Breeding site traits of European newts (Triturus macedonicus, Lissotriton vulgaris, and Mesotriton alpestris: Salamandridae) in the Montenegrin karst region

We recorded the occurrence of three European newt species - the smooth newt (Lissotriton vulgaris), the eastern alpine crested newt (Triturus macedonicus), and the alpine newt (Mesotriton alpestris) - in the Montenegrin karst, as well as their breeding site characteristics. In terms of long-lasting breeding site numbers and occupation rate, the most common species is the smooth newt, followed by the alpine newt and the crested newt. The examined water bodies with­out newts showed no significant differences of aquatic habitat characteristics compared to water bodies with newts. The factors that explained most of the observed variation in newt breeding site traits were the habitat category and habitat origin. The alpine newt primarily inhabits natural lakes, while the crested newt inhabits artificial breeding sites such as lithotelma and ubao. The smooth newt is less choosy and occurs in different types of natural and artificial habitats. The aquatic requirements of Montenegrin newt species do not differ substantially in many respects from requirements of the core species range populations.Istraživano je prisustvo tri vrste evropskih mrmoljaka u crnogorskom karstu, malog (Lissotriton vulgaris), istočnog glavatog (Triturus macedonicus) i planinskog mrmoljka (Mesotriton alpestris), kao i karakteristike njihovih reproduktivnih staništa. U pogledu broja reproduktivnih staništa, mali mrmoljak je najčešća vrsta, zatim sledi planinski i na kraju istočni glavati mrmoljak. Istraživana vodena staništa bez mrmoljaka nisu pokazala značajne razlike u karakteristikama u poređenju sa vodenim staništima sa mrmoljcima. Faktori koji najbolje objašnjavaju uočenu varijabilnost karakteristika reproduktivnih staništa mrmoljaka su tip i poreklo staništa. Planinski mrmoljak primarno naseljava jezera prirodnog porekla, dok istočni glavati mrmoljak naseljava antropogena staništa (najčešće kamenice i ublove). Mali mrmoljak naseljava različite tipove staništa prirodnog ili antropogenog porekla. Osobine reproduktivnih staništa mrmoljaka Crne Gore ne razlikuju se umnogome od osobina reproduktivnih staništa populacija iz centra areala ovih vrsta.Projekat ministarstva br. 14305

On the Asymptotic Distortion Behavior of the Distributed Karhunen-Loève Transform

All rights reserved.Investigation of sexual dimorphism patterns give us insight in how organisms adapt to fulfill their roles (reproductive, ecological, social) and enhance fitness. We examined sexual size and shape dimorphism in traits related to locomotion of nine anuran species from Serbia and Montenegro (Hyla arborea, Bombina variegata, Bufotes viridis, Rana temporaria, R. graeca, R. dalmatina, Pelophylax kl. esculentus, Pelobates fuscus and P. syriacus). Sexual size dimorphism in studied species ranges from female and male-biased, to absence of dimorphism. Sexual shape dimorphism was most pronounced in the forelimbs while the differences were small or did not exist in the hindlimbs and sacral traits. Males of most species were characterized by longer proximal parts (humerus and radioulna) and shorter distal forelimb parts, while the opposite pattern was observed in females. Also, some cases of significant intersexual shape differences are size-dependent. This indicates that these male traits are under stronger selective pressures to increase relative to body size, which may allow them to outcompete other males. Different types of behaviour can indirectly shape the limb morphology and lead to differences between the sexes. More data on the ecology and natural history of these animals are needed to explore the factors underlying the observed sex differences.Folia Zoologica (2017), 66(1): 11-2

If cooperation is likely punish mildly: Insights from economic experiments based on the snowdrift game

Punishment may deter antisocial behavior. Yet to punish is costly, and the costs often do not offset the gains that are due to elevated levels of cooperation. However, the effectiveness of punishment depends not only on how costly it is, but also on the circumstances defining the social dilemma. Using the snowdrift game as the basis, we have conducted a series of economic experiments to determine whether severe punishment is more effective than mild punishment. We have observed that severe punishment is not necessarily more effective, even if the cost of punishment is identical in both cases. The benefits of severe punishment become evident only under extremely adverse conditions, when to cooperate is highly improbable in the absence of sanctions. If cooperation is likely, mild punishment is not less effective and leads to higher average payoffs, and is thus the much preferred alternative. Presented results suggest that the positive effects of punishment stem not only from imposed fines, but may also have a psychological background. Small fines can do wonders in motivating us to chose cooperation over defection, but without the paralyzing effect that may be brought about by large fines. The later should be utilized only when absolutely necessary.Comment: 15 pages, 6 figures; accepted for publication in PLoS ON

Structural power and the evolution of collective fairness in social networks

From work contracts and group buying platforms to political coalitions and international climate and economical summits, often individuals assemble in groups that must collectively reach decisions that may favor each part unequally. Here we quantify to which extent our network ties promote the evolution of collective fairness in group interactions, modeled by means of Multiplayer Ultimatum Games (MUG). We show that a single topological feature of social networks-which we call structural power-has a profound impact on the tendency of individuals to take decisions that favor each part equally. Increased fair outcomes are attained whenever structural power is high, such that the networks that tie individuals allow them to meet the same partners in different groups, thus providing the opportunity to strongly influence each other. On the other hand, the absence of such close peer-influence relationships dismisses any positive effect created by the network. Interestingly, we show that increasing the structural power of a network leads to the appearance of well-defined modules-as found in human social networks that often exhibit community structure-providing an interaction environment that maximizes collective fairness.This research was supported by Fundacao para a Ciencia e Tecnologia (FCT) through grants SFRH/BD/94736/2013, PTDC/EEI-SII/5081/2014, PTDC/MAT/STA/3358/2014 and by multi-annual funding of CBMA and INESC-ID (under the projects UID/BIA/04050/2013 and UID/CEC/50021/2013) provided by FCT. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

Adaptive and Bounded Investment Returns Promote Cooperation in Spatial Public Goods Games

The public goods game is one of the most famous models for studying the evolution of cooperation in sizable groups. The multiplication factor in this game can characterize the investment return from the public good, which may be variable depending on the interactive environment in realistic situations. Instead of using the same universal value, here we consider that the multiplication factor in each group is updated based on the differences between the local and global interactive environments in the spatial public goods game, but meanwhile limited to within a certain range. We find that the adaptive and bounded investment returns can significantly promote cooperation. In particular, full cooperation can be achieved for high feedback strength when appropriate limitation is set for the investment return. Also, we show that the fraction of cooperators in the whole population can become larger if the lower and upper limits of the multiplication factor are increased. Furthermore, in comparison to the traditionally spatial public goods game where the multiplication factor in each group is identical and fixed, we find that cooperation can be better promoted if the multiplication factor is constrained to adjust between one and the group size in our model. Our results highlight the importance of the locally adaptive and bounded investment returns for the emergence and dominance of cooperative behavior in structured populations

Experimental and Kinetic Modeling Studies on the Conversion of Sucrose to Levulinic Acid and 5-Hydroxymethylfurfural Using Sulfuric Acid in Water

We here report experimental and kinetic modeling studies on the conversion of sucrose to levulinic acid (LA) and 5-hydroxymethylfurfural (HMF) in water using sulfuric acid as the catalyst. Both compounds are versatile building blocks for the synthesis of various biobased (bulk) chemicals. A total of 24 experiments were performed in a temperature window of 80–180 °C, a sulfuric acid concentration between 0.005 and 0.5 M, and an initial sucrose concentration between 0.05 and 0.5 M. Glucose, fructose, and HMF were detected as the intermediate products. The maximum LA yield was 61 mol %, obtained at 160 °C, an initial sucrose concentration of 0.05 M, and an acid concentration of 0.2 M. The maximum HMF yield (22 mol %) was found for an acid concentration of 0.05 M, an initial sucrose concentration of 0.05 M, and a temperature of 140 °C. The experimental data were modeled using a number of possible reaction networks. The best model was obtained when using a first order approach in substrates (except for the reversion of glucose) and agreement between experiment and model was satisfactorily. The implication of the model regarding batch optimization is also discussed

Social Closure and the Evolution of Cooperation via Indirect Reciprocity

Direct and indirect reciprocity are good candidates to explain the fundamental problem of evolution of cooperation. We explore the conditions under which different types of reciprocity gain dominance and their performances in sustaining cooperation in the PD played on simple networks. We confirm that direct reciprocity gains dominance over indirect reciprocity strategies also in larger populations, as long as it has no memory constraints. In the absence of direct reciprocity, or when its memory is flawed, different forms of indirect reciprocity strategies are able to dominate and to support cooperation. We show that indirect reciprocity relying on social capital inherent in closed triads is the best competitor among them, outperforming indirect reciprocity that uses information from any source. Results hold in a wide range of conditions with different evolutionary update rules, extent of evolutionary pressure, initial conditions, population size, and density

From Local to Global Dilemmas in Social Networks

Social networks affect in such a fundamental way the dynamics of the population they support that the global, population-wide behavior that one observes often bears no relation to the individual processes it stems from. Up to now, linking the global networked dynamics to such individual mechanisms has remained elusive. Here we study the evolution of cooperation in networked populations and let individuals interact via a 2-person Prisoner's Dilemma – a characteristic defection dominant social dilemma of cooperation. We show how homogeneous networks transform a Prisoner's Dilemma into a population-wide evolutionary dynamics that promotes the coexistence between cooperators and defectors, while heterogeneous networks promote their coordination. To this end, we define a dynamic variable that allows us to track the self-organization of cooperators when co-evolving with defectors in networked populations. Using the same variable, we show how the global dynamics — and effective dilemma — co-evolves with the motifs of cooperators in the population, the overall emergence of cooperation depending sensitively on this co-evolution