STATISTICAL INFERENCE FOR GEOMETRIC PROCESS WITH THE GENERALIZED RAYLEIGH DISTRIBUTION

In the present paper, statistical inference problem is considered for the geometric process (GP) by assuming the distribution of the first arrival time is generalized Rayleigh with the parameters $\alpha$ and $\lambda$. We use the maximum likelihood method for obtaining the ratio parameter of the GP and distributional parameters of the generalized Rayleigh distribution. By a series of Monte-Carlo simulations evaluated through the different samples of sizes small, moderate and large, we also compare the estimation performances of the maximum likelihood estimators with the other estimators available in the literature such as modified moment, modified L-moment, and modified least squares. Furthermore, we present two real-life dataset analyzes to show the modeling behavior of GP with generalized Rayleigh distribution

Flows and Decompositions of Games: Harmonic and Potential Games

In this paper we introduce a novel flow representation for finite games in strategic form. This representation allows us to develop a canonical direct sum decomposition of an arbitrary game into three components, which we refer to as the potential, harmonic and nonstrategic components. We analyze natural classes of games that are induced by this decomposition, and in particular, focus on games with no harmonic component and games with no potential component. We show that the first class corresponds to the well-known potential games. We refer to the second class of games as harmonic games, and study the structural and equilibrium properties of this new class of games. Intuitively, the potential component of a game captures interactions that can equivalently be represented as a common interest game, while the harmonic part represents the conflicts between the interests of the players. We make this intuition precise, by studying the properties of these two classes, and show that indeed they have quite distinct and remarkable characteristics. For instance, while finite potential games always have pure Nash equilibria, harmonic games generically never do. Moreover, we show that the nonstrategic component does not affect the equilibria of a game, but plays a fundamental role in their efficiency properties, thus decoupling the location of equilibria and their payoff-related properties. Exploiting the properties of the decomposition framework, we obtain explicit expressions for the projections of games onto the subspaces of potential and harmonic games. This enables an extension of the properties of potential and harmonic games to "nearby" games. We exemplify this point by showing that the set of approximate equilibria of an arbitrary game can be characterized through the equilibria of its projection onto the set of potential games

Separable and Low-Rank Continuous Games

In this paper, we study nonzero-sum separable games, which are continuous games whose payoffs take a sum-of-products form. Included in this subclass are all finite games and polynomial games. We investigate the structure of equilibria in separable games. We show that these games admit finitely supported Nash equilibria. Motivated by the bounds on the supports of mixed equilibria in two-player finite games in terms of the ranks of the payoff matrices, we define the notion of the rank of an n-player continuous game and use this to provide bounds on the cardinality of the support of equilibrium strategies. We present a general characterization theorem that states that a continuous game has finite rank if and only if it is separable. Using our rank results, we present an efficient algorithm for computing approximate equilibria of two-player separable games with fixed strategy spaces in time polynomial in the rank of the game

Structure of Extreme Correlated Equilibria: a Zero-Sum Example and its Implications

We exhibit the rich structure of the set of correlated equilibria by analyzing the simplest of polynomial games: the mixed extension of matching pennies. We show that while the correlated equilibrium set is convex and compact, the structure of its extreme points can be quite complicated. In finite games the ratio of extreme correlated to extreme Nash equilibria can be greater than exponential in the size of the strategy spaces. In polynomial games there can exist extreme correlated equilibria which are not finitely supported; we construct a large family of examples using techniques from ergodic theory. We show that in general the set of correlated equilibrium distributions of a polynomial game cannot be described by conditions on finitely many moments (means, covariances, etc.), in marked contrast to the set of Nash equilibria which is always expressible in terms of finitely many moments

Correlated Equilibria in Continuous Games: Characterization and Computation

We present several new characterizations of correlated equilibria in games with continuous utility functions. These have the advantage of being more computationally and analytically tractable than the standard definition in terms of departure functions. We use these characterizations to construct effective algorithms for approximating a single correlated equilibrium or the entire set of correlated equilibria of a game with polynomial utility functions.Comment: Games and Economic Behavior, In Press, Accepted Manuscript, Available online 16 April 201

IL-6 mediated JAK/STAT3 signaling pathway in cancer patients with cachexia

CONCLUSION: STAT3 may be considered as a therapeutic target for cachectic patients with gastric, lung and breast cancer. Furthermore, IL-6 mediates STAT3 activation in cachectic gastric and breast cancer patients (Tab. 5, Fig. 2, Ref. 62)

Development and validation of new SSR markers from expressed regions in the garlic genome

Only a limited number of simple sequence repeat (SSR) markers is available for the genome of garlic (Allium sativum L.) despite the fact that SSR markers have become one of the most preferred DNA marker systems. To develop new SSR markers for the garlic genome, garlic expressed sequence tags (ESTs) at the publicly available GarlicEST database were screened for SSR motifs and a total of 132 SSR motifs were identified. Primer pairs were designed for 50 SSR motifs and 24 of these primer pairs were selected as SSR markers based on their consistent amplification patterns and polymorphisms. In addition, two SSR markers were developed from the sequences of garlic cDNA-AFLP fragments. The use of 26 EST-SSR markers for the assessment of genetic relationship was tested using 31 garlic genotypes. Twenty six EST-SSR markers amplified 130 polymorphic DNA fragments and the number of polymorphic alleles per SSR marker ranged from 2 to 13 with an average of 5 alleles. Observed heterozygosity and polymorphism information content (PIC) of the SSR markers were between 0.23 and 0.88, and 0.20 and 0.87, respectively. Twenty one out of the 31 garlic genotypes were analyzed in a previous study using AFLP markers and the garlic genotypes clustered together with AFLP markers were also grouped together with EST-SSR markers demonstrating high concordance between AFLP and EST-SSR marker systems and possible immediate application of EST-SSR markers for fingerprinting of garlic clones. EST-SSR markers could be used in genetic studies such as genetic mapping, association mapping, genetic diversity and comparison of the genomes of Allium species