Auctions with Financial Externalities

We study sealed-bid auctions with financial externalities, i.e., auctions in which losers' utilities depend on how much the winner pays.In the unique symmetric equilibrium of the first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSB), larger financial externalities result in lower bids and in a lower expected revenue.The unique symmetric equilibrium of the second-price sealed-bid auction (SPSB) reveals ambiguous effects.We further show that a resale market does not have an e¤ect on the equilibrium bids and that FPSB yields a lower expected revenue than SPSB.With a reserve price, we find an equilibrium for FPSB that involves pooling at the reserve price.For SPSB we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a weakly separating equilibrium, and give an expression for the equilibrium.Auctions;financial externalities;reserve price;resale market

On the Unique D1 Equilibrium in the Stackelberg Model with Asymmetric Information

This note studies a version of the Stackelberg model in which the Leader has more information about demand than the Follower. We show that there exists a unique D1 equilibrium and that this equilibrium is perfectly revealing. We also give a full characterization of the equilibrium in terms of the posterior beliefs of the Follower and show under which condition there is first mover disadvantage.Separating equilibria;signalling games;Stackelberg competition

Optimal Auctions with Financial Externalities

We construct optimal auctions when bidders face financial externalities.In a Coasean World, in which the seller cannot prevent a perfect resale market, nor withhold the object, the lowest-price all-pay auction is optimal.In a Myersonean World, in which the seller can both prevent resale after the auction, and fully commit to not selling the object, an optimal two-stage mechanism is derived.In the first stage, bidders are asked to pay an entry fee.In the second stage, bidders play the lowest-price all-pay auction with a reserve price.In both worlds, the expected revenue is increasing in the financial externality, and each bidder's expected utility is independent of the financial externality.Optimal auctions;financial externalities;lowest-price allpay auction;Coasean World;Myersonean World

Essays in auction theory

Auction theory is a branch of game theory that considers human behavior in auction markets and the ensuing market outcomes. It is also successfully used as a tool to design real-life auctions. This thesis contains five essays addressing a variety of topics within the realm of auction theory. The first essay gives an easily accessible overview of the most important insights of auction theory. The second essay, motivated by the UMTS-auctions that took place in Europe, studies auctions in which, in contrast to standard auction theory, losing bidders benefit from a high price paid by the winner(s). Under this assumption, the first-price sealed-bid auction and the second-price sealed-bid auction are no longer revenue equivalent. The third essay analyzes how well different kinds of auctions are able to raise money for charity. It turns out that standard winner-pay auctions are inept fund-raising mechanisms because of the positive externality bidders forgo if they top another’s high bid. As this problem does not occur in all-pay auctions, where bidders pay irrespective of whether they win or lose, all-pay auctions are more effective in raising money. The fourth essay studies a particular auction type, a so-called simultaneous pooled auction with multiple bids and preference lists, that has been used for example in the Netherlands and Ireland to auction available spectrum. The results in this essay show that this type of auction does not satisfy elementary desirable properties such as the existence of an efficient equilibrium. The fifth essay argues that inefficient auction outcomes due to strong negative (informational) externalities (created by post-auction interactions) can be avoided by asking bidders prior to the auction to submit any publicly observable payment they would like to make.

Optimal Auctions with Financial Externalities

We construct optimal auctions when bidders face financial externalities.In a Coasean World, in which the seller cannot prevent a perfect resale market, nor withhold the object, the lowest-price all-pay auction is optimal.In a Myersonean World, in which the seller can both prevent resale after the auction, and fully commit to not selling the object, an optimal two-stage mechanism is derived.In the first stage, bidders are asked to pay an entry fee.In the second stage, bidders play the lowest-price all-pay auction with a reserve price.In both worlds, the expected revenue is increasing in the financial externality, and each bidder's expected utility is independent of the financial externality

Auctions with Financial Externalities

We study sealed-bid auctions with financial externalities, i.e., auctions in which losers' utilities depend on how much the winner pays.In the unique symmetric equilibrium of the first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSB), larger financial externalities result in lower bids and in a lower expected revenue.The unique symmetric equilibrium of the second-price sealed-bid auction (SPSB) reveals ambiguous effects.We further show that a resale market does not have an e¤ect on the equilibrium bids and that FPSB yields a lower expected revenue than SPSB.With a reserve price, we find an equilibrium for FPSB that involves pooling at the reserve price.For SPSB we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a weakly separating equilibrium, and give an expression for the equilibrium.

On the Unique D1 Equilibrium in the Stackelberg Model with Asymmetric Information

This note studies a version of the Stackelberg model in which the Leader has more information about demand than the Follower. We show that there exists a unique D1 equilibrium and that this equilibrium is perfectly revealing. We also give a full characterization of the equilibrium in terms of the posterior beliefs of the Follower and show under which condition there is first mover disadvantage.

Improving stroke care: Quality of care and health education in patients with a stroke or transient ischemic attack

This thesis focuses on the applicability of results of clinical trials of stroke and TIA patients in everyday practice and on measurement of quality of stroke care. A third aim is to further expand an underexposed aspect of stroke care, namely health education in stroke patients. Chapter 2.1 describes which proportion of patients in a stroke population fulfils the enrolment criteria of recently performed randomized controlled trials investigating antiplatelets in stroke patients. Chapter 2.2 focuses on the question whether the combination of low dose aspirin and dipyridamole is more effective than aspirin alone in reducing the risk of recurrent stroke and other major cardiovascular events in patients with a disabling stroke. Chapter 3.1 focuses on the measurement of quality of stroke care by process-of-care indicators. Chapter 4.1 covers the rationale, background and design of the computer-supported individualized health education for TIA and minor stroke patients (COSTA) study. Chapter 4.2 describes the knowledge of stroke and TIA patients about this disease and accessory risk factors and treatment. The main results of the COSTA study are presented in chapter 4.3. Chapter 4.4 provides a review of the literature on health education in stroke and TIA patients. Finally, chapter 5 and 6 provide a general discussion and summary of the results of the studies presented in this thesis

Simultaneous Pooled Auctions with Multiple Bids and Preference Lists

A simultaneous pooled auction with multiple bids and preference lists is a way to auction multiple objects, in which bidders simultaneously express a bid for each object and a preference ordering over which object they would like to get in case they have the highest bid on more than one object. This type of auction has been used in the Netherlands and in Ireland to auction available spectrum. We show that this type of auction does not satisfy elementary desirable properties such as the existence of an efficient equilibrium

On the Effectiveness of Feed-in Tariffs in the Development of Photovoltaic Solar

__Abstract__ Growing concern for climate change and rising scarcity of fossil fuels prompted governments to stimulate the development of renewables. This paper empirically tests whether feed-in tariff (FIT) policies have been effective in the development of photovoltaic solar (PV), explicitly taking into account structure and consistency of FITs. Panel data estimations are employed for 30 OECD member countries over the period 1990-2011. We find a positive effect of the presence of a FIT and the development of a country’s share of PV in the electricity-mix. This effect increases if policies are consistent. Tariff height is the most important characteristic of a FIT, but other characteristics such as cost level, duration of contract and restrictions on capacity levels can also not be neglected if the goal is to increase effectiveness of FITs