Experimental Essays on Singling Out, Emotions, and Electoral Decisions

This PhD thesis is a collection of three independent essays in the area of experimental economics. The first investigates the effects of singling out an individual on trust and trustworthiness. The second essay studies the role played by the punishment technology, and the experience and cultural background of the subjects in driving emotions and behavior in power-to-take game experiments. The third essay investigates the preferences of voters over the trustworthiness and competence of candidates in public elections

Competence versus Honesty: What Do Voters Care About?

We set up an experiment to measure voter preferences trade-offs between competence and honesty. We measure the competence and honesty of candidates by asking them to work on a real effort task and decide whether to report truthfully or not the value of their work. In the first stage, the earnings are the result of the competence and honesty of one randomly selected participant. In the second stage, subjects can select who will determine their earnings based on the fi rst stage's competence and honesty of the alternative candidates. We find that most voters tend to have a bias towards caring about honesty even when this results in lower payoffs

Temporary Workers Are Not Free-Riders: An Experimental Investigation

We conduct an artefactual field experiment to study whether the individual preferences and propensity to cooperate of temporary workers differ from permanent contract workers. We find that temporary and permanent contract workers have different other-regarding preferences, but display similar contribution patterns in an anonymous Public Good Game. Students, instead, are more selfish and contribute less than temporary and permanent workers

When Foul Play Seems Fair: Dishonesty as a Response to Violations of Just Deserts

We investigate the norm of just deserts and its effect on honesty. Just deserts is an essential norm in a market society, and honesty is an important factor in economic and social exchange. In particular, we analyze what happens when the social distributive rules betray the reasonable expectation that who deserves more will obtain a larger payoff. Using a formal-theoretic framework—equity theory—we explore the nexus between the perception of just deserts and honesty, combining cross-national survey (WVS) evidence and data from two laboratory experiments—conducted in the United States and Italy—to study whether violations of the principle of just deserts contribute to an increased tolerance for or an engagement in dishonest and corrupt acts. We find convergent evidence that violation of the just deserts norm results in a greater propensity toward self-serving dishonesty, and that this effect is distinct from the effect of inequality. Both the survey and experimental results also indicate that sensitivity to violations of the just deserts norm vary cross-nationally. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our results for theories of distributive justice and multiple equilibria in societal levels of honesty

Students, Temporary Workers and Co-Op Workers: An Experimental Investigation on Social Preferences

International audienceWe conduct an artefactual field experiment to compare the individual preferences and propensity to cooperate of three pools of subjects: Undergraduate students, temporary workers and permanent workers. We find that students are more selfish and contribute less than workers. Temporary and permanent contract workers have similar other-regarding preferences and display analogous contribution patterns in an anonymous Public Good Game

Non-Monetary Feedback Induces more Cooperation: Students and Workers in a Voluntary Contribution Mechanism

We conduct an artefactual field experiment to study and compare the behavior of workers and students in a linear voluntary contribution mechanism in which subjects can assign immaterial sanctions or rewards to the other group members. We find that both students and workers sanction group members who contribute less than the group average, and reward those who contribute more. In both subject samples, the use of non-monetary sanctions and rewards induces more cooperation. The magnitude of the effect, however, is heterogeneous, as feedback has more impact among students who, contrary to workers, respond positively to sanctions. Students also tend to use sanctions more than workers. We discuss the implications of these findings for social cohesion, cooperative spirit and organizational efficiency in the workplace

Cheating in the Lab Predicts Fraud in the Field An Experiment in Public Transportations

We conduct an artefactual field experiment using a diversified sample of passengers of public transportations to study attitudes towards dishonesty. We find that the diversity of behavior in terms of dis/honesty in laboratory tasks and in the field correlate. Moreover, individuals who have just been fined in the field behave more honestly in the lab than the other fare-dodgers, except when context is introduced. Overall, we show that simple tests of dishonesty in the lab can predict moral firmness in life, although frauders who care about social image cheat less when behavior can be verified ex post by the experimenter

Variable Markups in a Model with Adjustment Costs: Econometric Evidence for U.S. Industry

Market ; demand ; costs ; manufacturing

The attraction and compromise effects in bargaining: Experimental evidence

We experimentally investigate, in an unstructured bargaining environment with commonly known money payoffs, the attraction effect and compromise effect (AE and CE) in bargaining, namely, a tendency for bargainers to agree to an intermediate option (CE) or to an option that dominates another option (AE). We conjecture that the relevance of the AE and CE in bargaining is constrained by how focal the feasible agreements’ payoffs are. We indeed observe that there are significant AEs and CEs, but these effects are mediated by the efficiency and equality properties of the feasible agreements. Due to the allure of equality, the effects are harder to observe when an equal earnings contract is available. Decoys are more effective in shifting agreements from a very unequal contract to a less unequal one rather than the reverse

MOLECULAR COMPOSITION OF ACTIVE CHIOS MASTIC GUM COMPOUNDS, TERPENES, FOR USE IN COSMETIC, NUTRACEUTICAL, MEDICAL DEVICES AND PHARMACEUTICAL APPLICATIONS.

Chios mastic gum is a resin generated by the plant Pistacia lentiscus var. chia, generally cultivated in Mediterranean countries and particularly in the southern part of the Greek island of Chios. P. lentiscus is a very ancient plant and the related gum has been used since many centuries. Recent studies have associated specific pharmaceutical properties of Chios mastic gum with its particular molecular components. In fact, increasing scientific evidences are available on the therapeutic activity of Chios mastic gum. Its gastro-intestinal, antioxidant, anti-inflammatory, antidiabetic, antimicrobial and anticancer activity, as well as its beneficial effects in oral hygiene and in skin care are largely documented. In particular, it is used as a seasoning in Mediterranean cuisine, in the production of chewing gum, in perfumery, in dentistry, and for the relief of epigastric pain and protection against peptic ulcer. Up to more than 70 constituents of Chios mastic gum have been found and more than 60 have been identified. Six components, namely α-pipene, β-pipene, β-myrcene, linalool, trans-caryophyllene and camphene, account for 65% to 80% of the weight of the Chios mastic gum. The active components contributing to its therapeutic effects belong to the class of terpenes (mono- and sesquiterpenoids, triterpenic acids and triterpenoids). Triterpenic acids, in particular, possess various biological capacities such as anti-inflammatory, antioxidant, antiatherogenic, antihyperlipidemic, anti-tumor, antidiabetic and hepatoprotective effects. Chios mastic gum has been demonstrated to contain many of these active molecules such as oleanonic acid, moronic acid, 24Z-masticadienonic acid, 24Z-isomasticadienonic acid, 24Z-masticadienolic acid, 24Z-isomasticadienolic acid