International convergence and divergence of material input structures: an industry-level perspective

This note analyzes whether international material input structures have converged or diverged over time. Pooled variances for 25 industries were obtained from OECD input-output tables in constant prices for nine countries over the period 1971-1990. It is found that high-tech industries were mainly characterized by divergence of material input structures, whereas convergence was found for many low-tech, more mature industries. In line with studies on (labor) productivity growth rates, convergence of material input structures was prevalent in the 1970s, while divergence dominated in the 1980s.

Production Chains in an Interregional Framework: Identification by Means of Average Propagation Lengths

When linkages between industries are studied from the perspective of production chains, sequencing is important. In this respect, both the strength of the linkages and the distance between industries are relevant. Distance is measured by the average propagation length, defined as the average number of steps it takes a stimulus in one industry to propagate and affect another industry. Using the 1985 intercountry input-output table for six European countries, we present three applications. These are, visualizing the production structure by graphing its production chains, analyzing intercountry linkages between industries, and determining the role that each country plays within the system

The Effects of Aggregation on the Perron Root and its Corresponding Eigenvector

In this paper the behaviour of the Perron root and its corresponding eigenvector is examined, when the underlying matrix is being aggregated. Bounds are presented for the Perron root and the elements of the Perron vector of the resultant matrix. The bounds are mainly expressed in terms of the Perron root and vector of the original matrix. As an application aggregation in input-output analysis is considered

Monotonicity and Egalitarianism (revision of CentER DP 2019-007)

This paper identifies the maximal domain of transferable utility games on which aggregate monotonicity (no player is worse o when the worth of the grand coalition increases) and egalitarian core selection (no other core allocation can be obtained by a transfer from a richer to a poorer player) are compatible. On this domain, which includes the class of large core games, we show that these two axioms characterize a unique solution which even satisfies coalitional monotonicity (no member is worse off when the worth of one coalition increases) and strong egalitarian core selection (no other core allocation can be obtained by transfers from richer to poorer players)