Unamuno, Descartes y la hipótesis del sueño

In this article is analysed both the epistemological use that Descartes did of the so-call “the hypothesis of the dream” and the metaphysical and existential treatment that Unamuno gave to this problem. Both approaches are presented as variants of the metaphysical realism, being the conclusion that nothing in a philosophical sense can be said to prove its falshood, although yes a lot to advocate its abandonment.En este artículo se analiza tanto el uso epistemológico que hiciera Descartes de la llamada “hipótesis del sueño” como el tratamiento metafísico y existencial que Unamuno dio a este problema. Ambas aproximaciones son presentadas como variantes del realismo metafísico, siendo la conclusión que nada filosófico puede ser dicho para demostrar su falsedad, aunque sí mucho para propugnar su abandono

A Rodrigues-type formula for Gegenbauer matrix polynomials

This paper centers on the derivation of a Rodrigues-type formula for the Gegenbauer matrix polynomial. A connection between Gegenbauer and Jacobi matrix polynomials is givenThis research has been supported by the Universitat Politecnica de Valencia under grant PAID-06-11-2020.Defez Candel, E. (2013). A Rodrigues-type formula for Gegenbauer matrix polynomials. Applied Mathematics Letters. 26:899-903. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aml.2013.04.001S8999032

La impureza de la filosofía

The main purpose of this article is to revise the question of whether or not philosophical truths exist and if so, what is their status, what makes them specific and sets them apart from other truths. Following an analysis of the two tendencies that appear as answers to this question, characterized by the thoughts of Hegel and Schopenhauer, the author argues that there are no philosophical truths and furthermore, claims that philosophy is an impure activity, which cannot be reconciled the empirical and formal disciplines. Thus, the paper concludes that philosophy should not be a servant of any other discipline or activity.El presente artículo supone una revisión de la pregunta de si hay o no verdades filosóficas y, de haberlas, en qué consisten, qué las hace específicas, distintas a otras verdades. Tras un análisis de las dos tendencias que se presentan como respuesta a tal pregunta, caracterizadas por los pensamientos de Hegel y Schopenhauer el autor afirma y argumenta que no hay verdades filosóficas y además que la filosofías es una actividad impura irreductible a las disciplinas empíricas y formales. Por tanto, concluye el autor que la filosofía no debe ser tampoco la servidora de ninguna otra disciplina o actividad

Ortega and Wittgenstein: Not so far

En este artículo se pretende analizar hasta qué punto las filosofías de Ortega y Wittgenstein compartirían un horizonte filosófico común. En este sentido se presentan, aunque con matices distintos, los siguientes elementos comunes: el rechazo del realismo metafísico y el cientismo, el abandono de la concepción sustancialista del sujeto, la irrupción en la discusión filosófica del significado o el sentido como algo que necesita comprensión o aclaración, la urgencia de solucionar el problema de la autenticidad.This article aims to analyze to what extent the philosophies of Ortega and Wittgenstein share a common philosophical horizon. In this sense we note, although with different nuances, the following common elements: the rejection of metaphysical realism and scientism, the abandonment of the substantialist conception of the subject, the emergence in philosophical discussion of meaning or sense as something that needs understanding or clarification, the urgency of solving the problem of authenticity

Filosofía y silencio en Wittgenstein

In this paper is analysed the meaning of philosophy of Wittgenstein and the role played in it by the silence and the ethic and existential attitude proposed by this author. In this sense, it pays a special attention to the way in which Wittgenstein thought the social and cultural traits of his times, particularly the idea of progress.En este artículo se analiza el sentido de la filosofía de Wittgenstein y el papel que en ella juegan el silencio y la actitud ético-existencial que éste autor propone. En este sentido, se presta una especial atención a la manera como Wittgenstein pensó las características sociales y culturales de la época en que vivió, especialmente la idea de progreso

An approach to Wittgenstein’s antirealism

This article intends to analyze, in general, the romantic roots of Wittgenstein thought and, specifically, what could have been the position of Wittgenstein, especially the second Wittgenstein, on the philosophical problem of the language-reality relationship. No doubt it is a bold exercise, since Wittgenstein did not openly deal with this question, and would have considered it nonsense. However, its elucidation- the idea that Wittgenstein was committed to antirealism- seems to make his conception of language more understandable, and in particular how private languages would not be possible

The Problem of Animals in Ortega and Wittgenstein

This paper is devoted to analyse the problem of animals in Ortega y Gasset and the mature Wittgenstein philosophies. The main conclusion is we should prefer the approach of Wittgenstein because it affords a discontinuous continuity picture -a degree continuity- between animals and human beings that explains better our epistemic and moral attributions to animals