Kündigungsschutzrecht in den USA und in Deutschland: ein Beitrag zur ökonomischen Rechtsvergleichung

Der Beitrag plädiert für die Verwendung der ökonomischen Analyse als Methode der Rechtsvergleichung. Mit ihrer Hilfe wird gezeigt, daß das Vorurteil unbegründet ist, der Kündigungsschutz sei in den USA ?schwächer? (arbeitgeberfreundlicher) als in Deutschland. Die erwartete Abfindungszahlung kann in beiden Rechtssystemen durchaus gleich hoch ausfallen (in Deutschland ist die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer Abfindung höher, in den USA die Höhe der Zahlung). Eine institutionenökonomische Analyse zeigt darüber hinaus, daß die Beteiligung des Betriebsrates an Kündigungen in Deutschland opportunistisches Verhalten der Arbeitgeber und Arbeitnehmer einzudämmen hilft. Diese Art der Sicherung spezifischer Investitionen in Humankapital könnte zur Erklärung des empirischen Befundes beitragen, daß in Deutschland die Arbeitsproduktivität i.a. höher ist als in den USA. -- The paper argues in favor of the economic analysis as a method of international comparison of legal systems. It demonstrates that the legal rules governing the termination of employment contracts in the US are not "weaker" than in Germany. Arguing in terms of expected damages, the probability of a payment is higher in Germany, whereas the amount to be paid is higher in the US. An economic analysis of the German "workers' council" shows that this institution helps to prevent opportunistic terminations as well as opportunistic behavior of employees, and therefore protects specific investments into human capital. This may provide an explanation for the empirical observation that, in general, the productivity of labor is higher in Germany than in the US.Arbeitsvertrag,Betriebsrat,Quasirenten,spezifische Investitionen,Humankapital,economic comparison of law,termination of labor contracts,quasirents,human capital,specific investments workers' council

The Structure of the DCFR – Which Approach for Today's Contract Law?

This publication is with permission of the rights owner freely accessible due to an Alliance licence and a national licence (funded by the DFG, German Research Foundation) respectively.This paper discusses the DCFR as a potential model for a European Code because core members of the study group see it as this. The paper discusses, first, the overall structure and does so in two respects: It asks the question whether one should really aim at a big Code – including all obligations and large parts of property law – and argues that one should rather concentrate on a modern and convincing Contract Law Code, given that contract law is very complex today and there are not really many common problems with other obligations anyhow; the content and structure of contract law has reduced quality in the DCFR as a result of its combination with other obligations. Moreover, this paper asks the question whether all types of contract partners should be included and argues that the DCFR is right in doing so, but that it does not really reflect modern theory on where markets fail and therefore does not convincingly find the reasons where and why to differentiate in the substantive law solutions. In the two other sections two core phenomena of modern contract law are discussed: information and formation of contracts and service contracts and networks in today's service society. These are discussed with a view to see how intensively their peculiarities have indeed influenced the structure of the DCFR. Little such influence can be detected. These examples also show how well founded is the criticism that much too often general clauses are chosen instead of finding concrete solutions.Peer Reviewe

The Appropriate Level of Enforcement in Multilevel Regulation Mapping Issues in Avoidance of Regulatory Overstretch

In modern day ‘multilevel’ regulation, legal enforcement of transnational standards usually takes place at another level than where the norm was created in the first place. The quest for smart regulation begs the question which level is most appropriate to proper legal enactment and enforcement. Not only as a matter of location (e.g. inter- or supranational, or domestic), but also concerning the level of strength (i.e. intensity of prescription and/or coercion). How can ‘regulatory overstretch’ be avoided – given smart regulatory principles of subsidiarity and responsiveness? A general description is provided of regulatory enforcement, from a regulatory and an enforcement perspective, followed by a discussion of appropriateness of enforcement from the dimensions of location-level and of strength-level. Finally, a simple model is presented for a ‘remediableness analysis’ of appropriate matching of strength and location level scenarios of enforcement – as guidance for enactment and enforcement of transnational standards without regulatory overstretch

Võlaõiguse ühtlustamine Euroopa Liidus

ttp://www.ester.ee/record=b4377908~S1*es

La participación y la transparencia en los procesos decisorios de los actores privados transnacionales. Casos empíricos en los sectores de la seguridad alimentaria, de la política ambiental global y de la regulación farmacéutica y de los dispositivos médicos

Nuestra tesis doctoral toma en consideración algunos actores privados que operan a nivel transnacional en sectores de relevancia para el Derecho administrativo, tales como la seguridad alimentaria, la protección ambiental, la regulación farmacéutica y de los dispositivos sanitarios. De esos actores privados nos interesan sólo algunas de las actividades que prestan y que aquí denominamos de “impacto regulador”. Ese “impacto regulador” se presenta en nuestro trabajo como un concepto meta-jurídico que empleamos de manera amplia para comprender la capacidad que caracteriza las actividades que prestan nuestros actores privados transnacionales para influir sobre los destinatarios finales en los respectivos sectores. Conviene indicar que esas actividades no se traducen en la imposición coactiva de un determinado comportamiento o una obligación a sus destinatarios (ya sean sujetos públicos como privados), pues se materializan a través de una serie de actos de diversa índole –tales como normas técnicas o estándares privados, directrices, recomendaciones u otros instrumentos– de naturaleza flexible y de carácter no vinculante. No obstante, y como se verá, son considerables los efectos multiplicadores que tales actividades despliegan sobre los sectores objeto de análisis, como consecuencia del impacto que pudieran generar –en particular sobre la protección de determinados derechos fundamentales reconocidos a nivel europeo– y de ahí su relevancia para ser estudiado desde la perspectiva jurídico-administrativa. Y es que consideramos que la rama del Derecho administrativo es, quizás, la más experimentada en este campo, máxime cuando es la doctrina administrativista la que mayor interés ha demostrado en comprender en qué medida ciertos actores privados pueden llegar a intervenir en la cadena regulatoria de forma análoga o paralela –que no sustitutiva– a como lo ha podido venir haciendo hasta ahora la propia Administración en esos u otros ámbitos análogos. En función de los casos de estudio, el Derecho administrativo podría interesarse por conocer y comprender cómo nuestros actores de naturaleza jurídica privada operan a nivel transnacional y llevan a cabo sus actividades de impacto regulador. Observamos, además, que buena parte de los reglamentos internos y códigos de conducta que conforman la política interna de nuestros actores privados contienen criterios o prácticas de procedimiento que guardan una cierta similitud con aquellas normas típicamente procedimentales de naturaleza jurídico-administrativa que rigen la actividad de la Administración. Estas representan, por analogía y de manera abstracta, algunos de los valores de la cultura del Derecho administrativo como son, en particular, la participación y la transparencia. En algunos casos, tales criterios o prácticas permiten a determinadas realidades privadas –especialmente aquellas donde han adquirido carta de naturaleza– poner en marcha instrumentos armonizados y más eficientes en los diversos sectores en los que estos se proyectan. Por un lado, con la incorporación de la práctica de la participación, algunos actores privados reconocen a múltiples sujetos e intereses especialmente relevantes la oportunidad de intervenir en la tarea regulatoria, a fin de dar voz a sus pretensiones, deliberar y decidir de manera compartida. Por otro lado, la práctica de la transparencia permite a la comunidad global, si cabe, conocer y comprender cómo llevan a cabo sus actividades. En este orden de cosas, y desde el plano subjetivo, con nuestro trabajo pretendemos indagar –apoyándonos en los estudios ya realizados por parte de la doctrina administrativista en materias y sectores concomitantes– sobre el verdadero sentido de tales criterios o prácticas y de qué manera operan dentro de este marco estructural de actores privados transnacionales.This doctoral thesis focuses on certain private actors that operate transnationally in fields relevant to administrative law, such as food security, environmental protection, pharmaceuticals and medical device regulation. We are only interested in some of the activities carried out by these private actors, concretely those which have an effect that we have termed “regulatory impact”. In this work, we use the term “regulatory” as a meta-juridical concept, in order to understand the capacity that characterizes the activities of our transnational private actors to influence the final recipients in the respective fields. These activities do not result in the coercive imposition of a certain behaviour or an obligation on recipients (whether public or private subjects). Instead, they materialise through a series of varied acts with a flexible nature and a non-binding nature (e.g. technical norms or private standards, guidelines, recommendations or other instruments). However, these activities have considerable multiplier effects on the analysed fields as a consequence of their possible impact (in particular, on the protection of certain fundamental rights recognised at an European level). This makes their study from a legal-administrative perspective all the more relevant. In our view, the branch of administrative law is perhaps the most experienced in this matter. In particular, administrative doctrine has shown the greatest interest in understanding how far certain private actors may intervene in the regulatory chain in a way that is analogous or parallel –and not substitutive– to that of the Public Administration itself in these or other comparable fields. Depending on the case studies, administrative law can be a tool for finding out and understanding how our private legal actors operate transnationally and how they carry out their activities. Likewise, many of the internal rules and codes of conduct that make up the internal policy of our private actors contain procedural criteria or practices. These rules include some of the cultural values of administrative law, particularly participation and transparency. These criteria or practices have a certain similarity to those typically procedural principles of a legal-administrative nature that govern the activity of the Public Administration. The participation and transparency function as “strategies” which, in certain cases, set out to substantiate said activities of some private actors, in order to put in place harmonized and more efficient instruments in the various sectors in which they operate. On the one hand, with the incorporation of the practice of participation, some private actors recognize multiple subjects and stakeholders the opportunity to take part in the regulatory task, in order to give voice to their claims and deliberate collectively. On the other, sometimes the practice of transparency allows the global community to know and understand how these private actors carry out their activities. As a basis, we rely on extant studies in administrative doctrine pertaining to associated matters and fields. We intend to address, in this context and from a subjective viewpoint, the meaning of such practices and criteria and how they operate within the structural framework of transnational private actors