257 research outputs found
Strategies of Foreign Direct Investment in the Presence of Technological Spillovers
Dawid H, Zou B. Strategies of Foreign Direct Investment in the Presence of Technological Spillovers. Working Papers in Economics and Management. Vol 12-2013. Bielefeld: Bielefeld University, Department of Business Administration and Economics; 2013.In this paper we present a differential game model of two firms with different
technologies producing the same good and selling in the same world market.
The firm equipped with advanced technology is deciding whether to outsource parts
of its production to the home country of its competitor, where wages and the level of
technology are lower. Outsourcing reduces production costs but is associated with
spillovers to the foreign competitor. The degree to which the foreign competitor can
absorb these spillovers depends on its absorptive effort. Using numerical methods
the properties of a Markov Perfect Equilibrium of this game are characterized and
the implications of the variation of different key parameters are examined
Coordinating Static and Dynamic Supply Chains with Advertising through Two-Part Tariffs
Managerial delegation in a dynamic renewable resource oligopoly
I propose a differential oligopoly game of resource extraction under (quasi-static) open-loop and nonlinear feedback strategies, where firms are managerial and two alternative types of delegation contract are considered. Under open-loop information, delegation expands the residual steady state resource stock. Conversely, under nonlinear feedback information the outcome depends on the structure of managerial incentives. If sales are used, once again delegation favours resource preservation. On the contrary, if market shares are included in the delegation contract, this combines with an underlying voracity effect in shrinking the steady state volume of the resource
On the Attainment of the Maximum Sustainable Yield in the Verhulst-Lotka-Volterra Model
Coordination in closed-loop supply chain with price-dependent returns
This paper proposes two Closed-loop Supply Chain (CLSC) games in which a manufacturer sets some green activity programs efforts and a retailer sets the selling price. Both strategies influence the return rate, which is a state variable. The pricing strategy plays a key role in the identification of the best contract to achieve coordination as well as in achieving environmental objectives. The pricing strategy influences the return rate negatively, as consumers delay the return of their goods when the purchasing (and repurchasing) price is high. We then compare a wholesale price contract (WPC) and a revenue sharing contract (RSC) mechanism as both have interesting pricing policy implications. Our result shows that firms coordinate the CLSC through a (WPC) when the sharing parameter is too low while the negative effect of pricing on returns is too severe. In that case, the low sharing parameter deters the manufacturer to accept any sharing agreements. Further, firms coordinate the CLSC when the sharing parameter is medium independent of the negative impact of pricing on returns. When the sharing parameter is too high the retailer never opts for an RSC. We find that the magnitude of pricing effect on returns determines the contract to be adopted: For certain sharing parameter, firms prefer an RSC when the price effect on return is low and a WPC when this effect is high. In all other cases, firms do not have a consensus on the contract to be adopted and coordination is then not achieved
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