On the Rule of Chance Moves and Information in Two-Person Games

The value of information has been the subject of many studies in a strategic context.The central question in these studies is how valuable the information hidden in the chance moves of a game is for one or more of the players.Generally speaking, only the extra possibilities that are beneficial for the players have been considered so far.In this note we study the value of information for a special class of two-person games.For these games we also investigate how badly the players can do, both with and without knowing the result of the chance move. In this way one can determine to what extent the players are restricted in their possibilities by the fact that some information is hidden in the chance moves of the games.This allows for a comparison of the influence of the chance move to the control that the players have over the game result.information;games;control

Take-and-Guess Games

This paper studies two classes of two-person zero-sum games in which the strategies of both players are of a special type.Each strategy can be split into two parts, a taking and a guessing part.In these games two types of asymmetry between the players can occur.In the first place, the number of objects available for taking does not need to be the same for both players.In the second place, the players can be guessing sequentially instead of simultaneously; the result is asymmetric information.The paper studies the value and equilibria of these games, for all possible numbers of objects available to the players, for the case with simultaneous guessing as well as for the variant with sequential guessing.zero-sum games;morra;coin-guessing;asymmetric information

Skill and Strategy in Games.

This thesis consists of two parts. Part I deals with relative skill and the role of random factors in games. Part II is devoted to the computation of optimal strategies in two interesting classes of games: poker and take-and-guess games.

Skill and strategy in games

This thesis consists of two parts. Part I deals with relative skill and the role of random factors in games. Part II is devoted to the computation of optimal strategies in two interesting classes of games: poker and take-and-guess games.

On the Rule of Chance Moves and Information in Two-Person Games

The value of information has been the subject of many studies in a strategic context.The central question in these studies is how valuable the information hidden in the chance moves of a game is for one or more of the players.Generally speaking, only the extra possibilities that are beneficial for the players have been considered so far.In this note we study the value of information for a special class of two-person games.For these games we also investigate how badly the players can do, both with and without knowing the result of the chance move. In this way one can determine to what extent the players are restricted in their possibilities by the fact that some information is hidden in the chance moves of the games.This allows for a comparison of the influence of the chance move to the control that the players have over the game result.

A New Relative Skill Measure for Games with Chance Elements

An interesting aspect of games is the relative extent to which a player can positively influence his results by making appropriate strategic choices. This question is closely related to the issue of how to distinguish between games of skill and games of chance. The distinction between these two types of games is definitely interesting from a juridical point of view. Borm and Van der Genugten (2001) presented a method to measure the skill level of a game. In principle, their measure can serve as a juridical tool for the classification of games with respect to skill. In this paper we present a modification of the measure. The main difference is that this new definition does not automatically classify incomplete information games without chance moves as games of skill. We use a coin game and a simplified version of standard drawpoker as an illustration.games of skill;games of chance

On Strategy and Relative Skill in Poker

This article presents a generalization of the equilibrium analysis for the simple two-player poker game with alternate bidding of Von Neumann and Morgenstern.It approximates optimal play for this game if it is played with a regular deck of 52 cards and it discusses some strategic insights.In addition, the paper studies the relative skill level of this game.game theory