Performance monitoring at the task and the response level

How errors and confl ict are processed in the human brain, has been extensively investigated over the last decades. In this review, we argue that error research has mainly focused on one type of errors, namely errors at the response level. Furthermore, research on conflict and errors has primarily used a very restricted set of experimental paradigms, raising the question as to whether the results from this research can be generalized to other forms of errors and confl ict. We thus argue to approach errors and confl ict from a broader perspective

Brain regions involved in observing and trying to interpret dog behaviour

Humans and dogs have interacted for millennia. As a result, humans (and especially dog owners) sometimes try to interpret dog behaviour. While there is extensive research on the brain regions that are involved in mentalizing about other peoples' behaviour, surprisingly little is known of whether we use these same brain regions to mentalize about animal behaviour. In this fMRI study we investigate whether brain regions involved in mentalizing about human behaviour are also engaged when observing dog behaviour. Here we show that these brain regions are more engaged when observing dog behaviour that is difficult to interpret compared to dog behaviour that is easy to interpret. Interestingly, these results were not only obtained when participants were instructed to infer reasons for the behaviour but also when they passively viewed the behaviour, indicating that these brain regions are activated by spontaneous mentalizing processes

When your error becomes my error : anterior insula activation in response to observed errors is modulated by agency

Research on error observation has focused predominantly on situations in which individuals are passive observers of errors. In daily life, however, we are often jointly responsible for the mistakes of others. In the current study, we examined how information on agency is integrated in the error observation network. It was found that activation in the anterior insula but not in the posterior medial frontal cortex or lateral prefrontal cortex differentiates between observed errors for which we are partly responsible or not. Interestingly, the activation pattern of the AI was mirrored by feelings of guilt and shame. These results suggest that the anterior insula is crucially involved in evaluating the consequences of our actions for other persons. Consequently, this region may be thought of as critical in guiding social behavior

Spontaneous theory of mind is reduced for nonhuman-like agents as compared to human-like agents

Theory of Mind research has shown that we spontaneously take into account other's beliefs. In the current study, we investigate, with a spontaneous Theory of Mind (ToM) task, if this belief representation also applies to nonhuman-like agents. In a series of three experiments, we show here that we do not spontaneously take into account beliefs of nonhuman-like others, or at least we do it to a lesser extent than for human and human-like agents. Further, the experience we have with the other agent, in our case a dog, does not modulate spontaneous ToM: the same pattern of results was obtained when dog owners and no owners were compared. However, when more attention was attracted to the dog behavior, participants' behavior was influenced by the beliefs of the dog. In sum, spontaneous belief representation seems to be primarily restricted to human and human-like agents, but can be facilitated when more attention is drawn to a nonhuman-like agent

Strategy changes after errors improve performance

The observation that performance does not improve following errors contradicts the traditional view on error monitoring (Fiehler et al., 2005; Núñez Castellar et al., 2010; Notebaert and Verguts, 2011). However, recent findings suggest that typical laboratory tasks provided us with a narrow window on error monitoring (Jentzsch and Dudschig, 2009; Desmet et al.,2012). In this study we investigated strategy-use after errors in a mental arithmetic task. In line with our hypothesis, this more complex task did show increased performance after errors. More specifically, switching to a different strategy after an error resulted in improved performance, while repeating the same strategy resulted in worse performance. These results show that in more ecological valid tasks, post-error behavioural improvement can be observed

Pupillary contagion is independent of the emotional expression of the face

The concept of pupillary contagion refers to the automatic imitation of observed pupil size and reflects shared autonomic arousal. Previous studies linked the experience of sadness to changes in pupil size. Accordingly, Harrison, Singer, Rotshtein, Dolan and Critchley found evidence for pupillary contagion when the observed face expresses sadness, but not for neutral, happy or angry expressions [Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 1(1), 5–17. (2006)]. However, differences in eye movements might have influenced previous results. Furthermore, the relatively small sample size of the study merits additional replication. In the current study, we modified the previous experimental design (Harrison et al., 2006) by requiring high attention towards the eye region of the face, which minimized differences in eye movements between facial expressions. In doing so, we demonstrate that the degree of pupillary contagion is independent of the observed emotional expression. Instead, pupil size and emotional expression of the model independently contribute to the observer’s pupil size. The role of pupillary contagion for social communication is discussed