THE U.S. MEXICAN WINTER MARKET TRADE DISPUTE

On March 11, 1996, the Florida Fruit and Vegetable Association, the Florida Bell Pepper Growers Exchange, the Florida Farm Bureau, the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services and other U.S. tomato producers filed a petition with the International Trade Commission (ITC) for economic relief from the effects of increased tomato imports from Mexico under Section 202 (a) of the Trade Act of 1974. A second petition was filed with the U.S. Department of Commerce under Section 733 (a) of the U.S. Tariff Act of 1930, charging that Mexican tomatoes were being dumped on the U.S. market at prices less than fair market value (LTFV) and were the cause of material injury to the domestic industry. Florida growers blame their recent loss of market share and depressed prices during the 1995-96 winter season on NAFTA, the North American Free Trade Agreement. The reduction in trade barriers due to NAFTA allegedly resulted in a flood of Mexican tomato imports, which have depressed domestic prices and resulted in declining profits, employment and investments. These allegations constitute the legal criteria for a petition seeking economic relief from imports sold at less than fair market value. The ITC investigated the first petition and rejected it on July 2, 1996. The antidumping petition continued during the summer and fall, 1996, until trade negotiations resulted in a compromise agreement that suspended the investigation. On October 11, 1996, the U.S. and Mexican tomato growers reached an agreement suspending the dumping case and establishing a minimum import price for fresh tomatoes at $0.2068 per pound ($0.45/kg) or $5.17 per 25-pound box. The price floor appeared low enough to allow for competitive improvements and disposal of temporary oversupplies in the market. Thus the wholesale price of tomatoes from the two regions would be approximately equivalent, restoring a "level playing field."International Relations/Trade,

Six cases of cerebellar degeneration associated with chronic alcoholism

No Abstract

Mathematical sciences research equipment

Issued as Final project report, Project no. G-37-62

Linear or nonlinear wave problems with input sets

Issued as Progress reports no. [1-4], and Final report, Project no. G-37-62

Linear or nonlinear wave problems with input sets - II

Issued as Progress reports [nos.1-4], and Final report, Project no. G-37-60

Analysis of mathematical models for pollutant transport and dissipation

Issued as Final report, Project no. G-37-61

BRAZIL'S NEW FLOATING EXCHANGE RATE REGIME AND COMPETITIVENESS IN THE WORLD POULTRY MARKET

In early 1999, Brazil devalued its currency, increasing its competitiveness in the poultry industry and capturing world market share. This paper discusses the devaluation and its effects on Brazil's trade, evaluates preliminary statistics on the impact of the devaluation on world poultry markets, and reports the results from a computable general equilibrium (CGE) simulation of the devaluation. The medium-run CGE results are compared to the short-run impacts reflected in the preliminary statistics.International Relations/Trade, Livestock Production/Industries,

U.S. - MEXICO SUGAR DISPUTE: IMPACT OF NAFTA ON THE SUGAR MARKET

A side agreement to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) enables Mexico to ship more duty-free sugar to the United States than under the pre-1994 restrictive country-specific, tariff-rate quota (TRQ) policy. But U.S. and Mexican negotiators disagree over the issue of exactly how much sugar Mexico can actually export to the U.S. under the NAFTA side agreement. Disagreement focuses on which version of the NAFTA side agreement governs this issue. The U.S. argues that a 1993 side letter limits Mexican sugar exports to the U.S. to 250,000 MT. In contrast, Mexico insists it is entitled to ship all of its surplus sugar, currently 600,000 MT, to U.S. Consequently, Mexico has asked for a dispute-settlement panel to resolve the question under NAFTA. Three TRQ liberalization scenarios were simulated to show the possible policy implications. The simulation results report that, due to the sugar TRQ liberalization with Mexico, the net U.S. social welfare increases but U.S. producers lose.International Relations/Trade,

U.S.-MEXICO SUGAR DISPUTE: IMPACT OF NAFTA ON THE SUGAR MARKET

A side agreement to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) enables Mexico to ship more duty-free sugar to the United States than under the pre-1994 restrictive country-specific, tariff-rate quota (TRQ) policy. But U.S. and Mexican negotiators disagree over the issue of exactly how much sugar Mexico can actually export to the U.S. under the NAFTA side agreement. Disagreement focuses on which version of the NAFTA side agreement governs this issue. The U.S. argues that a 1993 side letter limits Mexican sugar exports to the U.S. to 250,000 MT. In contrast, Mexico insists it is entitled to ship all of its surplus sugar, currently 600,000 MT, to U.S. Consequently, Mexico has asked for a dispute-settlement panel to resolve the question under NAFTA. Three TRQ liberalization scenarios were simulated to show the possible policy implications. The simulation results report that, due to the sugar TRQ liberalization with Mexico, the net U.S. social welfare increases but U.S. producers lose.International Relations/Trade,