POLITICAL BUDGET CYCLES OR VOTERS AS FISCAL CONSERVATIVES? EVIDENCE FROM COLOMBIA

Theoretical models of the political budget cycle suggest that electoral manipulation of government expenditures can take the form of changes in the composition of spending, without impacting the overall budget or the deficit, and that the form and extent of this manipulation depend on the fiscal preferences of voters. In this paper, I use data on government expenditures and election outcomes in Colombia to provide an integrated analysis of voting behavior and the preelectoral dynamics of government spending. I emphasize potential changes in the composition, rather than the size, of the budget. I find that components of the budget that can be identified with targeted spending grow, and that non-targeted spending contracts, in the year preceding an election. Consistently, I find that voters reward the preelection increases in targeted spending, but punish incumbents who run high deficits before the election.Political Budget Cycle

The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy: Survey

This paper surveys the recent literature on the political economy of fiscal policy, in particular the accumulation of government debt. We examine three possible determinants of fiscal balances: opportunistic behavior by policymakers, heterogeneous fiscal preferences of either voters or politicians, and budget institutions. We focus on the contributions of the last 10 years and emphasize findings related to developing countries. We include a recent body of literature on the fiscal preferences of voters, which, interestingly, seems to suggest that voters do not favor high-spending governments. We also report some original empirical evidence. First, we test different hypotheses from the political economy literature in a simultaneous manner for a large set of both developed and developing countries. We find that less-fragmented governments and a greater ability of voters to monitor fiscal policy are related to lower deficits; the estimated effects are larger than when the two hypotheses are evaluated separately, as the existing literature does. Second, we suggest the role of the courts in the determination of fiscal policy as a promising new avenue of research, and present some suggestive novel evidence on the importance of this channel.

Electoral Manipulation via Expenditure Composition: Theory and Evidence

We present a model of the Political Budget Cycle in which voters and politicians have preferences for different types of government spending. Incumbents try to influence voters by changing the composition of government spending, rather than overall spending or revenues. Rational voters may support an incumbent who targets them with spending before the election even though such spending may be due to opportunistic manipulation, because it can also reflect sincere preference of the incumbent for types of spending voters favor. Classifying expenditures into those which are targeted to voters and those that are not, we provide evidence supporting our model in data on local public finances for all Colombian municipalities. Our findings indicate both a pre-electoral increase in targeted expenditures, combined with a contraction of other types of expenditure, and a voter response to targeting.

Political Fragmentation and Government Spending: Bringing Ideological Polarization into the Picture

The literature has come to no agreement about the empirical validity of the so-called weak government hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, political fragmentation should lead to higher government expenditure. With the aim of reconciling the empirical evidence with theory, in this paper we discuss and test a new hypothesis about this relationship: that fragmentation should matter for public spending only to the extent that the degree of polarization is high enough. Our results for a sample of presidential democracies show that a marginal change in the level of fragmentation in the governing coalition affects positively the size of the budget, but only if there is some degree of polarization. We also find that what matters for fiscal policy in presidential democracies is the degree of fragmentation and polarization within the governing coalition, rather than in the legislature at large. For parliamentary democracies we find erratic patterns for the relationship between fragmentation and public spending. Our results suggest interesting differences between presidential and parliamentary systems.Common-pool resource problem, government spending, politicalfragmentation, ideological polarization

Pork Barrel Cycles

We present a model of political budget cycles in which incumbents influence voters by targeting government spending to specific groups of voters at the expense of other voters or other expenditures. Each voter faces a signal extraction problem: being targeted with expenditure before the election may reflect opportunistic manipulation, but may also reflect a sincere preference of the incumbent for the types of spending that voter prefers. We show the existence of a political equilibrium in which rational voters support an incumbent who targets them with spending before the election even though they know it may be electorally motivated. In equilibrium voters in the more "swing" regions are targeted at the expense of types of spending not favored by these voters. This will be true even if they know they live in swing regions. However, the responsiveness of these voters to electoral manipulation depends on whether they face some degree of uncertainty about the electoral importance of the group they are in. Use of targeted spending also implies voters can be influenced without election-year deficits, consistent with recent findings for established democracies.

Meiosis in Phycomyces

A four-factor cross between two strains of Phycomyces involving two auxotrophic, one color, and the mating type marker is described. Samples of 40 germspores from 84 individual fertile germsporangia were characterized. The results show: (i) The germspores of a germsporangium are derived from one meiosis in approximately 78% of the cases. (ii) The four markers are on separate chromosomes. They are nonselective. (iii) Analysis of a large sample of germspores from 106 pooled germsporangia confirms that the four markers are unlinked. (iv) From the ditype/tetratype ratios it is inferred that each marker is located about 15 map units from its centromere

Análisis cualitativo y cuantitativo para los estudios políticos. Trilateralismo, metodología experimental y Grounded Theory

The paper discuss the application of qualitative and quantitative techniques in political studies. It describes the classical proposal of Johan Galtung, known as trilateral science, which invites to the permanent contrast to confirm, validate and accept facts and ideas; then it explores Grounded Theory as a mechanism to achieve and explore data in order to identify a possible dialogue with experimental methodology. Finally, it shows social capital as a case study to demon strate the relevance of multi methodological applications.El propósito de este texto es discutir la aplicación de técnicas cualitativas y cuantitativas en los estudios políticos. Para ello, se describe la propuesta clásica de Johan Galtung, conocida como trilateralismo, que invita al contraste permanente con el fin de confirmar, validar y aceptar hechos e ideas; luego, se busca explorar la Grounded Theory como mecanismo de consecución y exploración de datos con el fin de identificar un posible diálogo con la metodología experimental. Por último, se aborda el capital social como objeto de estudio que demuestra la pertinencia de aplicaciones multimetodológicas

Ambiente e educação: Um tecido invisível. Uma viagem da cidade para a sala de aula

Nos preguntamos por la naturaleza del vínculo entre entorno y educación, por la definición del entorno como un hecho en sí mismo educativo. Mediante la definición de un contexto teórico, desvelamos su concepción como fuente de experiencias, como red de relaciones o como constructo transformador de la propia realidad en que se inserta. Lo haremos en base a una metáfora, la de “un tejido invisible” que emerge cosiendo el entorno con la acción educativa. Por último, cuestionaremos las fórmulas actualmente generalizadas que relacionan rígidamente arquitecturas y pedagogías, buscando un diálogo abierto entre entorno y educaciónWe ask ourselves about the nature of the link between environment and education, for the definition of the environment as an educational fact in itself. Through the definition of a theoretical context, we reveal its conception as a source of experiences, as a network of relationships or as a transformative construct of the reality in which it is inserted. We will do it based on a metaphor, that of "an invisible tissue" that emerges by sewing the environment with educational action. Finally, we will question the currently generalized formulas that rigidly relate architectures and pedagogies, seeking an open dialogue between environment and educationQuestionamos a natureza do vínculo entre o meio ambiente e a educação pela definição do meio ambiente enquanto ferramenta educacional. Ao criar um enquadramento teórico, definimos a sua conceção como fonte de experiência, como rede de relações e como elemento transformador da própria realidade na qual se insere. A metáfora do “tecido invisível” à volta do qual é tecida a ação educativa servirá como ponto de partida. Finalmente será questionada a formula, atualmente generalizada, que considera a relação rígida entre arquitetura e pedagogia, à procura de um dialogo aberto entre envolvente e educaçã

The Method of Law and Economics: A Framework to Study the Scarcity, the Traffic and the Market of Human Organs (in Spanish)

The paper engages with the expansion of economic analysis into the social sciences, especially in the realm of legal studies. The paper pays particular attention to the recent use of microeconomic analysis as an explanatory avenue to approach human behavior in conditions of scarcity. In the first part, the paper offers a review of the substantive and methodological assumptions and operations of the field of Law and Economics. In the second part of the paper, the increasing shortage of human organs for transplant is used as an example to illustrate and examine the value, as well as the limitations, of Law and Economics