Bundling, tying and collusion

Tying a good produced monopolistically with a complementary good produced in an oligopolistic market in which there is room for collusion can be profitable if some buyers of the oligopoly good have no demand for the monopoly good. The reason is that a tie makes part of the demand in the oligopolistic market out of the reach of the tying firm's rivals, which decreases the profitability of deviating from a collusive agreement. Tying may thus facilitate collusion. It may also allow the tying firm to alter market share allocation in the collusive oligopolistic market.bundling ; tying ; collusion

Exclusive contracts and demand foreclosure

A firm may decide to have some of its customers sign exclusive contracts in order to deprive a rival of the minimum viable size, exclude it from the market, and enjoy increased market power. If contracts are required to be simple enough, this strategy may induce inefficient exclusion even if the excluded firm is present at the contracting stage. Exclusive contracts may thus cause inefficient eviction, not only entry-deterrence, even though the former is less likely than the latter. However, complex enough contracts, if feasible, would allow agents to reach a Pareto-optimum, without inefficient exclusion.exclusive dealing ; foreclosure ; exclusionary strategies

Frank TRENTMANN, Free Trade Nation. Commerce, Consumption and Civil Society in Modern Britain

Entre 1860 et 1931, la Grande-Bretagne fut le pays du libre-échange absolu, puisqu’elle ne soumettait les produits importés à aucun droit de douane, sans exiger la réciprocité. De nombreux historiens ont étudié la genèse du libre-échangisme britannique, et en particulier les activités de l’Anti-Corn Law League qui aboutirent en 1846 à la suppression des droits sur les céréales. Après les années 1840, la question du protectionnisme revint au centre du débat politique britannique au début du XX..

Exclusive contracts and demand foreclosure

A firm may decide to have some of its customers sign exclusive contracts in order to deprive a rival of the minimum viable size, exclude it from the market, and enjoy increased market power. If contracts are required to be simple enough, this strategy may induce inefficient exclusion even if the excluded firm is present at the contracting stage. Exclusive contracts may thus cause inefficient eviction, not only entry-deterrence, even though the former is less likely than the latter. However, complex enough contracts, if feasible, would allow agents to reach a Pareto-optimum, without inefficient exclusion.Une entreprise peut inciter certains de ses clients à signer des contrats exclusifs pour priver un concurrent de la taille minimale viable, l'exclure, et augmenter son pouvoir de marché. Si seuls des contrats simples sont possibles, cette stratégie peut conduire à l'exclusion inefficace de concurrents, même si ceux-ci sont déjà présents lorsque les contrats sont proposés. Les contrats exclusifs peuvent donc servir à évincer des concurrents et pas seulement à dissuader des entrants potentiels, bien que la dissuasion d'entrée soit plus probable que l'éviction. Cependant, la possibilité de proposer des contrats suffisamment complexes permettrait aux agents d'atteindre un optimum, sans exclusion inefficace

Hospital fall prevention: a systematic review of implementation, components, adherence, and effectiveness.

ObjectivesTo systematically document the implementation, components, comparators, adherence, and effectiveness of published fall prevention approaches in U.S. acute care hospitals.DesignSystematic review. Studies were identified through existing reviews, searching five electronic databases, screening reference lists, and contacting topic experts for studies published through August 2011.SettingU.S. acute care hospitals.ParticipantsStudies reporting in-hospital falls for intervention groups and concurrent (e.g., controlled trials) or historic comparators (e.g., before-after studies).InterventionFall prevention interventions.MeasurementsIncidence rate ratios (IRR, ratio of fall rate postintervention or treatment group to the fall rate preintervention or control group) and ratings of study details.ResultsFifty-nine studies met inclusion criteria. Implementation strategies were sparsely documented (17% not at all) and included staff education, establishing committees, seeking leadership support, and occasionally continuous quality improvement techniques. Most interventions (81%) included multiple components (e.g., risk assessments (often not validated), visual risk alerts, patient education, care rounds, bed-exit alarms, and postfall evaluations). Fifty-four percent did not report on fall prevention measures applied in the comparison group, and 39% neither reported fidelity data nor described adherence strategies such as regular audits and feedback to ensure completion of care processes. Only 45% of concurrent and 15% of historic control studies reported sufficient data to compare fall rates. The pooled postintervention incidence rate ratio (IRR) was 0.77 (95% confidence interval = 0.52-1.12, P = .17; eight studies; I(2) : 94%). Meta-regressions showed no systematic association between implementation intensity, intervention complexity, comparator information, or adherence levels and IRR.ConclusionPromising approaches exist, but better reporting of outcomes, implementation, adherence, intervention components, and comparison group information is necessary to establish evidence on how hospitals can successfully prevent falls

The Dynamic Organization of the Perinucleolar Compartment in the Cell Nucleus

The perinucleolar compartment (PNC) is a unique nuclear structure preferentially localized at the periphery of the nucleolus. Several small RNAs transcribed by RNA polymerase III (e.g., the Y RNAs, MRP RNA, and RNase P H1 RNA) and the polypyrimidine tract binding protein (PTB; hnRNP I) have thus far been identified in the PNC (Ghetti, A., S. PinolRoma, W.M. Michael, C. Morandi, and G. Dreyfuss. 1992. Nucleic Acids Res. 20:3671–3678; Matera, A.G., M.R. Frey, K. Margelot, and S.L. Wolin. 1995. J. Cell Biol. 129:1181–1193; Lee, B., A.G. Matera, D.C. Ward, and J. Craft. 1996. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA. 93: 11471–11476). In this report, we have further characterized this structure in both fixed and living cells. Detection of the PNC in a large number of human cancer and normal cells showed that PNCs are much more prevalent in cancer cells. Analysis through the cell cycle using immunolabeling with a monoclonal antibody, SH54, specifically recognizing PTB, demonstrated that the PNC dissociates at the beginning of mitosis and reforms at late telophase in the daughter nuclei. To visualize the PNC in living cells, a fusion protein between PTB and green fluorescent protein (GFP) was generated. Time lapse studies revealed that the size and shape of the PNC is dynamic over time. In addition, electron microscopic examination in optimally fixed cells revealed that the PNC is composed of multiple strands, each measuring ∼80–180 nm diam. Some of the strands are in direct contact with the surface of the nucleolus. Furthermore, analysis of the sequence requirement for targeting PTB to the PNC using a series of deletion mutants of the GFP–PTB fusion protein showed that at least three RRMs at either the COOH or NH2 terminus are required for the fusion protein to be targeted to the PNC. This finding suggests that RNA binding may be necessary for PTB to be localized in the PNC

Private Sector Metrics Contributions to Social Change: Customer Satisfaction Meets Agriculture Development

The ambitious current wave of agriculture development projects – public, private and public?private – expressly profess to break with 60 years of underperformance in support for smallholder agriculture in Africa and South Asia. These projects share with their discredited predecessors a supply?side approach that seeks to introduce something exogenous to improve agriculture outcomes. The introduced factors vary, including improved seeds to fertilisers to pest control and resource management to other agronomic techniques to supply chain efficiencies, improved production technologies, to better market access. The list goes on, driven by the technological ingenuity and commitment of highly educated agriculture specialists from the Global North. This article argues that these bold supply?side efforts run the risk of badly underperforming or even failing unless they build in real accountability to the intended beneficiaries – smallholder farmers – through systematic feedback loops. The argument draws from the business management canon of customer satisfaction