How to drive passenger airport experience: A decision support system based on user profile

This work presents a decision support system for providing information and suggestions to airport users. The aim of the study is to design a system both to improve passengers\u2019 experience by reducing time spent queueing and waiting, and to raise airport revenues by increasing the time passengers spend in discretionary activities. Passengers\u2019 behaviour is modelled with an activity-choice model to be calibrated with their mobile phone traces. The model allows to predict activity sequences for passengers with given socio-demographic characteristics. In order to predict queue length at check-in desks and security control and congestion inside commercial areas, passengers\u2019 movements are simulated with a microscopic simulation tool. A system to generate suggestion has been designed: passengers are advised to perform mandatory activities when the predicted queue length is reasonable and specific discretionary activities according to time available, user profiles, location distance, location congestion and airport management preferences. A proof-of-concept case study has been developed: passengers\u2019 behaviour in both cases of receiving and not receiving suggestion has been simulated. In the first case, passengers experienced less queueing and waiting time; the time saved was spent in discretionary activities, improving passengers\u2019 airport experience and increasing airport revenues

Il problema dell'ontologia nella Scienza della logica di Hegel

The subject of my dissertation is the problematic status of 'ontology' in Hegel's Science of logic. The main questions that motivate my work are the following: What is the subject of ontology? How can ontology approach its own subject? What kind of presuppositions are implicit when we characterize a philosophical project as 'ontological'?. The aim of my dissertation is to show the reasons why Hegel's speculative philosophy is today absolutely relevant to disclose the presuppositions that are inherent to the ontological questions, and to gain an answer that both challenges the place of ontology in the modern project of a self-grounding philosophy and at the same time paves the way to the possibility of a new self-critical study of being qua being thought. The course of my argument is divided into four sections: Introduction, Part One (chapters 1-3), Part Two (chapters 4-7), Conclusion. The Introduction sketches three leading questions (Why is the definition of 'metaphysics' so controversial? What is the meaning of doing metaphysics? Are there legitimate reasons to distinguish between 'metaphysics' and 'ontology'?) and proposes some criteria for the examination of the status quaestionis concerning Hegel's answer to these questions. The first part of my work is devoted to the motivation and the formulation of the ontological problem. Chapter 1 outlines Hegel's peculiar conception of a presupposition-free thinking, by bringing out the tight connection between presuppositionlessness and the concept of radical skepticism. More specifically, the point of my analysis here is to evaluate the critical function which, on Hegel's view, Pyrrhonian or Greek skepticism exerts on Kant's own concept of critical philosophy. Chapter 2 puts under investigation the motivation that leads the individual subject to commit herself or himself to the project of speculative thinking. On this regard, I discuss Houlgate's claim that the free act by which the subject decides to philosophize constitutes the 'historical ground' of the first concept of science. In Chapter 3, I come to pose the ontological problem of Hegel's Logic by way of a preliminary analysis of three kinds of presuppositions: the 'subjective presupposition', the objective presuppositions, the subjective-objective presuppositions. Then, I distinguish four aspects of what it means to 'problematize' the status of ontology: (i) to question the alleged gap between 'science' and 'reality'; (ii) to explain the transition from our condition of familiarity with the objects of consciousness to the process of understanding them in virtue of 'conceptual thinking' alone; (iii) to articulate the traditional question of ontology - namely, what is being? - within the subject-matter or the Sache selbst of the Logic; (iv) to show the points of similarities and the points of difference between Hegel's speculative philosophy and Aristotle's 'first philosophy' with respect to the topic of the intelligibility of being. In sum, Chapter 3 tries to place emphasis on the fact that the incorporation or Aufhebung of the traditional ontology (namely, the study of the general features of being qua being) into the field of a speculative logic (namely, the science of being qua being thought) involves a radical challenge to the very presuppositions of Aristotle's questioning. The second part of my work develops an 'ontological' interpretation of the Science of logic by working out an understanding of the concept of method in terms of a self-generating process. Chapter 4 provides an analysis of the difference between a 'traditional' and an 'idealistic' (more specifically, Hegelian) conception of thinking. My goal here is to show how Hegel appropriates two crucial thoughts of the history of philosophy (the Aristotelian distinction between active and passive nous, and the Spinozistic principle of absolute immanence) into his own original concept of 'objective thinking'. Chapter 5 is occupied by the critical confrontation between Hegel and Aristotle on the idea of process. In particular, three points engage this confrontation: (i) the relation of the process to its purpose; (ii) the question whether a process is inherently temporal; (iii) the question of what is left of Aristotle's triple distinction of human activities (poiesis, praxis, theoria) in Hegel's philosophy. Chapter 6 proceeds through four steps. The first step is to ask about the formal sense of the method of a presupposition-free ontology. The second step consists in the analysis of the presuppositions of the dogmatic ontology that was known to Hegel in the form of the Schulmetaphysik. The third step is the formulation of the three basic questions that express (and summarize) the method of a critical ontology (namely, an ontology that is free from the substrates of representation). The fourth step deals with the first question of the said method: Why to begin with the thought of pure being? Chapter 7 explores the second and the third question: How to advance beyond pure being? Whether and how does the meaning of being finds an end for its own advancement?. As concerns the second question, I claim that the advancement 'beyond' pure being has to do with the transformation of what Hegel calls the 'form of immediacy'. As concerns the third question, I try to dispel the idea that the speculative meaning of 'ending' is simply to make one last step or to put a stop to the logical movement by bringing it to a stable closure. Instead, I claim that the 'ending' of the process by which pure being 'finally' achieves its true meaning must be understood as a 'completion' that is inherently circular and is not restricted to the Logic as the pure or first science of the system of philosophy. In order to show the dynamic relation between the advancement and the end of Hegel's logical science, I conclude this chapter by articulating and discussing four questions about the sense or orientation of the logical advancement. The first question concerns the compatibility between the restless character of movement and the idea of its return into itself. The second question asks about the implication of the fact that the logical method must be regarded as a regressive foundation of its own beginning. The third question focuses on the reason why this regressive foundation is more than a mere restoration of the first immediacy of being. The fourth question is whether the logical process follows some rules or has some kind of core or fundamental operation that somehow imparts and transmits its directives from a 'centre' to the 'periphery' of the movement. The Conclusion of my work is devoted to the treatment of three points: (i) the demarcation between the scope and the limits of my interpretation and the work that needs to be done to fulfill the task of a logical reconstruction of ontology within the Science of logic; (ii) the study of the transformation of the traditional concept of 'substance' within the section 'The relationship of substantiality' in the Doctrine of Essence; (iii) a retrospective glance on the course of the argument, with the double aim of highlighting the answers that my interpretation has given to the questions formulated in the Introduction and stressing the reason why Hegel's project is so relevant for any actual attempt to practice an ontological inquiry

The problem of circularity between the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Science of Logic

The aim of this article is to discuss the objection of vicious circularity concerning the relation between the Phenomenology of Spiritand the Science of Logic. My argument is articulated in three stages: (i) in the first place, I will provide a historical reconstruction of the debate and I will try to neutralize the objection of vicious circularity; (ii) in the second place, I will examine the latest positions of the Hegel-Forschungabout the issue of a possibly reciprocal presupposition between the PhG and the SL; (iii) in the third place, I will analyze the meaning of a virtuous circularity, by showing its inner relation to a dynamic conception of systematicity. &nbsp

O problema da substância na Doutrina da Essência (1813) de Hegel

O objetivo deste artigo é esclarecer os termos da apresentação crítica da substância na Doutrina da Essência (1813) de Hegel. Para tanto, procederei em três passos: em primeiro lugar, apresentarei o conteúdo intrinsecamente relacional da categoria da substância na Doutrina da Essência (1813); em segundo lugar, analisarei em que consiste a falha que impulsiona a ciência lógica a ultrapassar a relação da substancialidade; em terceiro lugar, comentarei sobre o sentido geral da refutação hegeliana do sistema espinosista.  The aim of this article is to clarify the way in which Hegel’s Doctrine of Essence (1813) develops a critical presentation of the category of substance. To this end, I will proceed in three steps. In the first place, I will present the relational character of substance in the relevant place of the Doctrine of Essence (1813); in the second place, I will analyze the shortcoming which drives the logical science beyond the relation of substantiality; in the third place, I will make a few comments on the general sense of Hegel’s refutation of Spinoza’s system

Il metodo della critica di Hegel alla filosofia pratica di Kant

Il senso della ricerca condotta nella presente tesi è il tentativo di rendere esplicita la logica sistematica della filosofia pratica di Kant e di Hegel. La caratterizzazione di questo intento non è priva di problemi, in quanto sembra sottintendere che venga presupposta dall’interprete un’idea di filosofia, destinata a far valere un’unica concezione della logica, che verrebbe ritenuta comune sia a Kant che a Hegel, considerati come termini di un confronto estrinseco, i cui si deve decidere, dopo un’esposizione sommaria del punto principale prima dell’uno e poi dell’altro, quale dei due punti di vista abbia ragione e quale abbia torto. Ma niente ci sarebbe di più sbagliato che assumere questo atteggiamento in filosofia, quasi che si trattasse di venderne dei pezzi in un mercato. Il presente lavoro non pretende di essere né un’esposizione di tesi né una comunicazione di risultati, basate su un inquadramento preliminare di due punti di vista filosofici semplicemente diversi, ma si presenta come un insieme di ricerche che, lasciandosi guidare da un’interpretazione calata in opere specifiche, si occupano costantemente di giudicare la legittimità di un confronto in relazione a un tema, la filosofia pratica, che deve essere fatto emergere configurando un esame della relazione che sussiste fra sistema e libertà in una logica trascendentale di Kant, considerata nella sua affinità e differenza storico-filosofica dalla logica speculativa di Hegel. Senza propormi di interrogare Kant allo scopo di difenderne una presunta ortodossia, mi sono trovato, malgrado lo sforzo di mantenermi equilibrato nel considerare l’eguale necessità del corso delle argomentazioni di una logica trascendentale e di una logica speculativa, a rendere conto dei problemi sollevati da Kant con un metodo hegeliano (il ‘metodo assoluto’ secondo cui ogni figura logico-reale che appare nel sistema delle scienze filosofiche sviluppa a partire dal suo concetto tutte le sue determinazioni), in relazione a un tema in cui l’ ‘assolutezza’ della ragione pura significa anzitutto, per Kant, lo svincolarsi dai limiti della condotta conoscitiva dell’intelletto puro, che legifera a priori sull’ambito di costituzione dei fenomeni della natura in generale. Aver dato un’impostazione della morale di Kant a partire dal concetto di una logica della ragione pura pratica, quale è abbozzata dalla figura del sillogismo, che viene trattato, per motivazioni attinenti all’architettonica della ragione, nella ‘Delucidazione’ della seconda Critica, mi ha permesso di guardare a Hegel all’interno della stessa esposizione logica di Kant. Volendo evitare di risolvere il confronto in una giustapposizione fra paradigmi, ho istituito il confronto in modo tale che il lato kantiano costituisse la domanda, come è evidente dai titoli del terzo e quarto capitolo della tesi (rispettivamente dedicati alla possibilità e alla realtà della libertà), e il lato hegeliano fornisse la risposta, nel senso di fornire l’elemento di una rielaborazione di quegli aspetti (l’esperienza della prassi, il fatto che la forma pura della volontà debba concepirsi come creatrice di storia) che l’impresa kantiana di fondazione del problema della morale su basi non trascendenti rispetto alla ragione ha lasciato non sviluppati. Per riassumere con un’espressione il senso del confronto, si può affermare che esso è consistito nell’articolare un passaggio dalla ‘Critica della ragione pratica’ alla ‘Sistematica della ragione pura pratica’. A questo proposito, ritengo di avere caratterizzato in un modo non del tutto compiuto la posizione di Hegel, avendo scelto di limitarmi a discutere il significato generale della sua logica sistematica e approfondendo solo alcune categorie della Logica (il fondamento, le categorie della realtà effettiva, l’idea del bene) e della sua ‘etica’, nella misura in cui consolidavano la prospettiva dell’universale concreto, configurato in Kant mediante l’immanenza del livello trascendentale della ragione (le condizioni di possibilità) al livello empirico (il condizionato, consistente nelle forme dell’esperienza pratica del soggetto singolo e del soggetto metaindividuale del genere umano, che viene a consapevolezza di sé nel processo di trasformazione della sua realtà mediante la storia). Il problema principale cui confluiscono le varie ricerche riguarda la possibilità reale dell’esperienza della prassi in Kant. Considerando la necessità di un’estensione della tavola del giudizio riflettente pratico a una fenomenologia delle figure della coscienza morale, interpretata anche come il passaggio da una ‘riflessione pratica prima’ (acritica) a una ‘riflessione pratica seconda’ (critica), ho individuato nel concetto di storia, in cui la vicenda del soggetto autocosciente singolo si intreccia in un rapporto formativo di passività e attività con quella del mondo sociale, il punto mediano che collega il mondo intelligibile (il livello del fondamento, conosciuto mediante l’ ‘unico fatto’ della ragione) col mondo fenomenico (il livello del fondato, manifesto nell’esperienza), in modo tale che l’esperienza non finisca per essere un materiale dato cui la legge pura, nei casi presenti, astraendo dal processo che ne suscita la presenza, si applichi esteriormente attraverso un giudizio determinante

Intervention strategies for renewed living ecologies. The Belgian experience

Demolition-reconstruction interventions and deep renovation interventions are the main strategies implemented with the aim of adapting the existing residential heritage. In particular, the deep renovation interventions are at the centre of a cultural debate, as evidenced by the research carried out on large modernist peripheral settlements. In this context, it is interesting to investigate how this approach can be applied to those historic urban tissues and smaller centres that strongly characterise the Italian and European territory. Starting from the analysis of several case studies identified in the Belgian context, the work codifies archetypes of intervention on technological units and analyses their limits and potential of application to the Italian context with the aim of opening a debate between conservation approaches and adaptation approaches

Gap-acceptance behavior at roundabouts: validation of a driving simulator environment using field observations

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freeway rear end collision risk estimation with extreme value theory approach a case study

Abstract The current practice in crash-based safety analysis is hindered by some weaknesses: rarity of crashes, lack of timeliness, mistakes in crash reporting. Researchers are testing alternative approaches to safety estimation without the need of crash data. This paper presents an application of Extreme Value Theory in road safety analysis, using Time-To-Collision as a surrogate safety measure to estimate the risk to be involved in a freeway rear-end collision. The method was tested using data from an Italian toll-road with good results

Exploring the impact of automated vehicles lane-changing behavior on urban network efficiency

While automated vehicle (AV) research has grown steadily in recent years, the impact of automated lane changing behavior on transportation systems remains a largely understudied topic. The present work aims to explore the effects of automated lane changing behavior on urban network efficiency as the penetration rate of AVs increases. To the best of the authors knowledge, this represents the first attempt to do so by isolating the effects of the lane changing behavior; this was obtained by considering AVs with automated lateral control, yet retaining the same longitudinal control characteristics of conventional vehicles (CV). An urban road network located in Hannover, Germany, was modeled with the microsimulation software SUMO, and several scenarios were analyzed, starting from a baseline with only CVs and then progressively increasing the AV penetration rate with 10% increments. Results highlight a modest, but statistically significant, decrease in system performance, with travel times increasing, and average speed and network capacity decreasing, as penetration rates increase. This was likely caused by a more prudent behavior of AVs, which accepted larger gaps than CVs when performing lane changing maneuvers.Comment: Accepted article version of paper presented at the 2023 8th International Conference on Models and Technologies for Intelligent Transportation Systems (MT-ITS