The ontology of causal process theories

There is a widespread belief that the so-called process theories of causation developed by Wesley Salmon and Phil Dowe have given us an original account of what causation really is. In this paper, I show that this is a misconception. The notion of "causal process" does not offer us a new ontological account of causation. I make this argument by explicating the implicit ontological commitments in Salmon and Dowe's theories. From this, it is clear that Salmon's Mark Transmission Theory collapses to a counterfactual theory of causation, while the Conserved Quantity Theory collapses to David Fair's phsyicalist reduction of causation

The conserved quantity theory of causation and chance raising

In this paper I offer an 'integrating account' of singular causation, where the term 'integrating' refers to the following program for analysing causation. There are two intuitions about causation, both of which face serious counterexamples when used as the basis for an analysis of causation. The 'process' intuition, which says that causes and effects are linked by concrete processes, runs into trouble with cases of misconnections', where an event which serves to prevent another fails to do so on a particular occasion and yet the two events are linked by causal processes. The chance raising intuition, according to which causes raise the chance of their effects, easily accounts for misconnections but faces the problem of chance lowering causes, a problem easily accounted for by the process approach. The integrating program attempts to provide an analysis of singular causation by synthesising the two insights, so as to solve both problems. In this paper I show that extant versions of the integrating program due to Eells, Lewis, and Menzies fail to account for the chance-lowering counterexample. I offer a new diagnosis of the chance lowering case, and use that as a basis for an integrating account of causation which does solve both cases. In doing so, I accept various assumptions of the integrating program, in particular that there are no other problems with these two approaches. As an example of the process account, I focus on the recent CQ theory of Wesley Salmon (1997)

Causation and misconnections

In this paper I show how the conserved quantity theory, or more generally the process theory of Wesley Salmon and myself, provides a sufficient condition in an analysis of causation. To do so I will show how it handles the problem of alleged 'misconnections'. I show what the conserved quantity theory says about such cases, and why intuitions are not to be taken as sacrosanct

Would-cause semantics

This article raises two difficulties that certain approaches to causation have with would-cause counterfactuals. First, there is a problem with David Lewis's semantics of counterfactuals when we 'suppose in' some positive event of a certain kind. And, second, there is a problem with embedded counterfactuals. I show that causal-modeling approaches do not have these problems

Causal loops and the independence of causal facts

According to Hugh Mellor in Real Time II (1998, Ch. 12), assuming the logical independence of causal facts and the 'law of large numbers', causal loops are impossible because if they were possible they would produce inconsistent sets of frequencies. I clarify the argument, and argue that it would be preferable to abandon the relevant independence assumption in the case of causal loops

This disastrous event staggered me : reconstructing the botany of Ludwig Leichhardt on the expedition from Moreton Bay to Port Essington, 1844-45

Ludwig Leichhardt had to abandon a large and important collection of botanical specimens during his Expedition from Moreton Bay to Port Essington. Here we attempt to assess the significance of the lost collection by identifying the botanical references in his detailed published journal from the journey. From Leichhardt’s description of the plants and their habitats, and with our accurate knowledge of current distribution, it has been possible, in most cases, to identity his botanical references to a single species. In other cases there is lower degree of certainty. Well over one hundred of the species recorded in Leichhardt’s journal would have been new to science at the time if specimens had survived. The record does identify some potential locations for species that would represent range extensions and suggests an indigenous status for a number of plant species that where previously considered exotic. Certainly Leichhardt was a talented botanist and his significant contribution to Australian natural science should be recognised

Retrocausación

En este artículo abordo la cuestión de la dirección de la causalidad: qué distingue la causa del efecto. El enfoque se centrará exclusivamente en la compatibilidad de las teorías de la dirección del tiempo con la causalidad hacia atrás, dejando de lado muchos otros asuntos que son importantes para las teorías de la dirección de la causalidad. La causalidad hacia atrás (o retrocausación) se da cuando un efecto ocurre antes que su causa. En este artículo considero varias teorías de la dirección causal y analizo cuáles son compatibles con la causalidad hacia atrás. Concluyo que las consideraciones sobre los distintos tipos de causalidad hacia atrás apoyan claramente una teoría de «bifurcación local» («local fork theory») de la dirección de la causalidad.In this article, I tackle the issue of the direction of causality: what distinguishes cause from effect. The approach shall exclusively focus on the compatibility of the theories of the direction of time with backwards causality, leaving aside many other issues that are important for theories of the direction of causality. Backwards causation (or retrocausation) takes place when an effect occurs before its cause. In this article, I examine several theories of causal direction and analyse which are compatible with backwards causality. I conclude that the considerations of the different types of backwards causality clearly support a local fork theory of the direction of causality