El realismo interno de Putnam y la ciencia empírica

El articulo investiga varios argumentos que respaldan el realismo interno de Hilary Putnam en respecto a la ciencia empirica. En Models and Reality (1980), Putnam aplica el argumento de la teoría de modelos a la física para defender una vista pragmatista de la verdad. Pero esta vista de la verdad depende de la vista de Dios que Putnam critica con el mismo argumento. Además no parece compatible con ninguna vista realista de la ciencia. En Realism with a Human Face (1990), Putnam introduce la distinción entre metalenguaje y lenguaje del objeto. Esta distinción permite mantener la vista correspondentista de la verdad, y apoya el pluralismo actual de la ciencia empirica. En Words and Life (1994) el realismo interno es respaldado por argumentos anti-reduccionistas que confirman la diversidad de la ciencia.The paper investigates various arguments in favour of Putnam's internal realism with respect to the empirical sciences. In Models and Reality (1980), Putnam applies his model-theoretic argument to physics in order to defend a pragmatist view of truth. But this view of truth depends on the God's Eye View which Putnam criticizes with the same argument. In addition, it seems to be incompatible with any realistic account of science. In Realism with a Human Face (1990), Putnam introduces the distinction of meta-language and object lenguage. This distinction permits him to maintain the correspondence view of truth, and supports the actual pluralism of the empirical sciences. In Words and Life (1994), his internal realism is supported by anti-reductionist arguments which confirm the disunity of science

Models, unification, and simulations: Margaret C. Morrison (1954–2021)

The philosophy of science community mourns the loss of Margaret Catherine Morrison, who passed away on January 9, 2021, after a long battle with cancer. Margie, as she was known to all who knew her, was highly regarded for her influential contributions to the philosophy of science, particularly her studies of the role of models and simulations in the natural and social sciences. These contributions made her a world-leading philosopher of science, instrumental in shifting philosophers' attention from the structure of scientific theories to the practice of science. Her sophisticated studies of the function of models in scientific practice drew on detailed knowledge of the theories and experiments of physics as well as the history of physics. In emphasizing the autonomy of scientific models and their interventional character, her insights had some affinity with Cartwright's and Hacking’s views on phenomenological laws, entity realism, the instrumentalist interpretation of scientific theories, and the disunity of science. But Morrison’s approach was distinguished by the conviction that the existence of unobservable entities cannot be defended independently of the theories that support their evidence, and that scientific practice cannot be adequately understood without examining the reasons for theory unification

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