Leibniz algebroids, twistings and exceptional generalized geometry

We investigate a class of Leibniz algebroids which are invariant under diffeomorphisms and symmetries involving collections of closed forms. Under appropriate assumptions we arrive at a classification which in particular gives a construction starting from graded Lie algebras. In this case the Leibniz bracket is a derived bracket and there are higher derived brackets resulting in an $L_\infty$-structure. The algebroids can be twisted by a non-abelian cohomology class and we prove that the twisting class is described by a Maurer-Cartan equation. For compact manifolds we construct a Kuranishi moduli space of this equation which is shown to be affine algebraic. We explain how these results are related to exceptional generalized geometry.Comment: 58 page

Impact of system factors on the water saving efficiency of household grey water recycling

Copyright © 2010 Taylor & Francis. This is an Author's Accepted Manuscript of an article published in Desalination and Water Treatment Volume 24, Issue 1-3 (2010), available online at: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.5004/dwt.2010.1542A general concern when considering the implementation of domestic grey water recycling is to understand the impacts of system factors on water saving efficiency. Key factors include household occupancy, storage volumes, treatment capacity and operating mode. Earlier investigations of the impacts of these key factors were based on a one-tank system only. This paper presents the results of an investigation into the effect of these factors on the performance of a more realistic ‘two tank’ system with treatment using an object based household water cycle model. A Monte-Carlo simulation technique was adopted to generate domestic water appliance usage data which allows long-term prediction of the system's performance to be made. Model results reveal the constraints of treatment capacity, storage tank sizes and operating mode on percentage of potable water saved. A treatment capacity threshold has been discovered at which water saving efficiency is maximised for a given pair of grey and treated grey water tank. Results from the analysis suggest that the previous one-tank model significantly underestimates the tank volumes required for a given target water saving efficiency

The stable free rank of symmetry of products of spheres

A well known conjecture in the theory of transformation groups states that if p is a prime and (Z/p)^r acts freely on a product of k spheres, then r is less than or equal to k. We prove this assertion if p is large compared to the dimension of the product of spheres. The argument builds on tame homotopy theory for non simply connected spaces.Comment: 30 pages; improved exposition, some details adde

Generosity Pays in the Presence of Direct Reciprocity: A Comprehensive Study of 2×2 Repeated Games

By applying a technique previously developed to study ecosystem assembly [Capitán et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 103, 168101 (2009)] we study the evolutionary stable strategies of iterated 22 games. We focus on memory-one strategies, whose probability to play a given action depends on the actions of both players in the previous time step. We find the asymptotically stable populations resulting from all possible invasions of any known stable population. The results of this invasion process are interpreted as transitions between different populations that occur with a certain probability. Thus the whole process can be described as a Markov chain whose states are the different stable populations. With this approach we are able to study the whole space of symmetric 22 games, characterizing the most probable results of evolution for the different classes of games. Our analysis includes quasi-stationary mixed equilibria that are relevant as very long-lived metastable states and is compared to the predictions of a fixation probability analysis. We confirm earlier results on the success of the Pavlov strategy in a wide range of parameters for the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, but find that as the temptation to defect grows there are many other possible successful strategies. Other regions of the diagram reflect the equilibria structure of the underlying one-shot game, albeit often some non-expected strategies arise as well. We thus provide a thorough analysis of iterated 22 games from which we are able to extract some general conclusions. Our most relevant finding is that a great deal of the payoff parameter range can still be understood by focusing on win-stay, lose-shift strategies, and that very ambitious ones, aspiring to obtaining always a high payoff, are never evolutionary stable

Computing with Pavlovian Populations ⋆

Abstract. Population protocols have been introduced by Angluin et al. as a model of networks consisting of very limited mobile agents that interact in pairs but with no control over their own movement. A collection of anonymous agents, modeled by finite automata, interact pairwise according to some rules that update their states. Predicates on the initial configurations that can be computed by such protocols have been characterized as semi-linear predicates. In an orthogonal way, several distributed systems have been termed in literature as being realizations of games in the sense of game theory. We investigate under which conditions population protocols, or more generally pairwise interaction rules, correspond to games. We show that restricting to asymetric games is not really a restriction: all predicates computable by protocols can actually be computed by protocols corresponding to games, i.e. any semi-linear predicate can be computed by a Pavlovian population multi-protocol.

Evolutionary cycles of cooperation and defection

The main obstacle for the evolution of cooperation is that natural selection favors defection in most settings. In the repeated prisoner's dilemma, two individuals interact several times, and, in each round, they have a choice between cooperation and defection. We analyze the evolutionary dynamics of three simple strategies for the repeated prisoner's dilemma: always defect (ALLD), always cooperate (ALLC), and tit-for-tat (TFT). We study mutation–selection dynamics in finite populations. Despite ALLD being the only strict Nash equilibrium, we observe evolutionary oscillations among all three strategies. The population cycles from ALLD to TFT to ALLC and back to ALLD. Most surprisingly, the time average of these oscillations can be entirely concentrated on TFT. In contrast to the classical expectation, which is informed by deterministic evolutionary game theory of infinitely large populations, stochastic evolution of finite populations need not choose the strict Nash equilibrium and can therefore favor cooperation over defection