578 research outputs found
Speakable in Quantum Mechanics
At the 1927 Como conference Bohr spoke the now famous words "It is wrong to
think that the task of physics is to find out how nature is. Physics concerns
what we can say about nature." However, if the Copenhagen interpretation really
holds on to this motto, why then is there this feeling of conflict when
comparing it with realist interpretations? Surely what one can say about nature
should in a certain sense be interpretation independent. In this paper I take
Bohr's motto seriously and develop a quantum logic that avoids assuming any
form of realism as much as possible. To illustrate the non-triviality of this
motto a similar result is first derived for classical mechanics. It turns out
that the logic for classical mechanics is a special case of the derived quantum
logic. Finally, some hints are provided in how these logics are to be used in
practical situations and I discuss how some realist interpretations relate to
these logics
The bearable lightness of being
How are philosophical questions about what kinds of things there are to be understood and how are they to be answered? This paper defends broadly Fregean answers to these questions. Ontological categories-such as object, property, and relation-are explained in terms of a prior logical categorization of expressions, as singular terms, predicates of varying degree and level, etc. Questions about what kinds of object, property, etc., there are are, on this approach, reduce to questions about truth and logical form: for example, the question whether there are numbers is the question whether there are true atomic statements in which expressions function as singular terms which, if they have reference at all, stand for numbers, and the question whether there are properties of a given type is a question about whether there are meaningful predicates of an appropriate degree and level. This approach is defended against the objection that it must be wrong because makes what there depend on us or our language. Some problems confronting the Fregean approach-including Frege's notorious paradox of the concept horse-are addressed. It is argued that the approach results in a modest and sober deflationary understanding of ontological commitments
Melanin Pigmentation and Inflammation in Human Gingiva
Peer Reviewedhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/141745/1/jper0701.pd
Theories of Reference: What Was the Question?
The new theory of reference has won popularity. However, a number of noted philosophers have also attempted to reply to the critical arguments of Kripke and others, and aimed to vindicate the description theory of reference. Such responses are often based on ingenious novel kinds of descriptions, such as rigidified descriptions, causal descriptions, and metalinguistic descriptions. This prolonged debate raises the doubt whether different parties really have any shared understanding of what the central question of the philosophical theory of reference is: what is the main question to which descriptivism and the causal-historical theory have presented competing answers. One aim of the paper is to clarify this issue. The most influential objections to the new theory of reference are critically reviewed. Special attention is also paid to certain important later advances in the new theory of reference, due to Devitt and others
Modal Ω-Logic: Automata, Neo-Logicism, and Set-Theoretic Realism
This essay examines the philosophical significance of -logic in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with choice (ZFC). The duality between coalgebra and algebra permits Boolean-valued algebraic models of ZFC to be interpreted as coalgebras. The modal profile of -logical validity can then be countenanced within a coalgebraic logic, and -logical validity can be defined via deterministic automata. I argue that the philosophical significance of the foregoing is two-fold. First, because the epistemic and modal profiles of -logical validity correspond to those of second-order logical consequence, -logical validity is genuinely logical, and thus vindicates a neo-logicist conception of mathematical truth in the set-theoretic multiverse. Second, the foregoing provides a modal-computational account of the interpretation of mathematical vocabulary, adducing in favor of a realist conception of the cumulative hierarchy of sets
Towards a Proof Theory of G\"odel Modal Logics
Analytic proof calculi are introduced for box and diamond fragments of basic
modal fuzzy logics that combine the Kripke semantics of modal logic K with the
many-valued semantics of G\"odel logic. The calculi are used to establish
completeness and complexity results for these fragments
Normative Alethic Pluralism
Some philosophers have argued that truth is a norm of judgement and have provided a variety of formulations of this general thesis. In this paper, I shall side with these philosophers and assume that truth is a norm of judgement. What I am primarily interested in here are two core questions concerning the judgement-truth norm: (i) what are the normative relationships between truth and judgement? And (ii) do these relationships vary or are they constant? I argue for a pluralist picture—what I call Normative Alethic Pluralism (NAP)—according to which (i) there is more than one correct judgement-truth norm and (ii) the normative relationships between truth and judgement vary in relation to the subject matter of the judgement. By means of a comparative analysis of disagreement in three areas of the evaluative domain—refined aesthetics, basic taste and morality—I show that there is an important variability in the normative significance of disagreement—I call this the variability conjecture. By presenting a variation of Lynch’s scope problem for alethic monism, I argue that a monistic approach to the normative function of truth is unable to vindicate the conjecture. I then argue that normative alethic pluralism provides us with a promising model to account for it
A Burgessian critique of nominalistic tendencies in contemporary mathematics and its historiography
We analyze the developments in mathematical rigor from the viewpoint of a
Burgessian critique of nominalistic reconstructions. We apply such a critique
to the reconstruction of infinitesimal analysis accomplished through the
efforts of Cantor, Dedekind, and Weierstrass; to the reconstruction of Cauchy's
foundational work associated with the work of Boyer and Grabiner; and to
Bishop's constructivist reconstruction of classical analysis. We examine the
effects of a nominalist disposition on historiography, teaching, and research.Comment: 57 pages; 3 figures. Corrected misprint
Inconsistent boundaries
Research on this paper was supported by a grant from the Marsden Fund, Royal Society of New Zealand.Mereotopology is a theory of connected parts. The existence of boundaries, as parts of everyday objects, is basic to any such theory; but in classical mereotopology, there is a problem: if boundaries exist, then either distinct entities cannot be in contact, or else space is not topologically connected (Varzi in Noûs 31:26–58, 1997). In this paper we urge that this problem can be met with a paraconsistent mereotopology, and sketch the details of one such approach. The resulting theory focuses attention on the role of empty parts, in delivering a balanced and bounded metaphysics of naive space.PostprintPeer reviewe
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