maintain 1-competitiveness with a moderate speedup in the general setting of arbitrary packet sizes. We also prove a lower bound of $\phi+1\approx 2.618$ on the speedup of any 1-competitive deterministic algorithm, showing that our algorithm is close to the optimum. Additionally, we formulate a general framework for analyzing our algorithm locally and use it to show upper bounds on its competitive ratio for speedups in $[1,4)$ and for several special cases, recovering some previously known results, each of which had a dedicated proof. In particular, our algorithm is 3-competitive without speedup, matching both the (worst-case) performance of the algorithm by Jurdzinski et al. and the lower bound by Anta et al.Comment: Appeared in Proc. of the 15th Workshop on Approximation and Online Algorithms (WAOA 2017

Multi-round Master-Worker Computing: a Repeated Game Approach

We consider a computing system where a master processor assigns tasks for execution to worker processors through the Internet. We model the workers decision of whether to comply (compute the task) or not (return a bogus result to save the computation cost) as a mixed extension of a strategic game among workers. That is, we assume that workers are rational in a game-theoretic sense, and that they randomize their strategic choice. Workers are assigned multiple tasks in subsequent rounds. We model the system as an infinitely repeated game of the mixed extension of the strategic game. In each round, the master decides stochastically whether to accept the answer of the majority or verify the answers received, at some cost. Incentives and/or penalties are applied to workers accordingly. Under the above framework, we study the conditions in which the master can reliably obtain tasks results, exploiting that the repeated games model captures the effect of long-term interaction. That is, workers take into account that their behavior in one computation will have an effect on the behavior of other workers in the future. Indeed, should a worker be found to deviate from some agreed strategic choice, the remaining workers would change their own strategy to penalize the deviator. Hence, being rational, workers do not deviate. We identify analytically the parameter conditions to induce a desired worker behavior, and we evaluate experi- mentally the mechanisms derived from such conditions. We also compare the performance of our mechanisms with a previously known multi-round mechanism based on reinforcement learning.Comment: 21 pages, 3 figure

An experimental characterization of workers'' behavior and accuracy in crowdsourced tasks

Crowdsourcing systems are evolving into a powerful tool of choice to deal with repetitive or lengthy human-based tasks. Prominent among those is Amazon Mechanical Turk, in which Human Intelligence Tasks, are posted by requesters, and afterwards selected and executed by subscribed (human) workers in the platform. Many times these HITs serve for research purposes. In this context, a very important question is how reliable the results obtained through these platforms are, in view of the limited control a requester has on the workers'' actions. Various control techniques are currently proposed but they are not free from shortcomings, and their use must be accompanied by a deeper understanding of the workers'' behavior. In this work, we attempt to interpret the workers'' behavior and reliability level in the absence of control techniques. To do so, we perform a series of experiments with 600 distinct MTurk workers, specifically designed to elicit the worker''s level of dedication to a task, according to the task''s nature and difficulty. We show that the time required by a worker to carry out a task correlates with its difficulty, and also with the quality of the outcome. We find that there are different types of workers. While some of them are willing to invest a significant amount of time to arrive at the correct answer, at the same time we observe a significant fraction of workers that reply with a wrong answer. For the latter, the difficulty of the task and the very short time they took to reply suggest that they, intentionally, did not even attempt to solve the task. © 2021 Christoforou et al. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited

Fair linking mechanisms for resource allocation with correlated player types

The proceeding at: Second International Conference,Networked Systems (NETYS 2014), took place 2014. May 15-17. in Marrakech, Morocco.Resource allocation is one of the most relevant problems in the area of Mechanism Design for computing systems. Devising algorithms capable of providing efficient and fair allocation is the objective of many previous research efforts. Usually, the mechanisms they propose use payments in order to deal with selfishness. Since using payments is undesirable in some contexts, a family of mechanisms without payments is proposed in this paper. These mechanisms extend the Linking Mechanism of Jackson and Sonnenschein introducing a generic concept of fairness with correlated preferences. We prove that these mechanisms have good incentive, fairness, and efficiency properties. To conclude, we provide an algorithm, based on the mechanisms, that could be used in practical computing environments.Publicad

Fair linking mechanisms for resource allocation with correlated player types

Resource allocation is one of the most relevant problems in the area of Mechanism Design for computing systems. Devising algorithms capable of providing efficient and fair allocation is the objective of many previous research efforts. Usually, the mechanisms they propose deal with selfishness by introducing utility transfers or payments. Since using payments is undesirable in some contexts, a family of mechanisms without payments is proposed in this paper. These mechanisms extend the Linking Mechanism of Jackson and Sonnenschein introducing a generic concept of fairness with correlated preferences. We prove that these mechanisms have good incentive, fairness, and efficiency properties. To conclude, we provide an algorithm, based on the mechanisms, that could be used in practical computing environments.Publicad

Applying the dynamics of evolution to achieve reliability in master-worker computing

We consider Internet-based master-worker task computations, such as SETI@home, where a master process sends tasks, across the Internet, to worker processes; workers execute and report back some result. However, these workers are not trustworthy, and it might be at their best interest to report incorrect results. In such master-worker computations, the behavior and the best interest of the workers might change over time. We model such computations using evolutionary dynamics, and we study the conditions under which the master can reliably obtain task results. In particular, we develop and analyze an algorithmic mechanism based on reinforcement learning to provide workers with the necessary incentives to eventually become truthful. Our analysis identifies the conditions under which truthful behavior can be ensured and bounds the expected convergence time to that behavior. The analysis is complemented with illustrative simulations.This work is supported by the Cyprus Research Promotion Foundation grant TΠE/ΠΛHPO/0609(BE)/05, the National Science Foundation (CCF-0937829, CCF-1114930), Comunidad de Madrid grants S2009TIC-1692 and MODELICO-CM, Spanish PRODIEVO and RESINEE grants and MICINN grant EC2011-29688-C02-01, and National Natural Science Foundation of China grant 61020106002.Publicad

Achieving Reliability in Master-worker Computing via Evolutionary Dynamics

The proceeding at: 18th International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Computing, Euro-Par 2012), took place 2012, August 27-31, in Rhodes Island, Greece.This work considers Internet-based task computations in which a master process assigns tasks, over the Internet, to rational workers and collect their responses. The objective is for the master to obtain the correct task outcomes. For this purpose we formulate and study the dynamics of evolution of Internet-based master-worker computations through reinforcement learning.This work is supported by the Cyprus Research Promo-tion Foundation grant TΠE/ΠΛHPO/0609(BE)/05, NSF grants CCF-0937829, CCF-1114930, Comunidad de Madrid grant S2009TIC-1692, Spanish MOSAICO and RESINEE grants and MICINN grant TEC2011-29688-C02-01, and National Natural Science Foundation of China grant 61020106002.Publicad

Implementing the weakest failure detector for solving consensus

The concept of unreliable failure detector was introduced by Chandra and Toueg as a mechanism that provides information about process failures. This mechanism has been used to solve several agreement problems, such as the consensus problem. In this paper, algorithms that implement failure detectors in partially synchronous systems are presented. First two simple algorithms of the weakest class to solve the consensus problem, namely the Eventually Strong class (⋄S), are presented. While the first algorithm is wait-free, the second algorithm is f-resilient, where f is a known upper bound on the number of faulty processes. Both algorithms guarantee that, eventually, all the correct processes agree permanently on a common correct process, i.e. they also implement a failure detector of the class Omega (Ω). They are also shown to be optimal in terms of the number of communication links used forever. Additionally, a wait-free algorithm that implements a failure detector of the Eventually Perfect class (⋄P) is presented. This algorithm is shown to be optimal in terms of the number of bidirectional links used forever

Empirical Comparison of Graph-based Recommendation Engines for an Apps Ecosystem

Recommendation engines (RE) are becoming highly popular, e.g., in the area of e-commerce. A RE offers new items (products or content) to users based on their profile and historical data. The most popular algorithms used in RE are based on collaborative filtering. This technique makes recommendations based on the past behavior of other users and the similarity between users and items. In this paper we have evaluated the performance of several RE based on the properties of the networks formed by users and items. The RE use in a novel way graph theoretic concepts like edges weights or network flow. The evaluation has been conducted in a real environment (ecosystem) for recommending apps to smartphone users. The analysis of the results allows concluding that the effectiveness of a RE can be improved if the age of the data, and if a global view of the data is considered. It also shows that graph-based RE are effective, but more experiments are required for a more accurate characterization of their properties

Scheduling Dynamic Parallel Workload of Mobile Devices with Access Guarantees

We study a dynamic resource-allocation problem that arises in various parallel computing scenarios, such as mobile cloud computing, cloud computing systems, Internet of Things systems, and others. Generically, we model the architecture as client mobile devices and static base stations. Each client “arrives” to the system to upload data to base stations by radio transmissions and then “leaves.” The problem, called Station Assignment , is to assign clients to stations so that every client uploads their data under some restrictions, including a target subset of stations, a maximum delay between transmissions, a volume of data to upload, and a maximum bandwidth for each station. We study the solvability of Station Assignment under an adversary that controls the arrival and departure of clients, limited to maximum rate and burstiness of such arrivals. We show upper and lower bounds on the rate and burstiness for various client arrival schedules and protocol classes. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that Station Assignment is studied under adversarial arrivals and departures. </jats:p