46 research outputs found
Competition in Health Care Markets and Vertical Restraints
This paper studies competition between Managed Care Organizations (MCOs) and “Conventional Insurers”. Most of the time, MCOs sign exclusive contracts with providers and these vertical restrictions associated to differentiation in the providers'market imply a risk segmentation. Taking into account this phenomenon, we show that vertical restrictions in the health insurance sector can paradoxically create an “anti-raise rivals cost effect” in which MCOs. penetration allows to decrease conventional insurers premiums.VERTICAL RESTRAINTS; MANAGED CARE; COMPETITION POLICY.
Probing the role of atomic defects in photocatalytic systems through photoinduced enhanced raman scattering
Even in ultralow quantities, oxygen vacancies (VO) drastically impact key properties of metal oxide semiconductors, such as charge transport, surface adsorption, and reactivity, playing central roles in functional materials performance. Current methods used to investigate VO often rely on specialized instrumentation under far from ideal reaction conditions. Hence, the influence of VO generated in situ during catalytic processes has yet to be probed. In this work, we assess in situ extrinsic surface VO formation and lifetime under photocatalytic conditions which we compare to photocatalytic performance. We show for the first time that lifetimes of in situ generated atomic VO play more significant roles in catalysis than their concentration, with strong correlations between longer-lived VO and higher photocatalytic activity. Our results indicate that enhanced photocatalytic efficiency correlates with goldilocks VO concentrations, where VO densities must be just right to encourage carrier transport while avoiding charge carrier trapping
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Compulsory licensing and access to drugs
Compulsory licensing allows the use of a patented invention without the owner's consent, with the aim of improving access to essential drugs. The pharmaceutical sector argues that, if broadly used, it can be detrimental to innovation. We model the interaction between a company in the North that holds the patent for a certain drug and a government in the South that needs to purchase it. We show that both access to drugs and pharmaceutical innovation depend largely on the Southern country's ability to manufacture a generic version. If the manufacturing cost is too high, compulsory licensing is not exercised. As the cost decreases, it becomes a credible threat forcing prices down, but reducing both access and innovation. When the cost is low enough, the South produces its own generic version and access reaches its highest value, despite a reduction in innovation. The global welfare analysis shows that the overall impact of compulsory licensing can be positive, even when accounting for its impact on innovation. We also consider the interaction between compulsory licensing and the strength of intellectual property rights, which can have global repercussions in other markets beyond the South
Nursing Homes’ Competition and Distributional Implications when the Market is Two-Sided
We investigate the effect of competition in the nursing homes sector with a two-sided market approach. More precisely, we investigate the distributional implications across the three key actors involved (residents, nurses and nursing homes) that arise from the two-sidedness of the market. Within a Hotelling set up, nursing homes compete for residents and for nurses, who provide quality to residents, by setting residents price and nurses wage. Nurses are assumed altruistic and therefore motivated to provide quality. The market is two-sided because: i) a higher number of residents affects nurses workload, which affects their willingness to provide labour supply; and ii) a higher number of nurses affects residents quality through a better matching process and by relaxing nurses time constraints. Our key findings are that i) the two-sidedness of the market leads to higher wages for nurses, which makes the nurses better off; ii) this is then passed to residents in the form of higher prices, which makes residents worse off; iii) nursing homes profits are instead unaffected. In contrast, when nurses wages are regulated, the two-sidedness of the market implies a transfer between residents and nursing homes. When residents price are regulated, it implies a transfer between nurses and nursing homes. These results are robust to institutional settings which employ pay-for-performance schemes (that reward either nursing homes or nurses): the two-sidedness of the market is strengthened and residents are still worse off
Retail price regulation and innovation: Reference pricing in the pharmaceutical industry
Our paper is a first attempt to evaluate the long run impact of reference pricing on pharmaceutical innovation, health and expenditures. The model is based on a dynamic game involving three types of agents: pharmaceutical firms, consumers and a regulatory entity. Pharmaceutical firms choose the level of research investment and its innovative content, then negotiate introductory prices for new drugs with the regulator. Reference pricing affects negatively the intensity of research and it also modifies the types of innovations that are brought to the market, deterring small innovations. The model is calibrated with a small data on statins in France. Our results suggest that reference pricing typically generates a decline in health, whereas discounted expenditures may decrease or increase, depending on the degree of deterrence of cost reducing innovations. © 2009 Elsevier B.V
Retail price regulation and innovation: Reference pricing in the pharmaceutical industry
Our paper is a first attempt to evaluate the long run impact of reference pricing on pharmaceutical innovation, health and expenditures. The model is based on a dynamic game involving three types of agents: pharmaceutical firms, consumers and a regulatory entity. Pharmaceutical firms choose the level of research investment and its innovative content, then negotiate introductory prices for new drugs with the regulator. Reference pricing affects negatively the intensity of research and it also modifies the types of innovations that are brought to the market, deterring small innovations. The model is calibrated with a small data on statins in France. Our results suggest that reference pricing typically generates a decline in health, whereas discounted expenditures may decrease or increase, depending on the degree of deterrence of cost reducing innovations. © 2009 Elsevier B.V
The regulation of health care providers' payments when horizontal and vertical differentiation matter
This paper analyzes the regulation of payment schemes for health care providers competing in both quality and product differentiation of their services. The regulator uses two instruments: a prospective payment per patient and a cost reimbursement rate. When the regulator can only use a prospective payment, the optimal price involves a trade-off between the level of quality provision and the level of horizontal differentiation. If this pure prospective payment leads to underprovision of quality and overdifferentiation, a mixed reimbursement scheme allows the regulator to improve the allocation efficiency. This is true for a relatively low level of patients' transportation costs. We also show that if the regulator cannot commit to the level of the cost reimbursement rate, the resulting allocation can dominate the one with full commitment. This occurs when the transportation cost is low or high enough, and the full commitment solution either implies full or zero cost reimbursement. © 2012 Elsevier B.V
The regulation of health care providers' payments when horizontal and vertical differentiation matter
This paper analyzes the regulation of payment schemes for health care providers competing in both quality and product differentiation of their services. The regulator uses two instruments: a prospective payment per patient and a cost reimbursement rate. When the regulator can only use a prospective payment, the optimal price involves a trade-off between the level of quality provision and the level of horizontal differentiation. If this pure prospective payment leads to underprovision of quality and overdifferentiation, a mixed reimbursement scheme allows the regulator to improve the allocation efficiency. This is true for a relatively low level of patients' transportation costs. We also show that if the regulator cannot commit to the level of the cost reimbursement rate, the resulting allocation can dominate the one with full commitment. This occurs when the transportation cost is low or high enough, and the full commitment solution either implies full or zero cost reimbursement. © 2012 Elsevier B.V
Retail price regulation and innovation: Reference pricing in the pharmaceutical industry
Our paper is a first attempt to evaluate the long run impact of reference pricing on pharmaceutical innovation, health and expenditures. The model is based on a dynamic game involving three types of agents: pharmaceutical firms, consumers and a regulatory entity. Pharmaceutical firms choose the level of research investment and its innovative content, then negotiate introductory prices for new drugs with the regulator. Reference pricing affects negatively the intensity of research and it also modifies the types of innovations that are brought to the market, deterring small innovations. The model is calibrated with a small data on statins in France. Our results suggest that reference pricing typically generates a decline in health, whereas discounted expenditures may decrease or increase, depending on the degree of deterrence of cost reducing innovations.Innovation Me-too Reference pricing Pharmaceutical laboratories